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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to correctly determine and apply the
appropriate version of the relevant statute of limitations?
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court correctly applied the appropriate
statute of limitations period and whether the discovery rule applies is a legal
question, which is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the trial
court. See Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, Tf 4, 979 P.2d 823; Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT
App 78, % 18, 132 P.3d 63; Russell Packard Development, Inc., v. Carson, 2005
UT 14,1(18, 108P.3d74.
Issue Preserved at: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed February 26, 2001). [Attached hereto as Addendum "1"].
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed May 6, 2003). [Attached hereto as Addendum "2"].
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict
(filed March 10, 2004). [Attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. Motion and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under Rule 50 for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur (filed
March 23, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum "4"]. Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance
with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (filed April 19, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum
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"5"].
Did the trial court err when it submitted questions of law to the jury for
decision in a special verdict?
Standard of Review: The improper submission of a legal question to the jury by a
trial court is a question of law that is reviewed under a correction-of-error
standard. Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co., 62 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1936).
Issue Preserved at: The issue is one of plain error.
Did the trial court err in ruling that the discovery rule extended the period
for Plaintiffs' breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure claims against
Defendants?
Standard of review: Whether the trial court correctly applied the appropriate statute
of limitations period and whether the discovery rule applies is a legal question,
which is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the trial court. See
Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, \ 4, 979 P.2d 823; Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78, \
18, 132 P.3d 63; Russell Packard Development, Inc., v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, \ 18,
108P.3d74.
Issue Preserved at: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (fried February 26, 2001). [Attached hereto as Addendum "1"].
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (fded May 6, 2003). [Attached hereto as Addendum "2"].
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict
(filed March 10, 2004). [Attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. Motion and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under Rule 50 for
2

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur (filed
March 23, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum "4"].
4. Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure
claim against Defendants pursuant to various motions made by Defendants
throughout the course of litigation?
Standard of review: Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question
of law reviewed for correctness. See Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85,
% 10, 100 P.3d 1200. When reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict,
this Court must "review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party moved against, and will
sustain the denial if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground asserted for
directing a verdict. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ^f 12, 82 P.3d 1064,
cert, denied, 541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1716, 158 L.Ed.2d401 (2004) (quotations
and citation omitted).
Issue Preserved at: Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed February 26, 2001). [Attached hereto as Addendum "1"].
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed May 6, 2003). [Attached hereto as Addendum "2"].
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict
(filed March 10, 2004). [Attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. Motion and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under Rule 50 for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur (filed
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March 23, 2005). [Attached hereto as Addendum "4"]. Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance
with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). [Attached hereto as Addendum "5"].
5. Whether the trial court erred in applying the fraud exception to the merger
doctrine?
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness. See Selvage v. J J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d
1252, 1257 (Utah Ct.App. 1996).
Issue Preserved at: This issue will become relevant if this Court reverses and/or
remands this case and if Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants appeal the following Orders and the Special Verdict and Judgment
entered by Judge Donald J. Eyre, Fourth District Court-Millard, Millard County, State of
Utah:
1.

the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
entered on August 16, 2001;

2.

the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
entered on September 29, 2003;

3.

the Special Verdict and Judgment entered on March 10, 2005 for the amount
of $30,680.00 against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs;

4.

the Order denying Defendants' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment Not
Withstanding the Verdict entered on July 6, 2005;

5.

the Order denying Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment
entered on July 19,2005;

6.

and the Order awarding attorneys'fees to Plaintiff entered on August 25,
2005.

As more fully set forth herein, Defendants assert that the trial court erred in failing
to determine and apply the appropriate statue of limitations to Plaintiffs' claims for breach
of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure against Defendants. The trial court further erred
by incorrectly applying the "discovery rule" to extend the statute of limitations period for
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure. The trial court erred
by submitting questions of law related to the statute of limitations period to the jury for
decision. In addition, the trial court failed to apply governing legal precedent to Plaintiffs'
fraudulent nondisclosure claim. Finally, the trial court improperly granted Plaintiffs an
award of attorney's fees and costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs' home ("Home"), which is the subject matter of the litigation, is located
at 155 West 300 South, Filmore City, Millard County, Utah. [R. 442:13-17].1

2.

Defendants built the Home for their residence in 1993 and lived in the Home prior to
selling the Home to Plaintiffs in 1994. [R. 440:32; 442:24].

3.

The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the Fillmore City Building
Inspector, Jack Peterson ("Peterson"), throughout the course of construction. [R.

1. Citations to the trial transcript will be designated by page number followed by a colon
and the line number(s).
5

371:9].
4.

Defendants obtained a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance
("Certificate of Occupancy'') on or about January 28, 1994. [See Certificate of
Occupancy and Zoning Compliance, attached hereto as Addendum "6"].

5.

At the time of final inspection, the ground around the home was so muddy that
finish grading was impossible. [R. 375:20 through 375:25].

6.

Peterson, who conducted the final inspection, and who signed the Certificate of
Occupancy, gave Defendants permission to finish the grading in the spring when
the weather had cleared. [R. 378:16 through 379:8].

7.

An Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("EMSA") was executed between Defendants
and Plaintiffs on February 15, 1994 for the sale of the Home. [See Earnest Money
Sales Agreement, attached hereto as Addendum "7"].

8.

The relevant provisions of the EMS A for purposes of this appeal are:
\l(e) Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property subject to Section 1(c)
above and 6 below, accepts in its present physical condition, except: (BLANK)
\ 6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C,
the following
\ B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is
purchasing said property upon Buyers own examination and judgement and not
by reason of any representation made by to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or
Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value,
income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is"
condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event that
Buyer desires an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller
but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
\ C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which
6

has not or which will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against
the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances
of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing,
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing.
9.

Plaintiffs walked through the Home on February 11, 1994 before executing the
EMSA on February 15, 1994. [R. 87:18 through 100:21].

10.

Defendants read the "as is'Vno warranties clauses with Plaintiffs at the time the
EMSA was executed by both parties. [R.462:15-21].

11.

On February 15, 1994 Defendant Dan Smith discussed with Plaintiff William
Moore the footings and the grading and told Plaintiff Moore that he should avoid
moving dirt so as to avoid exposing the footings and that additional dirt was on the
property to complete the grading. [R. 448:2 through 449:22].

12.

Plaintiffs closed on the Home on or about May 2, 1994. [R. 104:23-25].

13.

Plaintiffs had the opportunity, but decided not to have the Home inspected. [R.
198:12-15].

14.

Plaintiffs did not request any additional warranties of any kind. [R. 199:16-18].

15.

Almost six years later in April 2000 while Plaintiffs were having gate posts
installed on the property, Plaintiffs were informed that the footings were not deep
enough. [R. 121:5],

16.

Plaintiffs subsequently contacted Jason Bullock of Sunrise Engineering in
approximately August 2000 who walked through the house as though he were
performing a final inspection and discovered the thirty (30) alleged code violations
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identified by the Plaintiffs. [R. 128:10-12; 131:11-17].
17.

Jason Bullock admitted that he easily discovered the lack of topsoil and grading and
the exposed footings by "basically walking around the house." [R. 137:19]. Jason
Bullock admitted that he did not need to do any digging to see the alleged grading
violation because "the top of the frame was exposed." [R. 138:14].

18.

An additional twelve (12) alleged code violations identified by the Plaintiffs were
later added by Lloyd Steenblik's inspection.

19.

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on August 24, 2000, more than six years
from the May 2, 1994 closing date.

20.

Plaintiff William Moore deceased in 2001 and Plaintiff Mary Moore became his
successor in interest.

21.

Defendants filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment on February 26, 2001
[see Addendum "1"] in which they argued that: (1) Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiffs' claim of rescission
was barred by the statute of limitations; (3) Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the
Consumer Sales Practices Act was barred by the statute of limitations; (4)
Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud and misrepresentation; (5) Punitive damages should
be dismissed because all underlying claims are subject to summary judgment.

22.

On August 16, 2001, the trial court entered a ruling on Defendants' first Motion
for Summary judgment and held that: (1) Plaintiffs' claim for negligent
misrepresentation in this case was precluded as a matter of law by the merger
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doctrine ; (2) That the claims of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent
misrepresentation had been pled with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) That there were genuine issues of material
fact with respect to claims of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent
misrepresentation that precluded summary judgment; (4) Defendants may have had
a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home or
building code violations, of which they were aware; (5) The discovery rule should
be applied to toll the statutes of limitations in situations where its application was
not otherwise expressly prohibited by law; (6) The discovery rule does apply to
those defects that would be considered latent and that there were issues of fact
with respect to when the defects should have reasonably been discovered; (7)
Plaintiffs elected rescission rather than monetary damages for breach of contract.
[See August 16, 2001 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "8"].
Defendants filed their next motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2003 arguing
that: (1) Plaintiffs' claims were barred inasmuch as the Plaintiffs failed to have the
home inspected and inasmuch as the applicable statute of limitation ran before the
suit was filed; (2) Plaintiffs admitted that the majority of their claims were patent
defects and should therefore be dismissed. [See Addendum "2"].
On August 29, 2003, the trial court held that: (1) the Defendants were only legally
obligated to disclose defects that were not discoverable by reasonable care; (2) that
summary judgment was appropriate for all admittedly patent items and that
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summary judgment was not appropriate for defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, and 39;
(3) that there were disputed material facts regarding Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation; (4) that there were disputed material facts regarding
Defendants' statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, the trial court granted
summary judgment only as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim of fraudulent
nondisclosure as to all defects except 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39. [See August 29,
2003 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "9"].
25.

Finally in November 2003, Defendants filed four (4) additional motions for
summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract; Consumer Sales
Practice Act; mutual mistake of fact; and fraudulent misrepresentations.

26.

On April 26, 2004, the trial court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims under the Consumer Sales Practice Act and
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, but denied the motion as to Plaintiffs breach of
contract claim. During the hearing on the motions, Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to
the dismissal of the claim for mutual mistake.

27.

In addition, on April 26, 2004, the trial court also denied Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider its prior ruling on Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure and Negligent
Misrepresentation causes of action.

28.

At the time of trial the Plaintiffs had dismissed all their claims except their two
claims for fraudulent nondisclosure regarding the improper grading and the alleged
improper insulation of windows and Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim with
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respect to the violation of the building code for grading.
29.

Plaintiffs previously elected to proceed on rescission and subsequently changed the
remedy they were seeking to seek monetary damages.

30.

The case was heard at a three day trial March 7-9, 2005.

31.

At the conclusion of trial the jury was asked to respond to special verdict
questions. [See Special Verdict, attached hereto as Addendum "10"].

32.

The jury found Defendants liable for breach of contract and for fraudulent
nondisclosure with respect to the improper grading, but not for the insulation of
the windows. The jury awarded $30,680 in monetary damages. The jury also found
the causes of action were not barred by the statute of limitations.

33.

During trial on March 9, 2005, Defendants' counsel made an oral motion for a
directed verdict and submitted a memorandum in support of the motion on March
10,2005. [See Addendum "3"].

34.

The trial court entered final judgment against Defendants in the amount of $30,680
in compensatory damages pursuant to the directed verdict on March 10, 2005.
[See Final Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum "11"].

35.

On March 23, 2005, Defendants' counsel file a motion and memorandum for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. [See Addendum "4"].

36.

The trial court denied both of Defendants' Rule 50 motions in an order entered
July 6, 2005. [See July 6, 2005 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "12"].

37.

Defendants then filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
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Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) on
April 19, 2005 [see Addendum "5"] which was denied by the Court in a July 18,
2005 order. [See July 18, 2005 Order, attached hereto as Addendum "13"].
38.

The trial court ultimately awarded Plaintiffs attorney's fees under section "N" of
the EMSA in the amount of $40,000.00 and costs in the amount of $10,000.00.
[See Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Awarding Attorney's Fees,
Expenses and Costs, attached hereto as Addendum "14"].
ARGUMENT

L

The trial court erred in failing to correctly determine the appropriate version
of the relevant statute of limitations.
The trial court erred by failing to first establish when Plaintiffs knew or should

have know of their causes of action against Defendants. Whether a statute of limitations
has run on a cause of action and whether the discovery rule applies, are both questions of
law. See Russell Packard Development, Inc., v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f 18, 108 P.3d 741
("The applicability of the statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule
are questions of law, which [the appellate court] reviews for correctness." (citing Spears
v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, f 32, 44 P.3d 742); Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah
1990) ("Whether the discovery rule applies to a cause of action is, like the statute of
limitation, a question of law, not of fact.")
The applicability of the statute of limitations or the discovery rule to any given
cause of action, however, first requires that the fact-finder determine when the claimant
discovered or should have discovered the facts supporting their alleged cause of action.
12

See Sevy v. Security Title Co, of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995) ("The
issue of when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis
of a cause of action is a question of fact."
Accordingly, a trial court's legal determination of the applicability of the statute of
limitations and the discovery rule must, by necessity, rely upon the factual determination
of "when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis of a
cause of action." Id,
As discussed hereinafter, the trial court's failure to adhere to the aforementioned
tripartite analysis has led the trial court and jury to commit error. The trial court erred by
non-discriminately applying the 2004 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 to Plaintiffs claims.
[See Addendum "8"; see Addendum "9"].
Importantly, the trial court's final Judgment and the Special Verdict are devoid of
any specific factual finding by the jury concerning the date on which Plaintiffs knew or
should have known of their cause of actions for breach of contract or fraudulent
nondisclosure as to the grading and windows.
As will be explained, without such a finding, as determined by a trier of fact, the trial
court could not properly determine the date on which Plaintiffs' causes of action
"accrued." Without establishing an "accrual" date, the trial court could not properly
determine which version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 to apply (the 2004 version, or one of the
three possible earlier versions) to Plaintiffs' causes of action. As will be demonstrated,
application of the correct version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 has a determinative impact on

13

whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred and whether the discovery rule becomes relevant to
Plaintiffs' claims.
A. The trial court could not properly determine what version of the statute of
limitations applies to Plaintiffs' claims because the trial court failed to
instruct the jury to determine when Plaintiffs knew or should have known
of their cause of action against Defendants,
The jury in this case should have specifically determined when Plaintiffs knew or
should have known of the facts forming the basis for their causes of action before the trial
court may make the legal determination concerning what version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5
applied.
Several different versions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 existed during the years
between the sale of the property to Plaintiffs on May 2, 1994 and the date that Plaintiffs
finally filed suit on August 24, 2000; however, only one version of the statute should be
applied to Plaintiffs' claims.
The first possible version was enacted in 1991 and was designated Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25.5.

[Attached hereto as Addendum "15"]. Subsection (10) of the 1991

version provides that "[t]his section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue
after April 19, 1991, notwithstanding that the act, error, omission, or breach of duty
occurred, or the improvement was completed or abandoned before April 29, 1991."
Relevant to this appeal are Subsections (3) and (4) of the 1991 version which provide:
(3)

An action against a provider shall be commenced within two years from
the date of discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the
date upon which the act, error, omission, or breach of duty should have
been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the act, error,
omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the
14

(4)

two year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment.
Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty
may be commenced against a provider more than six years after
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the
event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the
sixth year of the six year period, the injured person has two additional
years from the date of discovery to commence an action.

The 1991 version appears to contain an obvious inconsistency that was remedied
by the legislature in the 1999 version. Subsection (3) incorporates a two year "discovery
rule" provision as to most claims. Subsection (4) specifically carves out an exception for
claims based on breach of contract or breach of warranty and requires the filing of the
claim within six years after "completion of the improvement or abandonment of the
construction" unless the breach is discovered in the sixth year (at which point, the
claimant is allowed an additional two years from the date of discovery of the breach).
The inconsistency is that Subsection (4) unambiguously sets the date of the "date of
completion of the improvement or abandonment of the construction" as the time at which
the six year time period begins to run while Subsection (3) (which Subsection (4) is
subject to) allows a party two years from the date that the act, error (etc.) was discovered
or should have been discovered through reasonable diligence. Thus, whether the six year
statue of limitations for breach of contract and breach of warranty claims commences on
the date of completion or abandonment (as specifically stated in Subsection (4)) or
whether the six years commences at the time the breach was discovered or could have
been discovered (as stated in Subsection (3)) is unclear.
The 1991 version was effective until it was superseded in 1997 by U.C.A. § 78-12-
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21.5 [Attached hereto as Addendum "16"]. Section 10 the 1997 version states that "This
section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue after April 29 1991." In the
1997 version, Subsections (3) and (4)
(3)(a) An action against a provider shall be commenced within//ve years from
the date of discovery of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the date
upon which the act, error, omission, or breach of duty should have been
discovered through reasonable diligence.
(b) If the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable
before completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the
five year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment.
(4) Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may
be commenced against a provider more than six years after completion of the
improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the act, error,
omission, or breach of duty is discovered in first through the sixth year of the
six year period, the injured person has five additional years from the date of
discovery to commence an action (emphasis added).
The 1997 version primarily modified the two year period for filing to a five year
period and granted claimants five years from the date of discovery (instead of two) if the
act, error (etc.) was discovered at any point within the six years on breach of
contract/warranty claims. Again, the same internal inconsistency as existed under the
1991 version still exists in the 1997 version.
The 1999 version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 that superseded the 1997
version indicates in Subsection (11) that it applies "to all causes of action that accrue after
May 3, 1998, notwithstanding that the improvement was completed or abandoned before
May 3, 1999." [Attached hereto as Addendum "17"]. The 1999 version contains
significantly different language than its predecessors. Former Subsections (3) and (4) are
combined under a single Subsection (3) in the 1999 version. Furthermore, the caveat for
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actions based in contract or warranty is made preeminent as subpart (a) and is no longer
''subject to" the codified two-year discovery rule provision as in previous versions:
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty
establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within
that limitations period.
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two
years from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date
upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year
period begins to run upon completion or abandonment.
Finally, subsection (11) of the 2003 version which superseded the 1999 version
applies "to all causes of actions that accrue after May 3, 2003, notwithstanding that the
improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 2004." [Attached hereto as
Addendum "18"].
Subsection (3) of the 2003 version retains the exact same language as Subsection
(3) of the 1999 version.
It is readily apparent that application of either the 1991 version, the 1997 version,
or the 1999 version could result in a very different outcome for Plaintiffs' claims
depending on which version is applied. As will be argued in a subsequent section of this
brief, the 1999 version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 plainly rejects the application of the
discovery rule for causes of action based on breach of contract or breach of warranty.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure claim as to the grading and windows
could be barred depending on when Plaintiffs discovered or reasonably could have
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discovered the alleged fraud and depending on which version of the statute is applied.
As a preliminary matter, the jury (as fact-finders) should have first determined the
date on which Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their injuries in order for the court
to correctly establish an "accrual" date. Only by establishing an ^accrual" date could the
trial court have decided which version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 to apply.
"A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when a reasonable
person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of both the
injury and its governing cause." Matson v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233,
1235 (10th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). "'Generally, a cause of action accrues upon the
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Spears v. Warr,
2002 UT 24, f 33, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah
1996)) (other internal quotations and citation omitted).
Because neither the jury nor the trial court ever established a date on which
Plaintiffs breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure claims accrued, the trial court
could not properly determine which version of the statue of limitations should have been
applied to Plaintiffs claims. Furthermore, without the factual determination of when
Plaintiffs' knew or should have known of the alleged injuries and their cause(s), no court
of law can review whether the trial court applied the proper version of the statute of
limitations in the first instance.
Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error in assuming that the 2003
version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 applied to Plaintiffs' causes of actions and this Court
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should reverse the trial court's rulings and remand the issue for further proceedings.
B. The trial court could not properly determine whether the discovery rule
applies to Plaintiffs1 claims without a specific determination concerning
when Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their cause of action against
Defendants,
Before a trial court may properly apply the discovery rule to extend a statute of
limitations period, "an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know of and
could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a
claim." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). In fact, the entire
purpose of the discovery rule is to ensure that an applicable statute of limitations does not
begin to run until a party knows or should have known of the existence of a particular
cause of action. Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah
1995) (stating that, 'the discovery rule is an exception to the general rule, and it delays
the running of the limitation period 'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the
cause of action.'") (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court cannot properly
determine the applicability of the discovery rule without first allowing a factual
determination concerning the date a party knew or should have known of the existence of
a particular cause of action.
In the instant case, the trial court committed reversible error by deciding to apply
the discovery rule to Plaintiffs claims without first allowing the jury to determine when
Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their claims. As argued hereinafter, Defendants
believe that the trial court committed a fundamental legal error in finding that the
discovery rule applied to the six-year statute of limitations on breach of contract claims
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under U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. However, this substantive issue is secondary to the principal
concern that the trial court did not even correctly decide which version of the statute to
apply.
In addition to the foregoing pertinent discussion, "the discovery rule simply does
not apply where the plaintiff, at some point during the limitations period, has knowledge
of the facts underlying his claim." Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998).
Accordingly, if Plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts underlying their claims within the
appropriate limitations period, Plaintiffs could not invoke any non-statutory extensions
under a discovery rule theory.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the
application of the statue of limitations to Plaintiffs' claims, as found in the trial court's
September 29, 2003 Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, in the trial
court's July 6, 2005 Order Denying Defendants Rule 50 Motion. The trial court should
also find as reversible error inasmuch as the Special Verdict form contains no finding as
to the date on which Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their alleged injuries.
"It has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated
upon and find support in the findings of fact." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah
1993). Otherwise, "[t]he failure to enter adequate findings of fact on material issues may
be reversible error." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989).
Until there is a specific factual determination made as to when Plaintiffs knew or
should have known of the facts creating a cognizable cause of action, an "accrual" date
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cannot be determined; nor can the trial court determine which version of the statue of
limitations should have applied and whether the non-statutory discovery rule defense is
applicable.
2.

The trial court erred committed reversible error when it submitted questions
of law to the jury for decision in a special verdict
The trial court committed reversible error when it submitted questions of law to

the jury in the Special Verdict. "In the case of a special verdict, the jury only finds the
facts, and the court applies the law thereto and renders the verdict." Dishinger v. Potter,
47 P.3d 76, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). In Dishinger, this Court quoted Justice Ellett of the
Utah Supreme Court in explaining the function of a special verdict.
This Court noted that, "the special verdict was devised to relieve the jury of
attempting to apply the law in a complicated case to the facts in arriving at a verdict.
Instructions to the jury are thus simplified, and the jurors may, therefore, concentrate
upon the functions which belong to them, viz., to find the facts in the case." Id. (quoting
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970).
Rather than simply requesting the jury to determine when Plaintiffs knew or should
have known of the facts giving rise to their claims for breach of contract and fraudulent
nondisclosure, and then make a legal determination concerning applicability of the statute
of limitations and the discovery rule, the trial court disregarded the entire function and
purpose of a special verdict form by improperly requesting the jury to make complicated
legal determinations without first deciding upon the necessary predicate facts.
Utah courts have long held that a jury should not make any determinations
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concerning questions of law as such questions are the sole province of the courts. See
Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1936) (holding that a
question of law submitted to the jury was improper thereby allowing the Utah Supreme
Court to reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for a proper determination of the
legal issues); Bailey v. Spalding-Livingston Investments Co., 136 P. 962, 964 (Utah 1913)
(stating that a court may not require the jury to construe a contract because such
determination "is a matter of law for the court"). This Court should follow the rule
endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court and hold that the trial court's submission of the
question of law as to whether Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and fraudulent
nondisclosure were barred by the statute of limitations constitutes reversible error.
It is further worth noting that the applicability of the discovery rule and the statute
of limitations to the instant matter did not concern the jury in any way. In Beck v.
Coalition Mines Co., 269 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1954), the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
"[t]here was no need, however, for the [lower] court's explanation of the statute of
limitations to the jury since it was a matter of law which did not directly concern them,
and by the [trial] court's own admission nothing that he could say to them in explanation
of the statute of limitations could aid them in determining the several questions of fact
submitted to them."
The trial court in the instant case committed reversible error and prejudiced
Defendants by requiring the jury to decide a complicated question of law pertaining to the
statute of limitations and to the discovery rule. Specifically, the trial court prejudiced
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Defendants by requiring the jury to make a legal determination beyond the scope of the
jury's powers without the necessary findings of fact (i.e. "at what point did Plaintiffs
discover or could they reasonably have discovered the alleged breach of contract or the
code violations") to support such determination.
Finally, the Court should also reverse the trial court's final Judgment order in the
instant matter because "it has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must
be predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d
431, 436 (Utah 1993). Otherwise, "the failure to enter adequate findings of fact on
material issues may be reversible error." Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 116 P.2d 896,
899 (Utah 1989).
For the foregoing reasons the Court should reverse the trial court's final Judgment
order and specifically hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it
submitted the legal question of the applicability of the statute of limitations to the jury for
determination. This mistake was plain error on the part of the trial court.
3-

The trial court erred in finding that the discovery rule extended the period for
Plaintiffs' breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure claims against
Defendants,
The jury in the district court trial ultimately awarded Plaintiffs $30,680.00 in

compensatory damages. The grounds for the damage award are found in the Special
Verdict form completed by the jury. Although the Special Verdict form provided three
possible bases for Plaintiffs recover (breach of contract, fraudulent nondisclosure as to
the footings and fraudulent nondisclosure as to defective windows) the jury found
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Defendants liable only under the first two bases and awarded Plaintiffs the amount of
$30,680.00 for breach of contract and fraudulent nondisclosure as to the footings (but not
for fraudulent nondisclosure of the window defect). [See Addendum "10"].
Relevant to this section of Defendants' appeal is the fact that subpart (c) under
each of the three enumerated bases on the Special Verdict form specifically requested that
the jury determine whether each claim was barred by the statute of limitations. According
to the Special Verdict, the jury apparently found that neither Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim, nor their fraudulent nondisclosure claim as to the footings was barred by the statute
of limitations. As argued in the preceding sections of this brief, the jury had no authority
to determine whether the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. This question
and the question of whether the discovery rule should be applied are both legal questions
and outside the purview of the jury. The trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine
whether the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims.
The question the jury should have answered is "when did Plaintiffs discovery, or
when could they have reasonably discovered the facts supporting their alleged causes of
action?" Unfortunately, this central question was never asked or answered.
Defendants assert that from the earliest stages of the lawsuit and continuing
through the post-trial motion phase, the trial court failed to properly interpret and enforce
settled law on the issue of whether Plaintiffs claims were barred by the applicable statutes
of limitations. Because application of the appropriate statute of limitations period is a
legal question, this Court should review the trial court's orders for correctness.
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As argued in the first sections of this brief, the trial court first and foremost erred
in failing to consider which version of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 should apply. Nevertheless,
because the Court relied upon the 2003 (or possibly 1999) version of the statute as it
applied to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, Defendants will argue against the trial
court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 accordingly.
A. The trial court repeatedly failed to correctly interpret and apply the
statute of limitations rules to Plaintiffs1 breach of contract and fraudulent
nondisclosure claims.
Defendants first raised the statute of limitations defense (among other defenses)
against Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim in their Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (filed February 26, 2001). [See
Addendum "1"]. Therein, Defendants argued that U.C.A. § 78-12-23(2) governed the
breach of contract claim and that under that provision's six-year statue of limitations
period, Plaintiffs were required to bring their action within six years of the date that
Plaintiffs closed on their purchase of the home from Defendants. The undisputed closing
date was May 2, 1994. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should have filed their complaint no later
than May 2, 2000. Because Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until August 24, 2000,
Defendants asserted that the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract was barred.
Plaintiffs responded in their Memorandum in Opposition (filed March 12, 2001)
that the "discovery rule" applied and argued that application of the discovery rule should
extend the statute of limitations period for Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. In their
Reply Memorandum (filed March 26, 2001), Defendants argued that in Utah, governing
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case law precluded application of the discovery rule for breach of contract claims.
In its final written order, the trial court ordered the following:
.. .the discovery rule should be applied to toll the statue of limitations, even as
to contract-based claims, in situations where its application is not otherwise
expressly prohibited by law. Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of
law, that the discovery rule does apply in this case with respect to those defects
that would be considered latent, and that there remains issues of fact with
respect to when those defects would be considered latent, and that there remain
issues of fact with respect to when those defects should have been reasonably
discovered. Therefore summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, rescission, and violations of the
Consumer Sales Practices Act. [See Addendum "8"].
After more than two years of additional discovery, Defendants were finally able to
submit another Motion for Summary Judgment (filed May 6, 2003). At that juncture,
Defendants asserted that the statue of limitations periods set forth in U.C.A. § 78-1221.5(3) governed Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.
In the trial court's August 29, 2003 Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, the court nebulously ruled: (1) that U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 did apply; (2) that
subsection (3)(a) of that provision imposes a six year statue of limitations on breach of
contract claims; and (3) that subsection (3)(b) provides that all other causes of action
against a provider be brought within two years of the discovery of a cause of action or the
date upon which the cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence. Inexplicably, though, the court refused to grant Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim because "the discovery rule
applies in this case." [See Addendum "9"].
Defendants' also attempted to raise the statue of limitations defense on March 10,
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2005 on the final day of trial when counsel for Defendant made oral motion under Utah
R. Civ. P. 50(a) for a directed verdict. The final judgment was entered later that day
pursuant to the Special Verdict. Defendants also filed a written Memorandum in Support
of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for a Directed Verdict C'Rule 50(a) Memorandum") on
that day. [See Addendum *'3"]. Defendants subsequently submitted a Motion and
Memorandum for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for
Remittitur on March 23, 2004 ("Rule 50(b) Memorandum"). [See Addendum "4"].
In both the Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b) memoranda, Defendants again argued that
under the plain language of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5(3)(a), Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim should have been barred by the six year limitations period running from the earliest
of either the date that the original Certificate of Occupancy was issued to Defendants
(January 28, 1994) or the closing of the sale/occupancy date by Plaintiffs (May 2, 1994).
Because Plaintiffs' complaint was filed in August of 2000, over six years from either
date, the statute of limitations should bar the contract claim.
After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Defendants Rule 50 motions.
[See Addendum "12"].
B. The trial court erroneously applied the general discovery rule to ILC.A. §
78-12-21.5(3)(a).
The trial court clearly erred in permitting Plaintiffs to invoke the general discovery
rule in order to extend the time for the filing of their breach of contract claim. Subsection
(3) of both the 2003 and 1999 versions provides:
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or
27

abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty
establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within
that limitations period.
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two
years from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date
upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable
diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year
period begins to run upon completion or abandonment.
As previously argued by Defendants, the juxtaposition of these two paragraphs
clearly implies that only the non-contract claims are subject to the discovery rule.
Contract claims exist for six years and no more. This is to allow builders some certainty
and peace of mind that they will not be afflicted with stale contract claims.
Importantly, Subsection (4) of the 2003 version specifically refers only to
Subsection (3)(b) (not to Subsection (3)(a) governing breach of contract actions) in
providing a general nine year limit (plus two years if the injury is discovered in the eighth
or ninth years) from the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction on all actions other than breach of contract/warranty claims. The exclusion
of Subsection 3(a) from the general nine year limitations period indicates that the
legislature intentionally meant to preserve a strict six-year limit on all claims based on
breach of contract or warranty.
Subsection (4) of the 1999 version is different only in that it allows a maximum of
twelve years (plus two) for claims arising under Subsection 3(b). The 1999 version still
excludes Subsection 3(a) from the general twelve year limitations period.
The legislative preamble language in both the 2003 and 1999 versions explains the
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legislative purpose of drawing definite limitations periods and refers to the fact that "the
possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven [or "ten"
for the 1999 version] years following completion [of the building]. Clearly the intent of
this six year: statute of limitations is that it be construed in favor of the builder.
Surprisingly, the trial court submitted Jury Instruction 31 to the jury which
provides in relevant part: "Utah law provides that an action for construction defect based
in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of the closing of
the sale of the house." [See Jury Instruction #31, attached hereto as Addendum "19"].
Such a plain and clear instruction is painfully at odds with the trial courts insistence that
the discovery rule applies to U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 Subsection 3(a).
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs filed their claim more than six years after they
closed on the home on May 2, 1994. The trial court's unsupported extension of the
statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was clearly erroneous when
considered in light of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. Moreover, without a jury finding as to
"when" Plaintiffs knew or should have known about the alleged fraudulent disclosure, it
is impossible to determine whether that claim, too, is barred by the appropriate statute of
limitations.
This Court should reserve the trial court's numerous incorrect orders extending the
statute of limitations in contravention of U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5.
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4.

The trial court erred in failing to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure
claim against Defendants pursuant to various motions made by Defendants
throughout the course of litigation.
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law reviewed for

correctness. See Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, \ 10, 100 P.3d 1200.
When reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict, this Court must "review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds
could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict. Smith v. Fairfax Realty,
Inc., 2003 UT 41, ! 12, 82 P.3d 1064, cert, denied, 541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1716, 158
L.Ed.2d 401 (2004) (quotations and citation omitted).
The trial court erred in failing to grant Defendants' various motions for summary
judgment or in the alternative for failing to grant Defendants' Rule 50 Motions on the
issue of the viability of Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim.
In all three of the aforementioned motions, Defendants argued that under Utah
law, Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim should be dismissed as a matter of law
because Plaintiffs failed to obtain a home inspection on a home that was expressly sold
"as is" and without any warranty. In its August 29, 2003 Order on Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants as
to most of the alleged violations except for five of the enumerated defects. [See
Addendum "9"]. Ultimately, only two of those violations survived to reach the trial stage
(the grading claim and the window claim). Because the jury found Defendants liable only
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for fraudulent nondisclosure as to the grading claim, Defendants address only that
remaining alleged violation for purposes of this appeal.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that prior to purchasing the Home that they had an
opportunity to both inspect the Home and have an inspection performed. Plaintiffs do not
dispute that Section 6 of the EMS A expressly disclaimed all seller warranties other than
those contained in Section "C" without exception.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Section "C" of the General Provisions of the EMS A
warrants only that "(a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning
violation concerning the property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing;
(b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or
other encumberances of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c)
the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical systems, and
appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing."
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Section "B" of the General Provisions of the EMS A
provides in relevant part that "[ujnless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage [...]
Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in
Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection said inspection shall be
allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer." [See Addendum "7"].
Plaintiff Mary Moore does not dispute that neither she nor her deceased husband
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sought a home inspection at the time she purchased the Home.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that most of the alleged code violations including the
grading violation was discovered in August 2000 by Jason Bullock who discovered the
grading violation by ''basically walking around the house" and observing the "footing
exposed at grade level" without any intrusive or destructive testing.
Based on the foregoing admitted facts, the trial court should have granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendants on their Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 6,
2003.
Maack v. Resource Design and Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Ut. App. 1994) is
the governing case for this issue on appeal. As the plaintiffs did in Maack Plaintiffs in
this case alleged (among other things) fraudulent nondisclosure. As with the plaintiffs in
Maack, Plaintiffs in the present case, did not obtain a home inspection before purchase.
Id. at 573. Similarly the Maack sales agreement and Plaintiffs' EMSA at issue in this
case contained an "as is" clause "without any warranties as to its condition." Id.
In Maack this Court assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had
brought a fraudulent nondisclosure claim (although the plaintiffs did not distinguish
between fraudulent concealment and fraudulent nondisclosure). In lawsuit at bar,
Plaintiffs claim for fraudulent nondisclosure has been explicit pleaded.
Ultimately, this Court found that the plaintiffs in Maack were unreasonable in
failing to obtain a home inspection or insisting on express rights in the agreement. This
Court also found that no duty to disclose exists where the buyer could discover the facts
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by exercise of reasonable diligence. Id. at 579.
Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), is also relevant to
Defendants' position on appeal inasmuch as it conveys the general application of the rule
of caveat emptor in Utah:
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls on
the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a knowledgeable
home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale. Oftentimes,
however, real estate agents and sellers are understandably unaware of latent
defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an inherent risk involved in
purchasing a home. Id. at 1390 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The Schafir court further went on to note:
Generally, absent some express agreement between the parties—which is absent
here—the doctrine of caveat emptor precludes a home buyer from bringing suit for
discoverable defects in the home. Especially when the sale of a used home is
involved, the purchaser is on notice that the residence is not new and may contain
defects affecting the home's quality or condition. In the case of latent defects, a
home buyer's best resort against the seller is to sue for either fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Id. at n.12.
In the present case, it is undisputed that in August 2000, Jason Bullock observed
the alleged violation related to the grading by mere visual observation.
In Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 24, 48 P.3d 235, the Utah Supreme Court
cited extensively to its former decision in Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, ^[ 9, 31
P.3d 572 in discussing the burden that a plaintiff must meet in proving fraudulent
nondisclosure as to reasonably discoverable information:
To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff must prove the
following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3)
there is a legal duty to communicate. Mitchell v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, \ 9,
31P.3d572.
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In Mitchell, the plaintiffs alleged that at the time of their purchase of the
defendants' home (1) a swimming pool on the property was leaking, (2) the
defendants were aware of the leak, and (3) the defendants had a legal duty to
disclose these defects prior to selling their property to the plaintiffs, which
they failed to do. 2001 UT 80 at f 4, 31 P.3d 572. The defendants defended
that they had no duty to disclose defects under the doctrine of caveat emptor.
Id. at If 5, 31 P.3d 572. We held that sellers of real property owe a duty to
disclose material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable
inspection by an ordinary prudent buyer. Id. at \ 12, 31 P.3d 572.
With this holding, we issued some specific precautions. We first cautioned
that "if a defect can be discovered by reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat
emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee." Id. at ^[ 11, 31 P.3d
572. We next instructed that an ordinary prudent buyer would not be required
to "hire numerous expert home inspectors to search for hidden defects," but
this does not mean that inspection by an expert will never be required. Id. at ^
12-13, 31 P.3d 572.
Plaintiffs in the instant case were aware that they were buying the Home in an "as
is" condition, and that the EMSA disclaimed all warranties and representations other than
those found in Section "C." The alleged defects were discovered by a non-destructive
inspection in the year 2000, and could have been discovered in similar fashion before the
sale of the Home in 1994. Governing case law clearly establishes that Plaintiffs had a
responsibility to protect themselves by having the Home inspected before the sale.
Plaintiffs did not have the home inspected before the sale; instead Plaintiffs failed to
exercise reasonable diligence, waiting until August, 2000, over six years after purchasing
the Home, to have it inspected. Plaintiffs did not exercise ordinary diligence to discover
the alleged defects and, therefore, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to preclude the
Plaintiffs from bringing suit for the alleged defects in the Home.
Defendants again raised these arguments in their Rule 50 motions [See Addendum
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"3"; see Addendum "4"]; the trial court again denied Defendants' motions on the issue.
[See Addendum "12"]. Defendants again argued that the fraudulent nondisclosure claim
should be dismissed pursuant to Utah case law when Defendants made their Rule 60(b)
Motion. [See Addendum "5"]. The court again refused to accept Defendants' argument.
[See Addendum "13"].
Even applying the standard of review which requires this Court to take view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is clear that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a
directed verdict and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Defendants.
Even admitting that Plaintiffs were unsophisticated buyers, that Defendant Dan
Smith was an experienced home-builder, and that the Defendants had only lived in the
home a few months before selling it, Plaintiffs still knew they were buying the home "as
is," and that they were entitled to have an inspection performed. Even assuming that
Defendant Dan Smith did not discuss with Plaintiff William Moore that the topsoil
grading would need to be completed in the spring of 1994, Jason Bullock's easy visual
discovery the problem in August 2000 demonstrates that Plaintiffs could have discovered
the grading violation through a reasonable inspection.
This Court should reverse the trial court's September 29, 2003 Order and the trial
court's July 6, 2005 Order on the basis that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
finding that Plaintiffs claim for fraudulent nondisclosure could survive summary
judgment or a directed verdict based on the undisputed facts of the case.
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5.

The trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs an award of $40,000.00 in
attorney's fees and $10,000,00 in costs.
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law that is reviewed for

correctness. See Selvage, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct.App.1996). Defendants do not
dispute that paragraph "N" of the EMS A permits a prevailing party to recover attorney's
fees in an action under brought to enforce the EMS A. [See Addendum "7"]. However,
should this Court reverse the trial court and should further proceedings exonerate
Defendants, or result in a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants would be entitled to
recover their attorney's fees and costs from Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court
reverse the following Orders of the trial court and remand those matters requiring further
proceedings:
1.

the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered on
August 16, 2001;

2.

the Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered on
September 29, 2003;

3.

the Special Verdict and Judgment entered on March 10, 2005 for the amount of
$30,680.00 against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs;

4.

the Order denying Defendants' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding
the Verdict entered on July 6, 2005

5.

the Order denying Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment
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entered on July 19, 2005;
6.

the Order entered on August 25, 2005 awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted this

l"T day of May, 2006.

JUSJ^q^lLSWICK,
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & M C K A Y , L.L.C.,
Attorneys far Defendants Dan Smith and Carol Smith
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ADDENDA
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed
February 26,2001).
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed May 6, 2003).
Memorandum in Support of Oral Motion Under Rule 50 for Directed Verdict
(filed March 10, 2004).
Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion under
Rule 50 for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for
Remittitur (filed March 23, 2005).
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Relief from
Judgment in Accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)
Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance
Earnest Money Sales Agreement
August 16, 2001 Order
August 29, 2003 Order
Special Verdict
Final Judgment
July 6, 2005 Order
July 18, 2005 Order
Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Awarding Attorney's Fees, Expenses and
Costs
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1991)
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16.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1997)

17.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5(1999)

18.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (2003)

19.

Jury Instruction #31
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A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. (#889)
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (#7522)
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C.
192 East 200 North Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,

;

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.
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)
]>

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]
]
;
)
I
)i

Case No. 000700142 MI
Judge

Defendants, by and through their counsel, A. Bryce Dixon, of Dixon & Truman, P.C,
pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, submit this Memorandum in Support of
their Motion for Summary Judgment
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
L
INTRODUCTION
This litigation arose as a result of the sale of certain improved real property located in
Millard County, Utah (hereinafter "the subject home") by Defendants Dan and Carol Smith
(hereinafter "the Smiths") to Plaintiffs William and Mary Moore (hereinafter "the Plaintiffs").

\oOQ>

Construction was completed on the subject home in early November 1993. The Smiths
constructed the house for their own residence and thus moved into the subject home in midNovember, 1993, The Smiths obtained the Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance on
or about January 28, 1994, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " 1 . " Although Mr.
Smith had a general contractors license, he did not work in this capacity at all during the period
of time in which the transaction with the Moores was consummated.
In February of 1994 the Plaintiffs contacted the Smiths about the possible purchase of the
subject home. An Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered into between the parties on or
about February 15, 1994. A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "2." The
transaction closed on May 2, 1994. At this point the Plaintiffs were legally entitled to move into
the subject home. Copies of the closing documents are attached hereto as Exhibit "3."
The Smiths were not notified of any problems regarding the subject home until
December, 2000. This was over six years after the Smiths sold the home to the Plaintiffs. The
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for damages on August 24, 2000. The Smiths were not served,
however, until December 13, 2000.
II.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Dan and Carol Smith, built the subject home for their own residence. (See, Affidavit

of Dan Smithy 4).
2.

Construction was completed on the subject home in early November of 1993 and the

Smiths moved into the home in mid-November of 1993. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, f 5).
3.

Dan Smith was not actively working as a general contractor at the time of

the construction of the subject home or the sales transaction. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, ^ 6).

4.

The City of Fillmore issued a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance for

the subject home on or about January 28, 1994. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, ^ 7).
5.

On or about February 15, 1994, an Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered

between the Smiths and William and Mary Moore (hereinafter "the Moores") for the sale of the
subject home. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, ^| 9).
6.

The Smiths moved out of the subject home by the end of March, 1994. (See,

Affidavit of Dan Smith, f 11).
7.

Dan Smith never went to the subject home to perform any type of construction

services or repairs any time after the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered between the
Smiths and the Moores. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, If 12).
8.

The transaction between the Smiths and Moores for the sale and purchase of the

subject home closed on May 2, 1994. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, ^ 13).
9.

The Smiths were not made aware of any alleged construction defects until December

of 2000. (See, Affidavit of Dan Smith, f 15).
10.

The Moores filed their Complaint for damages on August 24,2000. (See, Affidavit

of Dan Smith, T| 16).
III.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking. 10 P.3d 338 (Ut. 2000). As will be explained more fully
below, there is no issue to be adjudicated at trial and the Smiths are therefore entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
A,

THE PLAINTIFFS' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Among the causes of action asserted in the Plaintiffs' Complaint is one for breach of

contract. Since the contract between the Plaintiffs and the Smiths was a written contract and the sale
of the home was not in Mr. Smith's capacity as a general contractor, the relevant statute of
limitations is six years as set forth in § 78-12-23(2). Specifically, the statute provides: "An action
may be brought within six years . . . upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22." The question then, is when did
the six year period begin to run.
The general principle regarding when a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of
limitations begins to run is "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause
of action [and that] mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running
of the statute of limitations." O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Ut. 1991)
(quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,86 (Ut. 1981)). The generally accepted rule with regard
to a claim for breach of contract is that it "accrues, thus causing the statute of limitations to
commence, only upon breach of the contract." Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson
Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Ut. 1984). In the instant case, the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is
premised on the alleged defective construction of the subject home. Therefore, the alleged breach
occurred, thus causing the statute of limitations to commence, at the very latest, on the date the
transaction between the parties closed.

The Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered into between the parties on or about
February 15, 1994. (See, Exhibit "2"). According to the escrow documents, the closing date was
May 2, 1994. (See, Exhibit "3"). Furthermore, at no time following May 2, 1994, did the Smiths
perform any type of construction services or repairs on the home. Therefore, the statute of
limitations began to run, at the very latest, on May 2, 1994, and the Plaintiffs had until May 2,2000
by which to file their Complaint.
It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint for damages until August 24,
2000. As is readily apparent, this is beyond the six year statute of limitations prescribed by § 78-1223(2). Therefore, the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is precluded by the applicable statute of
limitations and summary judgment is appropriate.
B,

THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF RESCISSION IS BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The claim of rescission is an equitable remedy. Acton v. Deliran,, 737 P.2d 996 (Ut. 1987).

A cause of action that is not subject to a specific statutory limitations period is governed by the
residual four-year limitations period found in § 78-12-25(3). Olsen v. Hoolev. 865 P.2d 1345 (Ut.
1993). § 78-12-25(3) provides: "An action may be brought within four years . . . for relief not
otherwise provided for by law." Since rescission in a form of equitable relief "not otherwise
provided for by law," it by default falls into the residual four year limitation period.
As explained above, typically a statute of limitations begins to run upon the occurrence of
the last act of negligence or other type of act that would then constitute a cause of action. In the
instant case, any such act, if it occurred at all, occurred no later than May 2, 1994, the date of
closing. As the Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint until August 24, 2000, it is patently obvious
that the applicable statute of limitations has long since expired on the Plaintiffs claim for rescission.

Therefore, the Smiths are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the Plaintiffs' claim for
rescission.
C.

THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMER SALES
PRACTICES ACT IS BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
The Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that the Smiths violated § 13-11-4 and § 13-11-5 of

the Consumer Sales Practices Act. This particular Act has its own statute of limitations as
prescribed by § 13-11-19(8). The statute reads in relevant part: "An action under this section must
be brought within two years after occurrence of a violation of this chapter[.]" Once again, any
alleged violation must necessarily have occurred by May 2,1994, the closing date of the transaction.
Therefore, the statute of limitations expired, at the very latest, on May 2, 1996. The Plaintiffs'
Complaint was not filed until August 24, 2000. As is readily apparent, this is well after the
expiration of the limitations period. Therefore, this Court should grant the Smiths' Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act.
D.

THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD THEIR ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD
AND MISREPRESENTATION WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY AND THE
SMITHS ARE THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "in all averments of fraud or

mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." This rule
applies to a cause of action for misrepresentation as well. See e.g., Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 966, 972 (Ut. 1982). Utah courts have stressed, and continue to hold, that "mere
conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are
insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary judgment." Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital.
784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Ut. 1989). See also, Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Ut. 1983).

To plead fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must allege that there was a false representation
regarding a material fact which was known to be false or made recklessly without sufficient
knowledge by the person making the statement. Fraud can also be shown by pleading the omission
of a material fact when there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of
the other party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party. Taylor v. Gason
Inc., 607 P.2d 293,294 (Ut. 1980). The reason for the specific pleading requirement is that" [fjraud
is a wrong of such nature that it must be shown by clear and convincing proof and will not lie in
mere suspicion or innuendo." Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America. 405 P.2d 339,341 (Ut.
1965).
A good example of the application of U.R.C.P. 9(b) is Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377
P.2d 189 (1962). In Heathman, the plaintiff brought suit against the law firm who had represented
a defendant in another case the plaintiff had previously filed. One of the allegations in his complaint
against the law firm was that the law firm fraudulently stopped his ability to obtain a default
judgment against the defendant in that prior case. In support of his claim for fraud he alleged that
a secretary at the law firm had filed a false affidavit, that the law firm filed false pleadings in
connection with the affidavit, and that members of the law firm discussed the default judgment with
judges of the court. Id. at 190. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the action based upon the
law firm's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the court noted that the plaintiffs complaint contained "no allegation whatever
of the contents, nature or substance of any alleged false statement in the affidavit or in the
pleadings[.]" The court further observed that there were not any allegations in the plaintiffs
complaint of "what was said, or the nature or substance of any conversation between the law firm
members and any judge or judges." IdL The court concluded that the allegations contained "merely

broad and general statements that a false affidavit and false pleadings were filed and judges were
contacted[.]" IcL Accordingly, the court held that the pleading was insufficient and affirmed the
ruling of the district court.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Plaintiffs have failed to plead fraud with sufficient
particularity to withstand a motion for summary judgment. A review of the Plaintiffs' Complaint
reveals that it contains broad accusations unsupported by any specific facts just as in Heathman. For
instance, paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs' Complaint states: "Defendants were aware that the Home had
not been built to code, that certain requirements for occupancy had not been met, and that false
information had been provided to the city inspector in order to obtain the certificate of occupancy."
(emphasis supplied).
No explanation is provided as to how the Smiths were aware the home had not been built to
code or in what ways the home was code deficient. Such information is vital to the establishment
of the Plaintiffs' claim of fraud and therefore must be plead with specificity. Instead of providing
specific facts necessary to establish a claim of fraud, the Plaintiffs have provided a blanket assertion
that clearly does not meet the specific pleading requirement of U.R.C.P. 9(b).
Likewise, the Plaintiffs' assertion that "certain requirements" were not met for occupancy
is clearly lacking. No indication is given as to what these "requirements" were or in what way they
were not met. Once again, it is a bare bones allegation similar to the ones the court ruled inadequate
in Heathman.
Finally, as for the allegation regarding "false information" being supplied to the city
inspector, no indication is given as to what information was actually provided or how it was false.
Rather than providing specific detail as required by U.R.C.P. 9(b), Plaintiffs once again make a bare
bones allegation unsupported by any specific facts.

As is readily apparent, Plaintiffs have made the type of general accusations that are
essentially conclusions of the pleader without setting out the basic facts that would constitute the
charged actions. This is clearly improper under the rules and is legally insufficient to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. It is not enough to make a few general statements when pleading
fraud in the hope that it will pass muster. Therefore, the Smiths' Motion for Summary Judgment
as to Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and misrepresentation should be granted.
E.

THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE ALL OF THE PLAINTIFFS' UNDERLYING CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Plaintiffs' final cause of action is for punitive damages. It is well settled in Utah that

if all of a party's underlying substantive claims are dismissed, a claim for punitive damages must
then be dismissed as well. See e.g., U.P.C. v. R.O.A. Gen.. Inc., 990 P.2d 945 (Ut. 1999). Indeed,
a claim for punitive damages is dependent on the validity of the underlying claims. Because all of
the Plaintiffs' claims are subject to summary judgment, the Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages
must be dismissed as well.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants, Dan and Carol Smith, respectfully request that this
Court grant their Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract,
rescission, and violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act on the basis of the expiration of the
statute of limitations. The Defendants further request that this Court grant their Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and misrepresentation on the basis that the
Plaintiffs have failed to plead those causes of action with sufficient particularity in accordance with
U.R.C.P. 9(b). Finally, the Defendants request that this Court grant their Motion for Summary

Judgment as to the Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages on the basis that there is no underlying
claim left to adjudicate and therefore the punitive damages claim must be dismissed.
DATED this

day of February, 2001.
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C.

A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants

A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. (#889)
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (#7522)
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C.
192 East 200 North Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Defendant
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vs.
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
) ss:
)^

DAN SMITH, having been duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled case.

2.

I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit. All the statements
hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal
and direct knowledge of the matter to which said statements pertain. If called as a
witness by a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able and shall testify as to each
and all of said matters in the manner hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit.

3.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Utah and am over
the age of 18 years.

4.

I built the home located in Millard County, Utah that is the subject of this dispute
(hereinafter "the subject home"), for the residence of my wife and me.

5.

Construction was completed on the subject home in early November of 1993 and
we moved into the home in mid-November of 1993.

6.

At the time of the construction and sale of the subject home I was not working as
a general contractor.

7.

I obtained the Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance for the subject
home from the City of Fillmore on January 28, 1994.

8.

I affirm that the copy of the Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance
attached to the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is a true and correct copy of the said original document.

9.

On or about February 15, 1994, an Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered
between my wife and me and William and Mary Moore (hereinafter "the
Moores") for the sale of the subject home.

10.

I affirm that the copy of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement attached to the
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is a true
and correct copy of the said original document.

11.

We moved out of the subject home by the end of March, 1994.

12.

Never at any time after the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was executed, did I

perform any type of construction or repair services on the subject home.
13.

The transaction between my wife and I and the Moores for the sale and purchase
of the subject home closed on May 2, 1994.

14.

I affirm that the copies of the closing documents attached to the Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are true and correct
copies of the said original documents.

15.

I was not made aware of any alleged construction defects regarding the subject
home until December of 2000.

16.

The Moores filed their Complaint for damages on August 24, 2000.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this X3

day of February, 2001.

i^
DAN SMITH
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
<% 3 day of February, 2001.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said
County and State.

yim-J
LOUISE SEMMENS
H0TM PUBLIC'STATE ol UTAH
192 E 200 N STE203
ST GEORGE UT 84770

C0MM.EXP 12-9-2003_
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Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance
CITY OF FILLMORE

Name of Owner:.

Dan Smith

Address of Owner:

155 W 300 S

Property described as:.

Building Permit No.:

1143

Telephone No.:

743-5170

Zone:
Legal description

Otherwise known as:
Street address
Architect/Engineer:
Contractor; _
/

Occupancy Group:.

X)faA. Jffa'Jl*

Nn of buildings on lot

New

Altered

.Building No.

W
-No. of Units

TYPE OF OCCUPANCY
^

FAMILY OCCUPANCY
Number of families approved to reside per building
Number of boarders or roomers with automobiles approved to reside on premises with a family
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces
BACHING SINGLES OCCUPANCY
Number of baching singles approved to reside per unit
-Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces. The number of occupants owning or operating
vehicles cannot exceed this number.

I declare under penalty of perjury that i am the owner or authorized agent of the property subject of this request, that the foregoing statements and answers are true and correct, and that the stated conditions will be maintained on the premises.

Signature

Date

Any change in intensity of use on the building or premises, or an increase of more than five percent (5%) in the number of occupants in an apartment or multiple residential building will require the issuance of a new certificate.

&Z. / 7 7 ^
T

Remarks:

Section 4-4 Zoning Ordinance No. 77-3 Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance. It shall be unlawful
to use or occupy or to permit the use or occupancy of any building or premises until a certificate of
occupancy and zoning compliance shall have been issued for the premises and/or building by Fillmore City.
Failure to comply with any section of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not
more then $1000 or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both as is set forth in Chapter 1
Sec. ii-iOO.

Legend

Yes(X)

No(0)

TJATF ^JL«JJ

*A%

/S

11 4 +

The undersigned Buyer

. hereby deposits with DiuKemye

EARNEST MONkY, the amount of

^ }

ffll/V

^ T j . ^ A . ^ i l ^ t r L

*

'

&~

the form of (1 , f j ^ C ^
nch shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law

-=
r\

YUTK^ ^

Received by

okerage

' ^ / / q t i

Dollars ($ * / ( 9 ^ Q

7V?

)

«

A / <£*l

$

'

/irlYi^kL

Phone Number
OFFER TO PURCHASE

1 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of trjeproperty situated at
in the City of 3'-lMyrr^^^K^

_ County of

fYl t^La/l^

, Utah,

bject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations utiltULor other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
cordance with Section G Said property Is owned by

K / (2J)\

yynZA'

as sellers and is more particularly described

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

Q Vacant Lot

Q Vacant Acreage

^ I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY

S Commercial

_ f Residential

_ Other

O Condo

O Other

(a) Included Items Unless excluded below this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title
(b) Excluded items The following items are specifically excluded from this sale _

(c)
CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS
z) CONNE

Seller represents that the property includes the foUowing improvements in the purchase price

3 public sewer
10

Qrconnected
CKconnected

Q well
O

O septic tank

0 connected

IVsirngation water/.secondary system

@ other sanitary system
C f public water
@ private water

G connected
Q

# of shares /U\ A J_

m connected

Q^JV antenna

0 connected

E3 other
S

fl^omffan^P

0 master antenna

E l natural gas

_J electricity
_J
.
V-^xAAj

_ T dedicated road

O prewired

{^connected

(d) Survey A certified survey \J shall be furnished at the expense of

J_conne
8_
connected

£2 Ingress & egress by private easement
_ l paved

O curb and gutter
£ 3 other rights

_*

prior to closing B T shall not be furnished

(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject fo Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical
condition except

2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The total purchase price for the property is
-.
/ A

00(h OO

*7y

fifiO'QQ
O

'

"

~~

D principal

O
D interest,

% per annum with monthly payments of $
D taxes,

o

~"

"—'

) which shall be paid as follows

•

insurance,

•

O

condo fees,

D other

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at

8l;ooo>0°

v J / l ^ t 7 <^ f t r u (
c

representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,

which include

O

\J'f)AjJ^

representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing

which Include

Q

XU^My

Dollars {$ ff 3 j OOP'

which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT

which obligation bears interest at
O

^//qr;

D principal,

D interest,

•

% per annum with monthly payments of $
taxes,

D insurance,

•

condo fees

•

other

representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows

Other
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing Buyer agrees to use best efforts
assume and/or procure same ana* this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
) make application within
n interest rate not to exceed

/V / n
'A/ fJ\r

days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at
% if Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within _

_ days after Seller's acceptance

f this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Sefler upon written .notice Seller agrees to pay up to __

A//A
_ mortgage loan discount
otnts, not to exceed $
A/ / / \
In addition, seller agrees to pay $
Af / n
to be used for Buyer's other ,-loan costs
age two of a four page form
Seller's I n i t l a l s ^ ^ * i )
Date f * / ^ 5 / f f /
Buyer's Initials (* ) {* *)

Date Jl—z.

L

cumbrances and exceptions noted herein,
need by (J a current policy of title insurance In the ar.
of purchase price Igan abstract of title brought current,
in attorney's opinion (See Section H)«
INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing. Buyer shall take title
this Agreement.
ct to any existing restrictive covenants, Including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has Q)has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing
t
VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:
Cl^L
d.JL*A eJ* J
(*"J
CJ^iJ.^ ^
SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted'
•~1-LfrK-< _
ptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied
to closing:

,

___

. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before .

at a reasonable location to be designated by

r, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closingsoffice aH documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
\greement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall^be'made as of 0 date of possession Qddate of closing @ other
. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on
f'J )(i *y o y / 4 7Hunless extended by written agreement of parties.
. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the iisting&gent
A/ /
fir
represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer,
the selling agent
A//A
represents ( ) Seller ( ) /buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement
in disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her. (
)(
) Buyer's initials (
)(
) Seller's initials.
, GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
EPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE
. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
until
itil .&? ' 0(3
dfi (AM/pNji
(AWPm
lEYl
{to Xfe Buyer/

f / dht.f'
af'siSignalure)

J vT^/ $^ Ti / /
s
V
f j

V
, 19 f? fT , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse ap_cj
arid the Agent sharf4e^orft
shaH4ewrr7the J_fAR NE_-T
'
' / ,
^
^
n
i
IP O / / •-_>
S '?-.„"

K h / AfU-

S i g n a t u r e ) '

(Date) "

K

" ( A d d r e s s )

V^M'/^/

(Sate)

er's Sf^nafxire)

S A H o Y J. 3 f
;.^V

f / y./ - (•< xr

(SSN/TAX ID)
(SSI

(Phone)

vi'ti/tfiufiif

/"S.tr- /

(Phone)

(Address)

i'J?j/

(S§N/TAX ID) <

0KONE
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above
REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's initials)

COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
asents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until
ecified below.

(AM/PM)

, 19

-J-Qer's^Signature)

7V1
(Qate)

/

'

(Time)

• TJ7Q

(Phone)

(Address)

j____u£
tf, A^zL-1. *>. tslW_
^'loBm P>Q>&axns
(Time)
(Address]
er's Signature)
Jitm.miyU

to accept the terms

"7^-?
-St7o
(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)
(SSN/TAX ID)

CK ONE:
ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.
(Buyer's Initials)

COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

(Date)

'er's Signature)

(Time)

(Time)

(Date)

(Buyer's Signature)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
ate Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).
0 J1 Iacknowledge
acknowledge receipppf
receipppt aafinal
Tinaicopy
co of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:
ATUREJ3F
ATUREOF
JREJ3F SELLER

/,?

/ ,.

SIGNATURE/OF BUYER

/ / //

SIGNATURE/OF I

J

I' v \- V.

~ZaMi$. £rZK
ie three of a four page form

"/v/

Date

D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed o n .
titled Mall and return receipt attached hereto to the •

/
Date

Seller D Buyer. Sent by

.,19.

-by

EXHIBIT
^J

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT

SETTLEMENT STATEMENT
'ype of Loan
] FHA 2. a FmHA 3 D Conv. Unins.
1 VA
5 D Conv Ins

6. File Number
29827-M

Form Approved OMB No. 2502 0 2 6 5

7. Loan Number

8. Mortgage Insurance Case Nun

^ot«: This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are she
Items marked "(p.o.c.)" were paid outside the closing^ they are shown here for InformaUonaJ Qu/gosjas. an/i a/A oat inrJudA^
the totals.
E. Name and Address of Seller
F. Name and Address of Lender
Name and Address of Borrower

Dan Irvin Smith
Carol L. Smith
P.O. 985
Fillmore, Ut. 84631

Jam K. Moore
/ J. Moore
. Rt. Box 234
Lmore, Ut. 84631
Properly Location

H. Settlement Agent

ited in
Lmore, Ut. 84631

SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF MILLARD COUNTY
Place of Settlement
I. Settlement Data
P.O. BOX 658
5/02/94
F i l l m o r e , Utah 84631

. of Lot 6, Blk. 32, P l a t A, F i l l m o r e
r Survey.
Summary of Borrower1! Transaction

K. Summary of Seller's Transaction
4 0 0 . Gross Amount Due To Seller

Grots Amount Due From Borrower

83,000.00

Contract sales arlce

83,000.00

4 0 1 . Contract sales price
402. Personal property

. Personal property

164.60

. Settlement charges to borrower (line 1400)

403.
404.
405.

Adjustments for items paid by teller In adva nee

Adjustments for items paid by seller in advance

. City/town taxes

to

406. City/town taxes

to

. County taxes

to

407. County taxes

to

. Assessments

to

408

to

Assessments

409
410.
411.
412
i. Qrost Amount Due From Borrower

83,164.60

i. Amounts Paid By Or In Behalf Of Borrowe r

4,000,00

. Deposit or earnest money
. Principal amount of new loan(s)

420.

Gross Amount Due To Seller

500.

Reductions In Amount Due To Seller

501

83,000.00

Excess deposit (see Instructions)

502. Settlement charges to seller (line 1400)

Existing loan(s) taken subject to

4,000,00
629.00

503. Existing loan(s) taken subject to
504
505

Payoff of first mortgage loan
Payoff of second mortgage loan

506
507.

*

508.
509

Adjustments for Items unpaid by seller
. City/town taxes
to
. County taxes

1/01/940

. Assessments

510

i<n.7i

S/D?/q4

to

Adjustments for items unpaid by t e l l e r
City/town taxes
to

5 1 1 . County taxes
512

1/f)1/q4to

Assessments

S/n?

i<n.7i

to

513.
514.
515.
51QTnnrte
517.

ApjVH * 1

i-n

7$R4K-M

Q 7^A

17

518.
519.
t. Total Paid By/For Borrower
>. Cash At Settlement From/To Borrower
. Gross amount due from borrower (line 120)
Less amounts paid by/for borrower (line 220
I. Cash

SRS:

(

4,1*3.71

5 2 0 . Tota! Reduction Amount Due Sailor

K3,lfe4,fcU

6 0 0 . Cash At Settlement To/From Seller
6 0 1 . Gross amount due to seller (line 420)

4,iyj.7J)

78,970.89

1
/ ^ / ; / f c > N Jr? /m&Wj/
D From

a

To Borrower

"& "* > £ / * * " * *

' *—'

vnnoii c\ rr)A#u

602. Less reductions In amt. due seller (line 520)
603.

Casjj

SELLERS

w

O To

^

nU

From § © l l e ;

34,580.88

u^ooa.oo"
,
1

{14,bb

U.bb )
68,419.12

\6^&i(f.jJy>7/2X*JTM - ^ £ ^ 2 . 1 - 1 IRev.7/e

Cai*ej Jn,y/t C//w..//„

Total Sales/Broker's Commission based on price $
Division of Commission (line 700) as follows
$
to
$
to
Commission paid at Settlement

@

%«

Paid From
Seller's
Settlement
i

i

Items Payable In Connection With Loan
Loan Origination Fee
%
Loan Discount
%
Appraisal Fee
to
Credit Report
to
Lender's Inspection Fee
Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to
Assumption Fee

Items Required By Lender To Be Paid In Advance
Interest from
to
@$
months to
Mortgage Insurance Premium for
years to
Hazard Insurance Premium for
years to

Paid From
Borrower's
Funds at
Settlement

/day

3. Reserves Deposited W th Lender
1. Hazard Insurance
per month
months @ $
per month
I Mortgage Insurance
months @ $
per month
I City property taxes
months <5> $
I. County property taxes
per month
months @ $
per month
3. Annual assessments
months <5> $
per month
months @ $
3.
per month
months <a> $
r.
per month
months <§> S
3.
3. Title Charges
Security T i t l e Company
1. Settlement or closing fee
to
2. Abstract or title search
to
3. Title examination
to
4. Title Insurance binder
to
5. Document preparation
to
.Qpmr^y T i t - i * rnrrtp^ny
3. Notary fees
to
1. Attorney's fees
to
(includes above Items' numbers*
3 Title Insurance
to
Security T i t l o Company
(includes above Items' numbers:
9 Lender's coverage
S
0. Owner's coverage
83.000.00
$
1.
2.
3.
O. Government Recording and Transfer Charges
: Mortgage tt.no
; Release $f) ,QQ
1, Recording fees Deed$ 1 S . 0 0
; Mortgage $
2 City/county tax/stamps Deed $
; Mortgage $
3. State tax/stamps. Deeds

75.00

75 00

?«; nr\

2^ nn

529 00

T).nn

0. Additional Settlement Charges
1. Survey
to
2. Pest Inspection to
TTplmnrP hfafrpr I k ^ r q &c-,'-.nr
p ^ l l m p r ^ M-qt-p-r llqprt;fi.<\<^nr.
^o.q/1 tfcit r>r &^p<^rnpnt-<3
6
>0. Total Settlement Charges (enter on lines 103, Section J and 502, Section K)

ERS INITIALS'.JlQjlL

kim

SELLERS INITIALS:

in nn
13 fiO

164.60

629,00
1121-2 (Rev. 7/87)

Order No, 23Q27-M
TO;

DATE.
Security Title Company of Millard County
180 South Main
P.O. Box 658
Fillmore, Utah 84631

—5/02/34

These instructions submitted this date, to you as ESCROW ^ F ^ i T d ^ y ^ e unc*ersigned
Seller(s) and Huyer(s), of the following real estate situated in
County, State of Utah, to-wit;
Beginning 20 feet West of the Northeast corner of Lot 6, Block 32, P l a t A,
Fillmore City Survey, thence West 89 f e e t ; thence South 128 f e e t ; thence
East 27 feet; thence South 202 feet more or l e s s t o the South l i n e of said
Lot 6; thence East 82 f e e t ; thence North 165 feet irore or l e s s t o a point
165 feet South of the North l i n e of said Lot 6; thence West 20 f e e t ; thence
North 165 feet to the point of beginning.
TOGETHER WITH a l l
rights,
privileges,
easements,
rights
of vray,
improvements
and
appurtenances
thereunto
belonging
or
in anyway
appertaining t h e r e t o .
SUBJECT TO covenants, conditions, r e s t r i c t i o n s , r e s e r v a t i o n s , easements and
r i g h t s of way of record.
•

~&

'k%

' :-: &

LocafeedHnf lillrnqfe, Ut

84631

Property Address:
WITNESSETH:
The undersigned parties hereby employ you as ESCROW AGENT to complete the closing
of this escrow (sale) in accordance with the following instructions. The parties agree to
deliver to you all properly executed instruments, documents, and funds necessary to comply
with the terms hereof; and which you may use when you have satisfied the terms and provisions of this agreement, or are in position to do so, on or before the 7
day
of
May_
, 19JL214 and:
You can issue your Standard Coverage Form Policy of Title Insurance with liability of
$
83,000.00, (fee: $ 529,Q0
charged to Seller
)
covering the hereinafter described property showing title vested in:
William K. Moore and Mary J . Moore, husband and wife, as j o i n t tenants

To bo free of all liens and encumbrances, except as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Taxes:
for the year 1994 now a l i e n not yet due.
Special assessments?
Easements:
in existence and/or of record.
Other:

The SALES PRICE IS $

83,000.00,

to be paid as follows:

EARNEST MONEY $ 4,000.00
DOWN PAYMENTS 79,000.00 plus
time of closing.
VKVKHHED BALANCE: $
0.00

closing c o s t s

t o be paid in f u l l a t the

iSwhuck sid? for GENERAL CONDITIONS)

GENERAL CONDITIONS
HANDLING OF FUNDS AND DOCUMENTS: Deposit all funds in connection with this
escrow in any of our escrow accounts in any federally insured depository selected by you and
disburse same by the issuance of checks from said account. P a y encumbrances in accordance
with this agreement, prorate all agreed items, and record such escrowed instruments as are
necessary or proper for commission, and disburse balance of escrowed funds to the party or
parties entitled thereto. If sale be based on contract of sale, deliver such contract and all related
instruments to designated escrow collection agent. Cause fire insurance policies to show the
interest of the respective parties after closing sale. You are hereby relieved of any obligation to
determine if fire insurance policy is in force and its premium paid.
TAXKS AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS: It is understood t h a t property taxes are assessed
nna 'interest on special assessments is charged on a ca'lenaar year-basis, ^f ou are therefore
instructed to make all prorations thereof on that basis. In prorating taxes, if the amount of the
current year's taxes be unknown, use prior year's taxes as a basis. You are hereby released
from any and all liability which could arise by reason of a n y variance between the amount
payable in taxes on the year of closing and on the said prior year. If parcel being sold be a
portion of a larger tract and no separate tax assessment is available therefor, no proration
shall be required to be made in escrow the Buyer and Seller hereby agreeing that they will
adjust the proration of taxes between themselves. You are to make no proration of unpaid
principal of special assessments unless specifically instructed to do so. You shall have no
assessment as may be reported by the various municipal offices involved.
PRORATIONS: Before prorating items relating to existing encumbrances and in accounting
for assumed obligations and impounded reserves, obtain from agent or individual making
collections thereon all needed information, including rate of interest, payment terms and existing balances. You are instructed to use information in m a k i n g required prorations and effecting settlement between the parties and are hereby released from a n y liability or responsibility
should the information furnished to and used by you prove to be incorrect.
CANCELLATION OR AMENDMENT: This escrow may not be cancelled or its terms modified without consent of all the parties hereto. Should either party to this escrow elect to cancel
the same, you are instructed to notify forthwith the r e m a i n i n g parties by mailing written
notice of said election to them and the real estate agent at their last known address. In the
event of cancellation, all documents are to be returned to the respective parties who shall have
deposited same with you. If cancellation occurs because of the default of seller and not of buyer,
you ure instructed to refund to buyer all funds escrowed by him, after deducting your charges
and expenses. However, if cancellation is occasioned by default of buyer and not of seller, you
are authorized to pay to seller buyer's escrowed earnest money, which shall be forfeited to seller
and treated as liquidated damages. In the event you have documents executed by both buyer
and seller, you shall cancel same by marking with the word "void," retaining said documents
in your files.
Failure to close this escrow within the period hereinabove provided shall not automatically
terminate or cancel same. You may continue to regard it as executory until notified to the
contrary in writing by any of the parties hereto. Should a dispute or controversy arise between
buyer and seller, you shall hold all monies and documents until such a time as existing differences shall have been resolved through compromise or a final judicial determination h a d of the
rights of the parties. In the event you interplead you may deposit the documents and funds in
court, deducting all your charges and expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees
and you will thereupon be relieved of further liability or responsibility in connection with this
escrow. The parties hereto agree to save you harmless, in the event of any such disagreement
between the parties, against all liability, costs, damages, expenses and attorney's fees t h a t
may arise or which may be incurred or sustained by you by reason hereof.

POSSESSION r>ATF, CLOSE OF ESCROW
PRORATE AND/OR ADJUST THE FOLLOWING AS OF
(See General Conditions on reverse side for details.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Hay

2, 199^

Taxes and special assessments.
Fire and casualty insurance and FHA insurance, if applicable.
Interest on all encumbrances.
Rents, if any, per rent statement.
Charge the Buyer and credit the Seller for funds held in impound account, if any, pertaining
to any loans assumed by Buyer.

WATER STOCK AND/OR WATER RIGHTS: ' 3 2

shares

o£ F W u

' - -*« ^ t e r stock

General instructions and conditions set forth on the reverse side hereof are hereby incorporated
in and made a part of the following instructions.
At the close of ESCROW you are to deliver or mail all documents, checks, $tc. by regular mail to
the persons entitled thereto at the addresses provided below,
\?

. * P ft f *

*

Failure to close this ESCROW within the period of time.hereinabove provided shall not automatically terminate or cancel the same. You may continue to regard it as executory until
canceled by notice from any of the parties hereto in writing.
The SELLER agrees to sell, and the BUYER agrees to buy the above described property upon
the terms and conditions herein contained.

SELLER

BUYER

Dan I r v i n Smith

{

William K. Moore

Ca*jd.J. &>-driL
"VBUYER

SELLER
Carol L. Smith
Address: p , o . 985
Fillmore, Ut

Mary J . Moore
Address, s t a r Rt. Box 234

84631

Fillmore, Ut

Phone Number: 743-5170

Phone Number: 743-6834

Social Security Number:

Social Security Number:

ACCEPTED THIS.J

day of.

May

84631

-.19.1214

SECURITY TITLE COMPANY
OF MILLARD COUNTY

^<nJh>

BY:.
R. Kent Dalton

(See back aide for GENERAL CONDITIONS)

Page Two
General Conditions

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: Parties hereto agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY,
assumes no responsibility or liability of unrecorded tax or mechanic's liens, personal property
taxes, mining locations, rights of parties in possession of the premises, surveys, location of
improvement or boundary lines, use of property in compliance with zoning ordinances or
restrictions and such other matters as are excepted under Schedule "B" of the standard form
policy or title insurance. It is further agreed that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, makes no
representation as to the sufficiency or validity of the documents deposited herewith nor makes
any representations as to the value, quantity, or condition of the property described herein. In
the event sale includes furniture or other personal property, it is understood and agreed that
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY has made no search of the records for chattel mortgages or
conditional sales contracts and does not certify as to title thereto, and buyer accepts the bill of
sale with understanding. Parties hereto further agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY
assumes no liability for and is expressly released from any claim or claims whatsoever in
connection with the receiving, retaining, and delivering of the above papers, except to account
for payments made thereon, from which it is authorized to deduct its customary collection
charges and expenses, together with any amount which may be required to pay costs, attorney
fees and other legal expenses by reason of any litigation or controversy which may arise in
connection herewith.
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, as ESCROW AGENT and ESCROWEE, assumes no responsibility for determining that the parties to this escrow have complied with the requirements of
the Truth in Lending, Consumer Credit Protection Act, (Public Law 90-321), Utah Consumer
Credit Code, or similar laws.

ADDITION TO GENERAL CONDITIONS
DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS: I n t e r n a l Revenue Code
S e c t i o n 6109(h)
imposes requirements
for f u r n i s h i n g ,
disclosing,
and
i n c l u d i n g t a x p a y e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers i n t a x r e t u r n s on the p a r t i e s t o
a residential real estate transaction involving seller-provided financing.
The p a r t i e s u n d e r s t a n d t h a t the d i s c l o s u r e r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e
e x c l u s i v e o b l i g a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s t o t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n and t h a t
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s
not o b l i g a t e d
to
transmit
the
taxpayer
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers t o the I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e or to the p a r t i e s
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s not r e n d e r i n g an o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e e f f e c t of
t h i s law on t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n , and t h e p a r t i e s a r e not a c t i n g on any
s t a t e m e n t s made or o m i t t e d by the escrow or c l o s i n g o f f i c e r .
To f a c i l i t a t e compliance w i t h t h i s l a w , the p a r t i e s t o t h i s escrow h e r e b y
authorize
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY t o
release
any
party's
taxpayer
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number t o any r e q u e s t i n g p a r t y who i s a p a r t y t o t h i s
transaction.
The r e q u e s t i n g party s h a l l d e l i v e r a w r i t t e n r e q u e s t
to
escrow.
The p a r t i e s h e r e t o waive a l l r i g h t s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y r e g a r d i n g
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t a x p a y e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers and a g r e e t o hold SECURITY
TITLE COMPANY h a r m l e s s a g a i n s t any f e e s , c o s t s , or judgments i n c u r r e d
and/or awarded i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the . r e l e a s e of t a x p a y e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
numbers.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I am an employee of DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C. and that on the ^ 3
day of February, 2001,1 placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the United States mails at St. George, Utah, with
1st class postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Gregory B. Hadley
James K. Haslam
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo,UT 84604
An Employeeof Dixon & Truman

ADDENDUM 2

1

i
A. BRYCE DDCON, ESQ (#889)
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ (#8992)
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Defendants

OFTw-n*••"..'
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
Plaintiffs,

•

vs.

;> MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
;) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
]

DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

]
)I Oral argument requested
)
]) Civil No.: 000700142 MI
]) Judge: EYRE
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INTRODUCTION
In August, 2000, after living in a home for about 6 !4 years, the Plaintiffs sued the Defendants
alleging DAN SMITH and CAROL SMITH sold them the home in February, 1994, with
construction defects. A previous motion for summary judgment was filed by the Smiths. The court
granted the motion partially and allowed discovery to proceed on the following two issues: 1)
whether the Smiths failed to disclose "latent and material defects in the home, or building code
violations, of which [the Smiths] were aware," and 2) "when those defects should have reasonably

been discovered'1 by the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiffs own testimony and discovery responses show that all of the 30-42
construction defects that they allege in this case could have been discovered by a home inspection
before they bought the house. The Utah law of caveat emptor, therefore, demands dismissal of all
claims based on said defects.
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-21.5, the applicable statute of limitations, bars all claims
brought by the Plaintiffs. Pursuant to Section 21.5, the period for commencing an action for breach
of a written contract is six years and the date for commencing an action for all other claims is two
years from the date Plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered, through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, the alleged defects. Here, Plaintiffs commenced their lawsuit more than six
years after the completion of construction and the date of contract. In addition, discovery has
revealed that Mary Moore had notice of the major alleged defects some five and six years before she
filed suit, though she chose not to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the defects until the year
2000.
At Plaintiffs' request, in August, 2000, Jason Bullock inspected the home and prepared a list
of 30 alleged defects. Most of these alleged defects, even if proven, are too insignificant to warrant
discussion. For example, item number 7 in Bullock's list alleges that an electrical outlet that was
covered by kitchen cabinetry had no cover plate. Even the Plaintiffs' own experts acknowledge that
the cost of an outlet cover plate is merely a dollar-although Plaintiffs' expert, Lloyd Steenblik, thinks
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it would take an electrician one hour, at $45 an hour, to screw the cover plate onto the outlet (See
page 8, Item #7, of the report of Project Analysts, one of Plaintiffs' experts Copies of the pages of
Project Analysts report cited herein are annexed as Exhibit 1 ) In addition, item number 25 alleges
that the electrical control panel was not labeled, although the wires next to the panel were labeled
It would take mere minutes for any person to fix this so called "defect" by transferring the
information from the labels on the wires to the stickers on the panel However, Plaintiffs' expert
Lloyd Steenbhk estimated that it would take an electrician 6 hours at $45 an hour to label the
electrical panel See page 30 of Exhibit 1 A third example is item number 29 which alleges that
outlets in the garage are not GFCI This could have been remedied by the installation of an outlet
costing a few dollars according to the Smiths' expert, Michael Barrett * See Item 29 of Michael
Barrett's report, the pertinent pages of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit 2 Most importantly,
every one of these alleged defects were obvious and not latent
The house is not threatened by the alleged defects The roof does not leak There is no
known damage to footings or foundation The best the Plaintiffs' experts can do is say that these are,
technically, building code violations and, if not corrected, might do harm m the future despite the
fact that the Plaintiffs lived m the home contentedly for over six years without a single complaint
to the Smiths

1

These are just a few of the many examples of how the Plaintiffs' experts have inflated
the repair costs of alleged defects. It is not necessary for this motion for summary judgment to
treat that issue, however
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IL
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for damages on August 24, 2000, alleging

separate causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Rescission; (3) Fraudulent Nondisclosure;
(4) Misrepresentation; (5) Violation of Consumer Sales Practices Act; and (6) Punitive Damages.
See Complaint. They amended the complaint to mutual mistake.
2.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Smiths knew their home was not built to code

when they sold it to the Plaintiffs. They call this "fraudulent nondisclosure." See Complaint, at
Third Cause of Action, p. 4.
3.

The fourth cause of action of Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the Smiths

misrepresented that their home was "built in compliance with applicable building codes," was "safe
for occupancy, and able to be lawfully occupied." See Complaint, at p. 5.
4.

Soon after the Smiths were served with the Complaint they submitted their first

Motion for Summary Judgment. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
5.

On August 16,2001, the Court entered an Order on The Smiths' Motion for Summary

Judgment. See Court's August 16, 2001, Order annexed hereto as Exhibit 3.
6.

The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim. See Court's

August 16, 2001, Order at p. 2.
1.

The Court's Order also reflects that the Plaintiffs were required to elect their remedies

between the breach of contract claim and the rescission claim. See Court's August 16, 2001, Order
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at p. 3.
8.

Plaintiffs elected the remedy of rescission as their sole remedy in this action and the

Court ordered that the Plaintiffs could not seek damages under their breach of contract claim. See
Court's August 16, 2001, Order at pp. 3 - 4 .
9.

The Court concluded "that the Smiths . . . may have a legal duty to disclose to

Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home, or building code violations, of which [the
Smiths] were aware." See Court's August 16, 2001, Order at pp. 2-3.

IIL
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs7 home, which is the subject matter of this litigation, is located at 155 West

300 South, Fillmore City, Millard County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Home").
2.

The Smiths built the Home for their own residence. Deposition of Dan Smith, p. 71,

the pertinent pages of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit 4.
3.

A^

The Smiths obtained a building permit for the construction of the Home. See

Building Permit and Building Permit Application annexed hereto as Exhibit 5.
4.

t

^"

The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the appropriate agencies

throughout its construction. See May 4, 2001, letter from Fillmore City annexed hereto as Exhibit
6. Also see p. 89 of Peterson deposition annexed hereto as Exhibit 7.
5.

\ ^

The Fillmore City Building Inspector, Jack Peterson, discussed the amount of roof
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ventilation with Mr. Smith and approved the as-built ventilation. See Deposition of Jack Peterson
at p. I l l , Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5 to his deposition, annexed as Exhibit 7a.
6.

The City Building Inspector expressly approved the height of the stairs even though

they were not in technical compliance with the code. See Exhibit 7, Peterson Deposition at pp. 65,
66.
7.

During one of the construction inspections, the City Building Inspector observed the

felt paper that served as flashing for the windows. See Peterson Deposition at p. 54, Exhibit 7.
8.

The Smiths obtained a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance on or about

January 28, 1994. See Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance annexed to Peterson
deposition as Exhibit 7, found here as Exhibit 8.
9.

The City Building Inspector signed off on the certificate of occupancy and the final

inspection. See Peterson Deposition, at p. 88, Exhibit 7.
10.

An Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("Agreement") was entered into between the

parties on or about February 15, 1994. See Agreement annexed hereto as Exhibit 9.
1L

The Agreement states in pertinent part that:

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above
and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical condition, except:
(this space
was intentionally left blank by the parties).
See Agreement at ^J 1(e).
SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the
following items are also warranted: none (handwritten).
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See Agreement at ^ 6
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES This offer is made
subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be
satisfied pnor to closing closing fees to be paid half by buyer + half by seller
(handwritten)
See Agreement at ^ 7
GENERAL PROVISIONS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE
GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE
BEEN ACCEPTED BY BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED
INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE
See Agreement at ^ 11
12

The General Provisions (also Exhibit 9) state

B INSPECTION Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling
Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income
herefrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition
subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event that Buyer desires
an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for
and paid by Buyer
See General Provisions at f B
C SELLER WARRANTIES Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim
or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
or which will not be remedied pnor to closing,
(c) the plumbing, heating, air
conditioning and ventilating systems, electncal system, and appliances shall be sound
or in satisfactory working condition at closing
See General Provisions at f C
COMPLETE AGREEMENT - NO ORAL AGREEMENTS
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This instrument

constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements
between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this
agreement
See General Provisions at ^j L
13

Plaintiffs did not condition the purchase of the property on the outcome of a home

inspection See Agreement (Exhibit 9) at ^j 6
14

Plaintiffs did not have an independent home inspection performed prior to purchasing

the Home

See Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants1 First Set of Requests for Admissions to

Plaintiffs, Response Number 6, and the Smiths First Set of Requests for Admission, Request Number
6 The pertinent request and their responses are annexed hereto as Exhibit 10
15

Plaintiffs walked through the house before purchasing it but never considered hiring

a home inspection to determine whether there were any unsatisfactory conditions

See Moore

Deposition, Vol I, pp 72-73
16

Plaintiffs had the opportunity to have a home inspection conducted and the Smiths

did not prevent them from doing so See Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendants Second Set of Requests
for Admission dated February 14, 2003, Response Number 2, 3 and 4 , and the Smiths Second Set
of Requests for Admission, Request Number 2, 3 and 4 Annexed as Exhibit 10
17

Since May 2, 1994, the Plaintiffs made improvements to the Home and the lot,

including landscaping, and installation of water softener, air conditioning, doors and water line, and
enjoyed the benefit of living m the Home and complete control over the Home and lot
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See

Deposition of Mary Moore, pp 50-52, 144-151. (Exhibit 11)
18.

Plaintiff admits that:

Neither my husband or I have ever been a contractor or an engineer, nor do we have
any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety
inspections, or anything like that.
See Affidavit of Mary Moore (Exhibit 12) at % 7.
19.

The alleged code violations identified by Plaintiffs were all discovered in the year

2000 by a home inspection, which did not involve destructive testing. See Exhibit 10, Response
Number 5, Request Number 5. See Deposition of Jason Bullock p. 33, Exhibit 13. See Deposition
of Lloyd Steenblik p. 77-78, copies of the pages cited herein are attached hereto as Exhibit 14. See
Project Analysts report (Exhibit 1) at p. 3.
20.

Jason Bullock prepared a list of 30 alleged code violations that he found upon

performing the home inspection in the year 2000, for which Mary Moore was charged merely $60.
See Deposition of Jason Bullock, p. 31-33. Exhibit 13.
21.

Jason Bullock discovered all of the alleged defects as he walked through the house

as though he were performing a final inspection. See Bullock Deposition, p. 30. Exhibit 13.
22.

Steenblik's inspection added 12 minor items to the list but the major alleged defects

were all in Bullock's original list. See Project Analysts report, summary sheet, Exhibit 1, p. 2.
23.
Plaintiffs discovered, or, were placed on notice of, many of the alleged defects long
before the home inspection in 2000:
a.

Mary Moore knew of the alleged window defects almost immediately upon
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moving into the house when she saw flaking of paint caused by water at the end of
the first winter. See Moore Deposition, Vol I, pp. 41-42. Exhibit 11.
b.
Mary Moore also saw exposed footings the first spring when she moved into
the house while doing landscaping. See Moore Deposition, Vol I, pp. 46,47. Exhibit
11.
c.
Defect Number 4 on Steenblik's list, alleging water damage and cracking to
the southeast corner of the foundation, was known to Mary Moore the first spring
after she moved into the house. See Moore Deposition, Vol. I, pp. 107-108. Exhibit
11.
d.
Some allegedly bad shingles on the garage roof were called to Mary Moore's
attention on November 7, 1997, when she had the shingles inspected by the shingle
manufacturer and was told that they were damaged by inadequate ventilation. See
Moore Deposition, Vol. II, p. 167 (Exhibit 11), and Exhibit 6 to her deposition.
(Annexed here as 11 A).
e.
Defect Number 41 in Steenblik's list, alleging plumbing defects, were known
to Mary Moore six months after she moved into the Home. See Moore Deposition,
Vol. I, p. 27. Exhibit 11.
f.
Defect Number 12, alleging that the smoke detectors were omitted from the
bedrooms, was known to Mary Moore approximately one year after moving into the
Home. See Moore Deposition, Vol. I, pp. 94,95. Exhibit 11.
g.
The various minor electrical problems alleged by Plaintiffs were known to
Mary Moore in December, 1997, when she was given notice of the need to check the
circuit breaker after the furnace stopped working. See Moore Deposition, Vol. I, p.
104. Exhibit 11. See also Exhibit 11 A.
24.

Plaintiffs have admitted that all of the 42 alleged defects could have been discovered

by a home inspection before they bought the house. See Plaintiffs5 Answers to Second Set of
Admission, Exhibit 10, Response Number 7, and the Second Set of Requests for Admission, Exhibit
10, Request Number 7.
Page 10 of 28

25.

Plaintiffs have admitted that all of the alleged defects are patent except items 9, 12,

26, 27, 38 and 39.2 See Plaintiffs' Answers to Second Set of Admission, Response Number 9, and
the Second Set of Requests for Admission, Request Number 9. Exhibit 10.
26.

There is no evidence of serious damage to the integrity of the house. There is no

allegation that the roof leaks. See Mary Moore deposition, p. 20. Exhibit 11. There is no known
damage to footings or foundation. See Mary Moore deposition p. 45. Exhibit 11.
27.

Lloyd Steenblik at first alleged that Dan Smith attached the window flashing

to the outside of the aluminum siding. Exhibit 1, Project Analysts report, item 9 at p. 10. Later his
superior showed him that he was mistaking a molding strip for the window nailing fm and that he
was wrong on that opinion. Steenblik depo. p. 45. Exhibit 14.
28.

Jack Peterson says he saw on inspection the felt paper that served as flashing for the

windows. Peterson depo. p. 54. Exhibit 7. He also testified that the slight water damage is caused
by mere condensation that sometimes forms on cold days because of the thin aluminum on the
windows. Pp. 57-58, Exhibit 7.

2

The Smiths propounded to the Plaintiffs a request for admission intended to establish
which defects were admittedly patent and which were considered by the Plaintiffs to be "latent,"
as the latter term is used in the Court's August 16, 2001, Order. Request Number 9 stated:
Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 42 in your
expert witness report at the time of the sale of the house were not a latent defects
as the phrase "latent defecf'is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths'
motion for summary judgment."
In response, Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects were not latent except items 9, 12, 26, 27,
38 and 39.
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29.

Allegation of Overspanning of Floor Joists- Peterson testified that the code calls

for a 13 foot one inch span. Peterson measured the span and found in his report, Exhibit 4 to his
deposition, annexed hereto as Exhibit 7B, that no joists exceeded that span. P. 75.
30.

Alleged lack of dirt covering the footings. At the time of the final inspection the

ground around the house was so "muddy" that the finish "grading was impossible." Peterson depo.
p. 148. Exhibit 7. With Jack Peterson's permission and the expectation that they would do the finish
grading in the spring when the weather cleared up, the Smiths were given a final inspection approval.
Depo. Peterson, p. 77. Exhibit 7.
31.

Allegation of Inadequate Roof Ventilation. The undisputed evidence is that Dan

Smith and the building inspector, Jack Peterson, had a discussion about the roof ventilation. Jack
Peterson testifies that he accepted Dan Smith's opinion that the amount of ventilation was adequate.
He did not "red tag" the ventilation. In Exhibit 5 to his deposition he said, "I also visited the job site
another occasion and Dan and I discussed the venting of the attic. Dan felt that it was adequate."
Exhibit 7A. Thus, Peterson "accepted it." Peterson depo. p. 111. Exhibit 7.
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ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS ARE BARRED INASMUCH AS THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED
TO HAVE THE HOME INSPECTED AND INASMUCH AS THE APPLICABLE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION RAN BEFORE SUIT WAS FILED.
This case is ripe for adjudication and disposal through summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
matenal fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." URCP 56(c).
hi this case, there are no latent defects because all of the defects alleged by Plaintiff were
discoverable by a home inspection. Indeed, all of the alleged defects in this case were literally
discovered by a home inspection. Utah law clearly holds that failure to obtain a home inspection in
these circumstances requires dismissal. Moreover, the applicable statutes of limitation ran before
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case. The Smiths should no longer be required to defend
themselves and incur attorney fees because "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and
the Smiths are "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,"
A.

The doctrine of caveat emptor applies to preclude Plaintiffs' claims inasmuch
as Plaintiffs had a duty to have the home inspected and had they done so, the
alleged defects could have been discovered before the sale.

Plaintiffs walked through the house before purchasing it but never considered hiring a home
inspection to determine whether there were any unsatisfactory conditions. They admit having the
opportunity to do so and that the Smiths did not prevent them from doing so. Plaintiffs also admit
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that the defects could have been discovered by a home inspection before they bought the house.
The alleged code violations were discovered in the year 2000 by a home inspection which
did not involve destructive testing. Jason Bullock created a list of 30 alleged code violations that
he found upon performing a $60 home inspection.
Maack v. Resource Design and Construction, Inc. 875 P.2d 570 (Ut. App. 1994) disposes of
this case. It holds that where a home inspection would have revealed the defects, failure to obtain
a home inspection is fatal to the plaintiffs case.
In Maack the plaintiff alleged fraudulent concealment,

nondisclosure, and negligent

misrepresentation. (Footnote of causes of action alleged by Plaintiffs here) P. 574. As here, Maack
did not obtain a home inspection before purchase. P. 573. As here, the Maack sales agreement
contained an "as is" clause "without any warranties as to its condition." P. 573. In Maack the trial
court found that the plaintiffs' failure to ask for a warranty and to have a home inspection performed
"fell below the level of ordinary diligence." P.574. The trial court granted summary judgment. P.
574.
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiffs alleged fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure, and negligent
misrepresentation.3 Plaintiffs knew when they purchased the Home that they lacked knowledge
concerning construction and, therefore, would need assistance to reasonably determine the condition
of the home. As in Maack, Plaintiffs chose to forego a home inspection, even though the sales

3

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim in 2001.
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contract expressly permitted the Plaintiffs to do so. As in Maack, the sales contract contained an "as
is" clause.
The Maack court, discussing the fraudulent concealment claim, quoting Atherton
Condominium Bd. v. Blume Dev.. 115 Wash. 2d 506, 799 P.2d 250, 261 (Wash 1990) stated that
a "fraudulent concealment cause of action requires, inter alia, that ca careful, reasonable inspection
on the part of the purchaser would not disclose the defect'." P. 578. Then the Maack court disposed
of the nondisclosure claim, noting that the Maacks were unreasonable in failing to obtain a home
inspection and, quoting from Horsch v. Terminix Infl Co., 19 Kan. App. 2d 134, 865 P.2d 1044,
1048 (Kan. App. 1993), held that a "party to [a] contract has [a] duty to disclose facts material to
[the] transaction and not within [the] reasonable reach of the other party if the other party could not
discover these facts by exercise of reasonable diligence." P. 579.4
Therefore, Maack holds that failure to obtain a home inspection disposes of both fraudulent
concealment and nondisclosure. In this case, a $60 home inspection prompted this lawsuit which
is based strictly on allegations of technical code violations. Mary Moore's deposition and the reports
of the Plaintiffs' experts annexed hereto show that the alleged defects were not discovered by a
precipitous event. For over six years, Plaintiffs lived contentedly in the Home without a single
complaint to the Smiths. There was no subsidence causing cracking of stucco or instability of the
4

The Maack court observed at footnote 8 that twice in their appellate brief plaintiffs
admitted that an inspection by a general contractor ... would have revealed the defects in the
stucco and other parts of the residence." Similarly, in this case Plaintiffs admit that a home
inspection would have revealed the alleged defects before the sale of the Home.
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foundation. There was no roof leak that made the home suddenly uninhabitable. The ceiling did not
cave in. A review of Plaintiffs' expert report says almost nothing of damage caused by any of the
alleged defects. Every alleged defect was discovered by a very basic home inspection performed
over six years after the sale of the Home-a home inspection which, had it been done before purchase,
would have disclosed the alleged defects to the Plaintiffs.
There are many issues as to whether the alleged defects were caused by the Plaintiff
inasmuch as numerous construction and remodeling changes were done by the Plaintiffs. There are
issues whether the alleged defects actually complied with the building code applicable in 1993.
Nonetheless, there is no issue but that every alleged defect could have been discovered by a home
inspection before the Plaintiffs purchased the Home because that is how these alleged defects were
discovered over 6 years later.
Maack is not the only Utah case on this point. In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah
App. 1994), plaintiff home-buyers sued the sellers of the subject home, among others, for defects
in the home. The trial court granted the defendant sellers' motion for summary judgment, and the
plaintiffs appealed. The Schafir opinion is replete with statements of law regarding Utah's caveat
emptor doctrine and the duties of home buyers to have the homes inspected prior to purchasing the
homes.
The Schafir court held that:
The general rule in this state is that the doctrine of caveat emptor still applies to the
sale of real estate. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the "doctrine [of caveat
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emptor] has eroded in the sale of new residential housing. However, the doctrine
appears to prevail in the sale of used property whether homes or commercial."
Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 645
(Utah 1982). Additionally, "one of the reasons for retaining the doctrine of caveat
emptor in the area of real estate transactions is the assumption that the vendee
has a reasonable opportunity to inspect the premises." Loveland v. Orem City
Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 779 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting).
Schafir at 1389 (emphasis added). The Schafir court further stated that:
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls
on the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a
knowledgeable home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale.
See Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643,
645 (Utah 1982). Oftentimes, however, real estate agents and sellers are
understandably unaware of latent defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an
inherent risk involved in purchasing a home.
Schafir at 1390 (emphasis added). Even in its footnotes, the Schafir court restated its position,
stating that:
Generally, absent some express agreement between the parties—which is absent here-the doctrine of caveat emptor precludes a home buyer from bringing suit for
discoverable defects in the home. Especially when the sale of a used home is
involved, the purchaser is on notice that the residence is not new and may contain
defects affecting the home's quality or condition. In the case of latent defects, a home
buyer's best resort against the seller is to sue for either fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
Schafir at n.12 (emphasis added).
The Schafir court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the defendant
home-sellers. Schafir clearly places the responsibility to discover defects on the buyer, not the seller.
Schafir holds that defects discoverable by a home inspection are not actionable. In the case at bar,
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since all defects are of the discoverable type, summary judgment should be granted
In accord is a recent Utah Supreme Court opinion Hermansen v Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48
P 3d 235 (citing Mitchell v Chnstensen. 2001 UT 80 at P11, 31 P3d 572 held "With this holding,
we issued some specific precautions We first cautioned that 'if a defect can be discovered by
reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee "
The Hermansen case noted that numerous home inspectors are not required but a basic home
inspection is required to exercise ordinary diligence Id at P 26 Neither Hermansen nor Mitchell
overrule this requirement laid down m Maack and Schafir
In the mstant case, the alleged defects were discovered by a non-destructive inspection in the
year 2000, and could have been discovered in similar fashion before the sale of the Home m 1994
The Maack, Schafir, and Hermansen decisions all make it clear that the Plaintiffs had a duty to
protect themselves by having the Home inspected before the sale Plaintiffs did not have the home
inspected before the sale, instead Plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence, waiting until
August, 2000, over six years after purchasing the Home, to have it inspected5 In this case, Plaintiffs
did not exercise ordinary diligence to discover the alleged defects and, therefore, the doctnne of
caveat emptor applies to preclude the Plaintiffs from bnnging suit for the alleged defects in the
Home

D

If "reasonable diligence" were construed to permit a person to wait as long as the
person wanted before having a home inspected, these types of lawsuits could be brought at any
time after the closing of the sale, even fifty years later
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B. Plaintiffs claims are also barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.
This is a construction defect case. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Dan Smith constructed
the house in violation of building code provisions, thus making the house unfit for human
occupation6 The Plaintiffs contend that these code violations constitute defects Construction defect
cases are governed by UCA §78-12-2 5. Subsection (3) provides
(a) An action by or against a provider (builder) based m contract or warranty shall be
commenced within six years of the date of completion of the improvement or
abandonment of construction Where an express contract or warranty establishes a
different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within that limitations
period
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years
from the earlier of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which
a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable diligence If the
cause of action is discovered or discoverable before completion of the improvement
or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins to run upon completion
or abandonment
The Plaintiffs have alleged breach of contract as their first cause of action Thus, the six year
time limitation established by subsection 3(a) applies to bar Plaintiffs' claim The cause of action
accrues when the house is completed In this case the house was built in November of 1993. The
complaint was initially filed on August 24, 2000, well over six years later While subsection 3(b)
allows for all other causes of action a tolling of the limitations period until the plaintiff should have

6

Plaintiffs make this argument notwithstanding the obvious fact that they have lived m
the house for 9 years, the last three after the home inspection which purportedly revealed that the
house was not fit to inhabit They also ignore the fact that the building official signed a
Certificate of Occupancy.
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discovered the alleged defects, subsection 3(a), covenng breaches of contract, does not Subsection
3(a) clears states that a cause of action for construction defect arising from contract accrues on the
completion of the construction or the date of the contract It does not accrue upon discovery of the
defect
In Bngham Young University v Paulsen Construction. 744 P 2d 370 (I Jt Sup Ct 1987) the
court held m a construction defect case that the six year limitation barred BYXTs claim But BYU
argued for tolling of the period BYU claimed "that it is entitled to have the statute tolled until BYU
discovered that it had a claim against Paulsen " Id at p 1373 The court rejected that argument
holding "In construction contract cases [that is, breach of contract cases], an owner's claim of
defective construction against a general contractor is generally considered to accrue on the date that
construction is completed We adopt this general rule and hold that B YU's causes of action accrued
upon completion " Thus, this case, though decided before UCA §78-12-21 5, holds m accordance
that the six year period for written contracts is not subject to discovery tolling 7
Subsection 3(b) provides that all other claims for relief against a builder for construction
defect are to be brought WLthin two years of the time when a plaintiff should have discovered the
defects The limitations period began to run on Plaintiffs' second claim, fraudulent non-disclosure,
its third claim, fraud, its fourth claim rescission based on mistake, and its fifth claim based on the
7

In any event, assuming arguendo, that the discovery rale applied to the six year statute
of limitations for breach of contract, as set forth above, had Plaintiffs exercised reasonable
diligence, the alleged defects could have been discovered prior to their purchase of the home
Therefore, the six year statute of limitation would have accrued upon the closing of the sale
Page 20 of 28

Consumer Sales Practices Act when Plaintiffs should have, by exercising reasonable diligence,
discovered the alleged defects. Thus, the question is whether Plaintiffs can raise a genuine issue as
to when Plaintiffs should have reasonably discovered the alleged defects. The Smiths assert that
there are no genuine issues of fact for the following reasons:
1. The Plaintiffs could have had a home inspection performed prior to buying the Home.
This is essentially the same argument as made above but with application to the statute of limitations
as distinguished from reasonable reliance in the nondisclosure context. A home inspection would
have discovered all of the alleged defects because there were none hidden from a non-destructive
modest home inspection performed by Jason Bullock for $60. If the exercise of reasonable diligence
demanded an inspection, then all claims are barred. Certainly, "reasonable diligence" cannot be
construed to allow a buyer to toll the running of the limitations period while that buyer waits as long
as he/she wants before having a home inspected.
2. Even though they waited until 2000 to get a home inspection, Plaintiffs received notice
of the alleged defects long before the inspection and shortly after moving into the house. For
example, Mary Moore knew of the alleged window defects almost immediately upon moving into
the house. She saw flaking of paint caused by water at the end of the first winter. Mary Moore also
saw exposed footings the first spring when she moved into the house while doing landscaping.
Defect Number 4 in Steenblik's list notes alleged water damage and cracking to the southeast comer
of the foundation. Mrs. Moore said she noticed this the first spring after she moved into the house.
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In addition, some allegedly bad shingles on the garage roof were called to her attention on November
7,1997, when she had the shingles inspected by the shingle manufacturer and was told that they were
damaged by inadequate ventilation. In relation to Defect Number 41 in Plaintiffs' list of defects,
alleging plumbing defects, Mary Moore testified she had toilet problems six months after she moved
into the Home. Defect number 12 alleges that smoke detectors were omitted from the bedrooms.
Mary Moore testified that she discovered this alleged code violation about a year after moving into
the Home. In addition, Plaintiffs allege various minor electrical problems; but Mary Moore admits
that in December, 1997, when the furnace quit, she was given notice of the need to check the circuit
breaker.
All of these alleged defects were discovered more than 2 years before Plaintiffs filed suit
Thus, these alleged defects are barred by the applicable two year statute of limitation contained in
UCA §78-12-2.5 (3)(b).
Moreover, knowledge of these defects placed Plaintiffs on notice as early as 1995 that there
may be other unsatisfactory conditions in the Home. Accordingly, Subsection 3(b) required that
Plaintiffs exercise reasonable diligence to discover the other alleged defects.8 Instead, Plaintiffs were
dilatory and refrained from hiring a home inspection until five years later. Defendants should have
had an inspection done earlier that would have revealed the remaining alleged code violations. Thus,
all alleged defects are barred, not just those that were actually discovered more than two years before

8

As we know, a $60 home inspection would have discovered the alleged defects.
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the filing of suit. The statute provides that if, through reasonable diligence, the defects could have
been discovered, they are barred. Plaintiffs are not entitled to willful ignorance in order to toll the
limitation period.

C. PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT
COMPLIED WITH THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR CASE REQUIRED BY THE ORDER ON
DEFNDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Soon after the Smiths were served with the Plaintiffs' Complaint, they submitted their first
Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 16, 2001, the Court entered an Order granting, in part,
the Smiths' Motion, and limiting the issues remaining for trial. With respect to Plaintiffs5 remaining
claims, the Court "concluded] that the Smiths ... may have a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any
latent and matenal defects in the home, or building code violations, of which [the Smiths] were
aware." The Court also stated that "the discovery rule does apply in this case with respect to those
defects that would be considered latent, and that there remain issues of fact with respect to when
those defects should have reasonably been discovered" by Plaintiffs. A copy of the Order is attached
hereto as Exhibit 3, for the Court's convenience.
In other words, Plaintiffs must show that the alleged defects were 1) latent, 2) material, 3)
known to the Defendants, and 4) not discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence by
the Plaintiffs. Smiths in this section intend to show that irrespective of the arguments made above,
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Plaintiffs case fails to satisfy these four elements. As to the latency requirement, Plaintiffs have
admitted under rule 36 that all but six of the defects are patent.
The Plaintiffs have admitted expressly that most of the alleged defects were not latent.
The Smiths propounded the following request for admission to Plaintiffs: "Request number 9: Admit
that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 42 in your expert witness report at the
time of the sale of the house were not latent defects as the phrase 'latent defect' is used in the
court's order regarding the Smiths' motion for summary judgment." As shown in the annexed
Exhibit 10, Plaintiffs admitted that all defects were not latent except numbers 9 (no counter flashing
at windows or doors), 26 (overspanned joists), 27 (Footings do not meet minimum 30" frost line
depth) and 38 and 39 are obviously not material. The other item was 12 which is also deemed not
material: whether the smoke detectors were hard wired or battery operated. Thus, by Plaintiffs own
express and binding admissions, even if there were no issue as to a reasonable home inspection or
as to the statute of limitation, only these alleged three defects can be raised at trial.
The Plaintiffs have no proof of the requisite knowledge that the Smiths were aware that the
alleged condition was defective.
1. Windows. Item 9 (no counter flashing at windows or doors).
The Plaintiffs' experts have been confused about this issue. Lloyd Steenblik at first alleged
that Dan Smith attached the window flashing to the outside of the aluminum siding. Exhibit 1.
Project Analysts report, item 9 at p. 10. Later his superior showed him that he was mistaking a
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molding strip for the window nailing fin and that he was wrong on that opinion. Exhibit 14, p. 45.
The other experts still insist that something must be wrong with the flashing or else water would not
get on the sills. However, as shown above, they have done no destructive testing to show whether
the flashing exists or how it was installed incorrectly. Jack Peterson says he saw on inspection the
felt paper that served as flashing for the windows. Peterson depo. p. 54. Exhibit 7. Both Dan Smith
and Jack Peterson testify that the slight water damage is caused by mere condensation that sometimes
forms on cold days because of the thin aluminum on the windows. The only evidence of defect here
is speculation based on slight water damage. There is simply no evidence that Dan Smith knew there
was a defect in the flashing.
2. Item 26. Alleged Overspanning of Floor Joists.
Here again, the code calls for a 13 foot one inch span. That was what the building inspector,
Jack Peterson, required. Peterson measured the span and found in his report , Exhibit 4 to his
deposition, that no joists exceeded that span. P. 75. Exhibit 7. How then would Dan Smith be
aware of a building code violation?
3. Item 27. Alleged lack of dirt covering the footings.
At the time of the final inspection the ground around the house was so "muddy" that the
finish "grading was impossible." Peterson depo. p. 148. Exhibit 7. With Jack Peterson's
permission and the expectation that they would do the finish grading in the spring when the weather
cleared up, the Smiths were given a final inspection approval. Depo. Peterson, p. 77. Id. Once
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again, this alleged defect (which, by the way, has caused no damage to the house) was approved by
the building inspector.
Other Alleged Defective Items That the Building Inspector Passed off.
By way of further illustration to show what total lack of evidence supports the Plaintiffs' bad
faith allegations against the Smiths the following defects are mentioned in connection with this
requisite element of knowledge.
Allegation of Inadequate Roof Ventilation. The undisputed evidence is that Dan Smith
and the building inspector, Jack Peterson, had a discussion about the roof ventilation. Jack Peterson
testifies that he accepted Dan Smith's opinion that the amount of ventilation was adequate. He did
not "red tag" the ventilation. In Exhibit 5 to his deposition he said, "I also visited the job site another
occasion and Dan and I discussed the venting of the attic. Dan felt that it was adequate." Thus,
Peterson "accepted it." Peterson depo. p. 111. Exhibit 7.
If the building inspector passes off an item, how can Plaintiffs in good faith claim that Dan
Smith knows that the item was in violation of the code?

V,
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs own testimony and discovery responses undeniably demonstrate that all of the
42 construction defects that they allege in this case could have been discovered by a home inspection
before they bought the house. Accordingly, not only does the doctrine of caveat emptor apply to
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preclude Plaintiffs' claims in this case, but the six year and two year statutes of limitation bar
recovery for Plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot prove that the Smiths knew of any code
violations because the building inspector approved the very items alleged as code violations.

DATED this

5+^

day of May, 2003.
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, a P.C.

By:
A. BRYCE/piXON, ESQ. (#889)
AARON m. WAITE (#8992)
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Introduction

Engagement
Project Analysts was engaged to determine the costs to correct code violations in the
residence of Mary Moore 155 West 300 South, Fillmore, Utah 84631. Project
Analysts reviewed documents, correspondence, reports, exhibits, and bids relative to
the construction of the home. Project Analysts visited the home and observed the
actual construction conditions. We reviewed the appropriate Uniform Building,
Codes. Project Analysts determined the estimated cost of making repairs to code
violations we confirmed. Project Analysts has not reviewed the contract between
Mary Moore and Dan Smith to determine or assign contractual responsibility for any
code deficiency correction costs.

Background
Mary Moore purchased the home from Dan Smith in 1994. Defects in the home
construction were discovered six years after the home was purchased. Mary Moore
requested an inspection of her home by Jason Bullock of Sunrise Engineering
("Sunrise"). Jason Bullock inspected the home on August 8, 2000. Mark O. Barr,
also of Sunrise, conducted an additional inspection of the home, on October 9, 2000.
Project Analysts was asked in October 2001 to estimate the cost of repairs to items
found not to comply with building codes that were in effect when the home was
constructed. Project Analysts performed an on site inspection of the home
November 20, 2001.

Summary Conclusion
Project Analysts has determined that there are several building code violations that
require correction and repair in the Mary Moore residence.

The estimated total cost to repair the listed defects is $110,730 as itemized in
Table 01 - Summary of Repair Costs.

i

Mary Moore
S u m m a r y of Repair Costs
Table 01
Item #
2

Description
Ledger to rear deck has not been fastened properly with bolts.

3

Joists that bear over header for deck have not been anchored.

4

Foundation on SE Corner is cracked and breaking apart.

5

All handrails must return to wail at top and bottom.

6

No soffit venting has caused roof shingles to deteriorate

7
8
9

Open outlet box under kitchen cabinets with exposed electrical wiring.
Attic opening does not meet required code opening of 22" X 30".
No counter-flashing at windows or doors, has caused water damage.

10

Bathroom Fixtures not caulked

Est. Repair Cost

$
$
$
$
$

11,466

$
$

58
470
18.611
315
2.002

128
94
428
776

12

No smoke detectors in bedrooms, smoke del In home not compliant.

$
$
$

13
13a.

Stair risers exceed 8" max with 3/8 variance. (Interior)
Concrete Entrance Stairs. Stair rise exceed 7" max & 3/8" variance.

$
$

8.800
2.790

14

No 5/8 type X sheetrock under stair lids.

15
16
17
17a
18
19
20
22
23

No pressure reducing valve has been installed.
Copper lines in house are not grounded.
2x6 window header \o basement bedroom is over spanned.
2x6 headers @ interior doorway is over spanned.
Missing nuts and washers on anchor bolts for sill plate \n basement.
4' cantilever at front of house requires doubled up end joists.
No combustion air, vent clearance problems.
Water heater is not seismically strapped to foundation.
Kitchen required to be on 2 - 20 amp GFCI circuits w / 1 2 / 2 AWG.

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

750
285
470
655

24

Bathrooms required to be on separate 20 AMP circuits for GFCI's.

25

Electrical panel has not been labeled.

26

House has over spanned joists throughout the house.

27

Footings do not meet minimum 30" frost line depth.

28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Grading not 2 % slope for first 10 feet away from house (Incl. in 27)
Outlets in garage are not on GFCI.
No GFCI in basement.
Exhibit C: Item 2 Add duplex for peninsular cabinet.
Exhibit C: Item 3. Add duplex for garbage disposal.
Exhibit C: Add outlet in master bedroom, dining room.
Exhibit C: Ground natural gas to grounding circuit.

35

Exhibit C: Item 6. Add grounding kit to circuit breaker box.

36

Exhibit C: Add smoke detector to basement. (Incl. In 12)

37

Exhibit C: Item 9. Correct wiring at main breaker.

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

38
39
40
41
42

Install insulations baffles to allow ventilation at exterior walls.
Add beam at bearing partition offset from garage beam.
Plates and sills on concrete in basement are not treated lumber.
Costs to implement plumbing code repairs listed by Cox Plumbing
Cost to restore finishes in rooms where plumbing work done

$
$
$
$
$

Grand Total

$

2

598
6
1,031
245

124
437
437
338
6.397
30.680

218
218
245
765
377
126
460
238
600
2440
3,093
6.250
7,625

111,045

Site Visit
Project Analysts conducted an onsite inspection of the home on November 20, 2001.
We reviewed the listings of items reported as found not to be in code compliance
prepared by Sunrise from their previous inspections of the home on August 7, 2000
and October 9, 2000. During our inspection we observed the existing conditions at
the home relative to each item listed by Sunrise as, "found not to be in code
compliance", throughout the remainder of this report the listed items found not to be
in code compliance will be referred to as "defects".

Project Analysts took measurements, quantified the existing conditions, observed the
materials used, and determined the actual conditions at the home relative to the each
listed defect, and performed non-destructive visual examinations only. We did not
do an exhaustive inspection looking for additional non-compliant work. However, in
the course of examination of the defects list prepared by Sunrise, three potential
additional code compliance problems were observed. The three additional defects
Project Analysts observed, evaluated and subsequently determined to be violations of
the 1991 building codes are:
Item 38. Insulation baffles to allow ventilation at exterior walls.
Item 39. Add beam at bearing partition offset from garage beam
Item 40. Plates and sills on concrete in basement are not treated lumber.
Project Analysts evaluated a repair method and estimated the cost to repair these three
additional defects to comply with building codes.

During our site visit we performed the following evaluations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Evaluated the size, span and type of material used for visible joists and
headers.
Sampled the distance from the top of the existing soil to the top of the existing
footing on each side of the home.
Landscaping and grading conditions and materials were noted
Examined the orientation of the home on the property.
Observed the unfinished basement areas.
Reviewed structural, mechanical, plumbing and electrical systems.
Observed and quantified the outside dimensions of the home.

3

Mary Moore Property
em
#
Schedule 01 - Repairs Cost Esimate
December 11,2001
7 Open outlet box under kitchen cabinets with exposed electrical wiring.
Comment:
From Exibit C Item 1 NEC Section 370-28 -( C) Page 70-286
Repair Method:
A cover plate needs to be installed on this open rough-in box. The cover plate will need to be modified as there is a
cabinet frame member covering part of the open rough in box.
Work Description
Modify Cover Plate & Install
Cover Plate
Subtotal
Sales Taxes @ 5 75%
Profit & Overhead @ 25%
Total

Electrician

QTY
1
1

UNITS
Hr
Ea

$ / Unit L M E S
$ 45.00
S
$
1.00
M

0 0575
0 25

Page 8 of 49 Pages

LABORS
$
$
-

Mat $
$
$
1

$

$

1

EQUIP. $
$
$
-

SUB $
$
45
$
-

$

$

45

TOTALS
$
45
$
1
$
$
$
$

Mary Moore 419.xls Repairs Estimate

46
0
12
58

Mary Moore Property
#
!5

Schedule 01 - Repairs Cost Esimate
Electrical panel has not been labled.
Comment:
NEC Section 384-13 Page 70-303.
Repair Method'
Determine the function of each circuit and label existing electrical panel
Work Description
Electrician
Subtotal
Sales Taxes @ 5.75%
Profit & Overhead @ 25%
Total

QTY
6

UNITS
Hr

$/Unit L M E S
$ 45.00
L

0.0575
0.25

Page 30 of 49 Pages

LABOR $
$
270
$
270
$

December 11,2001

Mat $
$
$ _$
-

EQUIP, $
$
$
$

SUB $
$
$
$
-

TOTAL $
$
270
$
270
$
$
68
$
$ _338_

Mary Moore 419 xls Repairs Estimate

Mary Moore Property
#
Schedule 01 - Repairs Cost Esimate
December 11,2001
29 Outlets in garage are not on GFCI.
Comment
NEC Section 210-8(A) (2) Page 70 - 39
Repair Method
Replace existing garage circuit breaker with a GFCI circuit breaker and reconnect the electrical for Garage to panel
Work Description
Add 1-20Apm circuit breaker to Electrician
the Panel Box
Wire garage electrical to new
Electrician
circuits
1 - 20 Amp GFCI Breakers
Subtotal
Sales Taxes @ 5 75%
Profit & Overhead @ 25%
Total

29.

QTY
1

UNITS $ / Unit L M E S
Hr
$ 45 00
L

LABOR $
$
45

Mat $
$
-

EQUIP. $
$

SUB $
$
-

TOTALS
$
45

90

$

$

$

-

$

90

$
$
$

-

$
$
$
$
$
$

38

135

$
$
$

2

Hr

$

45 00

L

$

1

Ea

$

38 00

M

$
$
$

38
38

$
$
$

-

0 0575
0 25

173
2
43
218

1993 NEC Articles 210-8, 210-52 (g)
Additionally, Article 210-8 only requires the OUTLET to be GFCI protected, not the circuit. The garage outlet
could be easily replaced with a GFCI receptacle.

Page 36 of 49 Pages

Mary Moore 419 xls Repairs Estimate

70-38

NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE

210-7. Receptacles and Cord Connectors.
(a) Grounding Typa. Receptacles installed on 15- and 20-ampere branch
1
circuits shall be of the grounding type. Grounding-type receptacles shall be
installed only on circuits of the voltage class and current for which they are
rated, except as provided in Tables 210«21(b)(2) and (b)(3).
Exception: Nongrounding-type receptacles installed in accordance with
Section 210-7(d), Exception,
(b) To Be Grounded. Receptacles and cord connectors having grounding contacts shall have those contacts effectively grounded.
Exception No. 1: Receptacles mounted on portable and vehiclemounted generators in accordance with Section 2*0-6.
Exception No. 2: Ground-fault circuit-interrupter replacement receptacles as permitted by Section 210-7(d), Exception.
(c) Method* of Grounding. The grounding contacts of receptacles and
cora connectors shall be grounded by connection to the equipment grounding conductor of the circuit supplying the receptacle or cord connector.
(FPN): For installation requirements for the reduction of electrical noise, see
Section 250-74, Exception No. 4.
The branch circuit wiring method shall include or provide an equipment
grounding conductor to which the grounding contacts of the receptacle or
cord connector shall be connected.
(FPN No. 1): Section 250-91 (b) describes acceptable grounding means.
(FPN No. 2): For extensions of existing branch circuits, see Section 250-50.
(d) Replacements, Grounding-type receptacles shall be used as replacements for existing nongrounding types and shall be connected to a grounding conductor installed in accordance with Section 210-7(c).
Ground-fault circuit-interrupter protected receptacles shall be provided
where replacements are made at receptacle outlets that are required to be
so protected elsewhere in this Code.
Exception: Where a grounding means does not exist in the receptacle
enclosure, either a nongrounding or a ground-fault circuit-interrupter-type of
receptacle shall be usecL A grounding conductor shall not be connected from
the ground-fault circuit-interrupter-type receptacle to any outlet supplied
from the ground-fault
circuit-interrupter-type
receptacle.
Existing
nongrounding-type receptacles shall be permuted to be replaced wittx
grounding-type receptacles where supplied {/trough a ground-fault circuitinterrupter. These receptacle locations shall be marked "GFCl protected."
(e) Cord- and Plug-Connected Equipment. The installation of
grounding-type receptacles shall not be used as a requirement that ail cordand plug-connected equipment be of the grounded type.
(FPN): See Section 250-45 for type of cord- and plug-connected equipment to be
grounded.
(f) Nonlnterchangeable Types. Receptacles connected to circuits having different voltages, frequencies, or types of current (ac or dc) on the
same premises shall be of such design that the attachment plugs used on
these circuits are not mterchangeable.

ARTICLE 210 — BRANCH CIRCUITS

70-39

210-8. Ground-Fault Circuit-Interrupter Protection for Personnel. .
(a) Dwelling Units.
(1) All 125-voit, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles
installed in bathrooms shall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel.
(2) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- or 20-amperestccejrtac&s installed in
\Hfpttsg«*56hall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel.
Exception No. 1 to (a)(2): Receptacles that are not readily accessible.
Exception No. 2 to (a)(2): A single receptacle or a duplex receptacle for I
two appliances located within dedicated space for each appliance that in
normal use is not easily moved from oneplace to another, and that is cord- \
and plug-connected in accordance with section 400-7(a)(6), (a)(7), or (a)(8).
Receptacles installed under exceptions to Section 210-8(a)(2) shall not be
considered as meeting the requirements of Section 210-52(g).
(3) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles installed
outdoors where there is direct grade level access to the receptacles shall |
have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel
(FPN): See Section 215-9 for feeder protection.
For the purposes of this section, "direct grade level access'' is defined
as being located not more than 6 feet, 6 inches (1.98 m) above grade level
and being readily accessible.
(4) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles installed
in crawl spaces at or below grade level and in unfinished basements shall
have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel.
For purposes of this section, unfinished basements are defined as por- 1
tions or areas of the basement not intended as habitable rooms and limited
to storage areas, work areas, and the like.
j
Exception No. 1: A single receptacle supplied by a dedicated branch
circuit that is located and identified for specific use by a cord- and plugconnected appliance, such as a refrigerator or freezer.
Exception No. 2: T)\e laundry circuit as required by Sections 210-52(f)
and 220-4(c).
Exception No. 3: A single receptacle supplying a permanently installed
sump pump.
(5) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- and 20-ampere receptacles to serve I
counter top surfaces, installed within 6 feet (1.83 m) of a wet bar sink or
kitchen sink, shall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for per- j
sonnel.
(FPN): The intent of this subsection is to permit the exemption of receptacles
that are located specifically for appliances sucn as refrigerators and freezers from
ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for personnel.
(6) All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- or 20-ampere receptacles installed in
boathouses shall have ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for
personnel.

# 1A

70-46

NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE

Exception No. 3: In addition to the required receptacles specified by
Section 210-52, switched receptacles supplied from a general-purpose
branch circuit as defined in Section 210-/0(a)> Exception No. 1 shall be
permitted
I Exception No. 4: A receptacle served by a circuit supplying only motor
loads.
'
Exception No. 5: Receptacles installed to provide power for electric
ignition systems or clock timers for gas-fired ranges, ovens, or counterJ mounted cooking units.
(2) Receptacles installed in the kitchen to serve counter top surfaces
shall be supplied by not less than two small appliance branch circuits,
either or both of which shall also be permitted to supply receptacle outlets
| in the kitchen and other rooms specined in Section 210-52(b)(l). Additional
small appliance branch circuits snail be permitted to supply receptacle out| lets in the kitchen and other rooms specified in Section 210-52(b)(l).
(c) Counter Tops. In kitchens and dining areas of dwelling units, a
I receptacle outlet shall be installed at each walicounter space 12 inches (305
J mm) or wider. Receptacle outlets shall be installed so that no point along
the wall line is more than 24 inches (610 mm), measured horizontally from
a receptacle outlet in that space.
I A receptacle outlet shall be installed at each island or peninsular counter
top with a long dimension of 24 inches (610 mm) or greater and a short
dimension of 12 inches (305 mm) or greater. Receptacle outlets to serve
island or peninsular counter tops shall be installed above, or within 12
inches (305 mm) below the counter top. Receptacle outlets shall be
installed so that no point along the centerline of the long dimension is more
than 24 inches (610 mm), measured horizontally from a receptacle outlet in
that space. A peninsular counter top is measured from the connecting
I edge.
Counter top spaces separated by range tops, refrigerators, or sinks shall
I be considered as separate counter top spaces. Receptacle outlets rendered
I not readily accessible by appliances fastened in place or appliances occupying defeated space shall not be considered as these required outlets.
I Receptacle outlets shall not be installed in a face-up position in the work
surfaces or counter tops in a kitchen or dining area.
(FPN): The 24-lnch (610-mm) dimension is measured along the wall line or centerline. and the intent is that there be'a receptacle outlet for every 4 linear feet
I (1.2 ra) or fraction thereof of counter lqngth.^

(d) Bathroom*. In dwelling units, at least one wall receptacle outlet
I1 shall be installed in the bathroom adjacent to each basin location. See Section 2108(a)(1).
I (e) Outdoor Outlet*. For a one-family dwelling and each unit of a twofamily dwelling that is at grade level, at least one receptacle outlet accessible at grade level shall be installed at the front and back of the dwelling.
I See Section 210-8(a)(3).
(f) Laundry Areas. In dwelling units, at least one receptacle outlet shall
be installed for the laundry.

ARTICLE 210 — BRANCH CIRCUITS
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Exception No. 1: In a dwelling unit that is an apartment or living area
in a multifamity buildins where laundry facilities are provided on the premises that are available to all building occupants, a laundry receptacle
shall not be required
Exception No. 2: In other than one-family dwellings where laundry
facilities are not to be installed or permitted, a laundry receptacle shall not
be required
* (Q) Bawnwita and GarftOtt* For a one-family dwelling, at least one
receptacle outlet, in addition to any provided for laundry equipment, shall
be installed in each basement and in each attached garage, and in each
detached garage with electric power. See Sections 210-8(a)(2) and (a)(4).
(h) Hallways. In dwelling units, hallways of 10 feet (3.05 m) or more in I
length shall have at least one receptacle outlet.
|
As used in this subsection, the hall length shall be considered the length
along the centerline of the hall without passing through a doorway.
210-60. Quest Rooms. Guest rooms in hotels, motels, and similar occupancies shall have receptacle outlets installed in accordance with Section
210-52. See Section 2108(b)(1).
Exception: In rooms of hotels and motels, the required number of
receptacle outlets determined by Section 210-52(a) shall be permitted to be
located convenient for permanent furniture layout.
210-62. Show Windows. At least one receptacle outlet shall be installed
directly above a show window for each 12 linear feet (3.66 m) or major
fraction thereof of show window area measured horizontally at its maximum width.
210-63. Rooftop Heating, Alr-Condrtionlng, and Refrigeration Equipment |
Outlet A 125-volt, single-phase, 15- or 20-ampere-rated receptacle oudet
shall be installed at an accessible location for the servicing of nesting, airconditioning, and refrigeration equipment on rooftops and in attics and
crawl spaces, The receptacle shall be located on the same level and within
25 feet(7.62 m) of the heating, air-conditioning, and refrigeration equip- |
ment. Tne receptacle outlet shall not be connected to the load side of the
equipment disconnecting means.
Exception: Rooftop equipment on one- and two-family dwellings.
210-70. Lighting Outlets Required. Lighting outlets shall be installed
where specked in Sections 210-70(a), (b), and (c) below.
|
(a) Dwelling Untt(s). At least one wall switch-controlled lighting outlet
shall be installed in every habitable room; in bathrooms, hallways, stairways, attached garages, and detached garages with electric power; and at
outdoor entrances or exits.
(FPN);

A vehicle door in a garage is not considered as an outdoor entrance.

At least one lighting outlet controlled by a light switch located at the
point of entry to the attic, underfloor space, utility room, and basement
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MJIard County State of Utah
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Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
James K. Haslam (6887)
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801)377-4411
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
Plaintiffs.
ORDER

vs.
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos
Trust,

Civil No. 000700142 Ml
Judge Fred Howard

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court for decision
pursuant to a Notice to Submit for Decision filed by the Defendants, and a hearing was
held before the Court on May 31. 2001. concerning this motion and Plaintiffs'
Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Appearing at the hearing were
James K. Haslam, of Hadley & Associates, on behalf of Plaintiffs, and A, Bryce Dixon,
of Dixon & Truman, on behalf of Defendants. The Court, having reviewed the motions
and all memoranda, objections, and other materials filed in support and in opposition

thereto, and having heard oral arguments from the parties on the motions, and for good
cause shown, hereby makes the following findings, conclusions, and rulings:
Pursuant to the common-law merger doctrine, execution and delivery of a deed
by a seller usually renders any prior contractual terms extinguished and unenforceable.
Although certain specific exceptions allow a party to avoid application of the merger
doctrine, a claim for negligent misrepresentation relating to alleged construction defects
in a building does not fall within any such exception. Accordingly, Plaintiffs1 claim for
negligent misrepresentation in this case is precluded as a matter of law by the merger
doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc.. 2000 UT App 200,21
P,3d 219.
With respect to Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent
misrepresentation, the Court concludes that those causes of action, though not pleaded
wrth great detail, have been pleaded in the Complaint with sufficient particularity by
Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In any
event, the Court would grant Plaintiffs' motion to amend the Complaint to plead these
causes of action with greater detail if Plaintiffs desired to do so. Moreover, the Court
concliides that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to these claims
that precludes the granting of summary judgment. Finally, the Court further concludes
that Defendants, as the sellers of the home in question, may have had a legal duty to

2

disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home, or building code
violations, of which they were aware.
With respect to the remaining claims, the Court believes that the discovery rule
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations, even as to contract-based claims, in
situations where its application is not otherwise expressly prohibited by law.
Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the discovery rule does apply
in this case with respect to those defects that would be considered latent, and that there
remain issues of fact with respect to when those defects should have reasonably been
discovered. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs'
claims for breach of contract, rescission, and violations of the Consumer Sales
Practices Act.
The Court will consider, at the close of all discovery, a motion for summary
judgment by Defendants, based on their limitations defense,
Finally, over Plaintiffs' objection, the Court required Plaintiffs to make an election
of remedies at the hearing between their contract-based claims asserting both a right to
contractual damages and a right to rescission of the transaction. Plaintiffs elected to
pursue the remedy of rescission.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' claim

of negligent misrepresentation, and that claim is hereby dismissed;

3

2.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied as to all other claims;

3.

Plaintiffs may not seek monetary damages for breach of contract, but may

pursue the remedy of rescission; and
4.

No further motions for summary judgment will be considered by the Court

until after the close of discovery,
DATED this /£%.

day of / ^ ^ T

, 2001.
BY THE COURT:
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1

Q. Did you get tired of building houses?

2

A. No.

3

Q. So what is very little, how many homes or let me ask

4

this.

5|

A. Okay.

61

Q- In the Fillmore area since 1979 have you built other

7
8
9

things in this area besides homes?
A. I built two homes for myself. One home out in Flowell.
In this area.

10

Q- Yes.

11

A. I think that is it.

12

Q. So you built nothing else other than homes in this

13

area since 1979?

14

A. Well, now since 1979?

15

Q. That is my question.

16

A. Yes, but I built the home that she is living in for

17 ourselves and this one over here, the other home we built here
18
19
20

in town.
Q. The one that we talked about that you built after you
came back from Cedar City?

21

A. Yes.

22

Q. So that is two.

23

A. And we built the cement block building.

24

Q. Is that the shop?

25

A. Yes.
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To Whoai It May Concern
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inspection has been completed and I find that the construction meets the intent of the building
code in place at the time of construction
Sincerely^
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a.

UY-

1

getting in there and looking?

2
3

A.
siding off .

4
5
6

The only way I know is you take some of the

Q.

Did you actually see the windows and inspect

A,

Yes.

them?
I was there when they were putting the

7

siding on.

We had to put a vacuum behind the siding,

8

which went under that.

9

Q-

So you actually saw that there was --

10

A.

Well, the felt that goes over to the

11

windows.

12

Q.

You saw the felt?

13

A.

On the siding it goes over to the windows.

14

Q.

And the felt is sometimes called a

15

weather-resistant

membrane?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And you saw that these windows had the

18
19

Yeah.

weather-resistant membrane, correct?
A,

We're talking about two different issues.

20

Now under the new code they're putting a piece of

21

material out about this far out from the windows all

22

the way around, and then they're going in with felt.

23

But at that time --

24
25

Q.

When you say that far, you were talking

about nearly 12 inches?
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•Villiam Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dan Smith, et aL
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Q And it still hasn't been covered as of this
day'?
A Probably not. It's not where anybody's
going to get into it, I'll tell you You have to work
at it to get there
Q All right. Let's go to No 8, then, the
attic access was brought to Mr. Smith's attention on
the final inspection
Okay What's your recollection of that?
A. Basically it's like — it's a little
smaller. This was a new thing in the code that year,
the 22 by 30. It's still effective today, 22 by 30.
It's not a life safety issue, and there was nothing in
the attic, as far as anything that needed to be
serviced of that nature. So I didn't really consider
it at the time as being a real issue.
Q. So you passed it off?
A. I passed that part of it.
Q. All right. And then let's go to No. 9, the
windows.
Now, I think it's a stipulated fact in this
case that there are — that nobody has done any
destructive testing around the windows. Do you know
how a person would be able to determine that there was
no counter flashing around the windows without actually
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A. It's about a foot strip that goes around the
window. And they were using felt as the same
situation, they were running it over to the window.
But that's an interpretation, I guess, whether that
would be acceptable or not
Q. Okay.
A. But it was required on the siding
Q So what I just want to make sure is the
felt, which was the weather resistive membrane that was
m use at that time, did you actually see that it was
installed in the windows at this house?
A. I saw the felt go along for the sidmg,
yeah.
Q. Okay. When he says counter flashing, there
is no counter flashing, do you have an understanding of
what he means? Do you think he means this one foot
strip?
A. I think he's talking about the one foot
stnp that is required now. And a lot of places still
are not enforcing that. So I don't know
Q. All right. But the one foot weather
stripping was not required by the 1991 building code,
was it?
A. I would have to research it a little more.
But I don't -

Page 54

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

7

getting in there and looking
A. The only way I know is you take some of the
siding off.
Q. Did you actually see the windows and inspect
them?
A Yes. I was there when they were putting the
siding on. We had to put a vacuum behind the siding,
which went under that.
Q. So you actually saw that there was —
A Well, the felt that goes over to the
windows.
Q. You saw the felt?
A. On the siding it goes over to the wmdows.
Q. And the felt is sometimes called a
weather-resistant membrane?
A Yes. Yeah.
Q. And you saw that these windows had the
weather-resistant membrane, correct?
A. We're talking about two different issues.
Now under the new code they're putting a piece of
material out about this far out from the windows all
the way around, and then they're going in with felt.
But at that time Q. When you say that far, you were talking
about nearly 12 inches?
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MR HADLEY: I'm sorry, I didn't hear your
question.
M R DIXON: I didn't hear his answer.
MR. HADLEY: Okay.
MR- DIXON:
Q Your answer was I don't think so?
A. I would really have to research that to make
sure whether it was or wasn't
M R HADLEY: Robert, would you read m e I'm sorry, are you talking? I was talking over you.
What was Bryce's question, Robert?
(Whereupon, the record was
read back as follows:
"QUESTION. All right. But the one
foot weather stripping was not
required by the 1991 building code,
was it?")
M R HADLEY: Okay.
MR DIXON:
Q. Let me see what you're talking about,
Mr. Peterson. When you're talking about a one foot
strip, is this a nailing fin that you're talking about,
or is this something in the nature of a
weather-resistant membrane?
A It's a weather-resistant membrane.

14 (Pages 53 to 56)
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inspection on the house at 155 West 300 South, the
house we're talking about here today?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And this is the inspection that would have

been checked off all 33 items in order to approve the
final -A.

It would have either marked okay or not

applicable, depending on the situation.
Q.

Okay.

Let's see, I think I have just one

little thing here.

Oh, Exhibit 7 I'll call -- this

will be the certificate of occupancy.
It appears you signed this certificate of
occupancy, a copy of which is Exhibit 7, correct?
A.

Yes.
MR. HADLEY:

Do you have another copy of

that?
MR. DIXON:
Q.

Yes.

And this is for the home at 155 West 300

South that we've been discussing during this
deposition, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, what must a person do in order to

qualify to receive a certificate of occupancy, pass t
final inspection?
A.

Yes.

**ROBERT
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MR. DIXON
Q Well, the only reason [ ask that question is
this, did you ever hear her say she didn't want a smoke
detector because she smoked and that set this smoke
detector off?
A No. I don't recall that at all.
Q. I'm not saying that she did I'm just
asking questions You understand that, I'm just trying
to find out.
In any event, you didn't red tag the smoke
detector issue on the final inspection, did you?
A. No As I say, I thought at that time that
would probably be taken care of. I mentioned the
deficiencies. They were in the house when I made the
inspection. I figured it was their home and they would
correct those on the deficiencies
Q. Ail right Now, on October — let's see,
No 13. We're slowly getting there.
Do you need to take a break, sir?
A. No. I want to get this over with.
Q. Okay. Now, we're talking about the stairs.
Tell me what you remember about the stair issue First
of all, tell me about what you remember with Dan Smith,
and then I'll ask you about what you remember about
Mary Moore
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A. Well, the stairs were becoming an issue
after the stairs were put in, and Dan called me over
and said the stairs were maxed I have a deal here on
the code that says they can be at eight and nine. But,
anyway, the problem it's not even addressed in any of
these issues was the fact that it did not have the six
foot six head room, and one more tread in the stair
would have made it even worse I mean, it was just —
it was one of those things that there had to be some
give and take where we had an eight, nine required
minimum in residential.
So a seven, seven eleven, is the best, but
there's no way to put it in without a real problem.
So at that time we told Dan that the
stairs - that would work rather than shrink that -- I
think we were minus about — on each, or something —
maybe it might have been a couple of inches on the head
room, and if we went one more tread you would be
bumping your head going down the stairs.
Q. So you went ahead and passed that off?
A. I went ahead and passed that off. That was
before the final. It was one of those special days,
and I don't remember which day it was
Q. Now, do you remember Mary Moore ever
complaining to you about the stairs ever after she

bought the house*?
A. The stair issue didn't come up. I think
Bill fell dowTi the stairs one time.
THE WITNESS. Didn't he? Or something But
it was brought up later when this thing was measured.
I got the impression that Jason was looking at a lot
shorter rise. He put a seven something rise, instead
of the eight, nine that it can be.
MR. DDCON:
Q. Okay So the first time you remember Mary
Moore complaining about the stairs is after Jason
Bullock inspected them, correct? Is that correct?
A. I don't recall whether it was or wasn't.
Q. Okay. Let's go on to 14.
A. 14, 14.
Q. You just say - that's sheet rock under the
stair ledge, and you just say it's not required.
A. It wasn't required. I've got a code sheet
on that here somewhere. It wasn't required at that
time. That's been a major — I've got that in here I
put it where it was on these sheets here.
Q. You're looking through the Project Analysts
report?
A Yeah. This one here I think is it That's
the one, the code issue on that one.
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Q. Well, I don't think we're going to spend
much time on that. You don't think it was required and
that's fine.
A. I don't think it was required
Q. Now, let's go to 15, Jason Bullock says
there was no pressure reducing valve and you also say
that it's not required The water pressure wasn't that
high, correct?
A. I've got a deal on that, too. It says right
in the code book if it's over 80 pounds, then it's
required. And our city water pressure in the area that
she's in is about 70 pounds
Q. And that's the reason why a water —
A. Yeah, we don't have — we're not putting
them in town most areas, because it is less than —
than is required. Less than 80 pounds.
Q. Okay. And you say that the copper lines
were grounded, correct?
A. Well, the electrical boxes was grounded to
copper. I tested all the outlets, and they all show
ground. So I don't know where they're coming
from.
Q. All right. And No 18, missing nuts and
washers on anchor bolts for sill plate. Did you see
any —
A. I have never been able to find that I

|
f
1
t
r
I.
L
1
j
|
II
|
$
jj
fc
|
|
|
|
|
1
t
|
|
p

17 (Pages 65 to 68)
Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc.
Post Office Box 3079 St. George, Utah 84771 (435)688-7844
dfcOc900-c8lb-4872-9c68-a9977531dd8e

William Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dan Smith, et al.
Deposition of L, lack Peterson, taken on February 20, 2003
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Q Are there any additional requirements
besides passing the final inspection?
A. No.
Q. And then the last exhibit is Exhibit 8, it's
another to whom it may concern letter dated May 4th,
2001. Was this letter signed by you, sir?
A. Yes. I can see that from here.
Q. Do you know why you wrote this letter?
A. Ho, I do not at this time.
Q. Is it true that you felt that the - or
found, rather, that the construction of the house at
155 West 300 North meant the intent of the building
code — 300 South, excuse me. Let me start over again.
Strike that
Is it true, sir, that you found that the
construction of the house at 155 West 300 South met the
intent of the building code in place at the time of
construction?
A. I would say yes at this point.
Q. Okay.
MR. DIXON: I'll pass the witness.
MFL HADLEY: Okay.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that7
A. Yes, I do
Q Do you understand there's a little tussle
that's developed between Mary and the Smiths, and we're
here to kind of unravel that? You understand that?
A. (Nods head).
Q. Okay. What I want to do is I'm going to
have to repeat and go through a few of the things that
you have discussed with Bryce. And I want you to know
so you know that I feel that you've been truthful, but
I want to dig a little bit and get into the code some.
Is that okay with you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. DIXON: I don't mean to distract you, I
sometimes worry about the exhibits.
THE WITNESS: I thought that was an extra
copy of that one
MR. DIXON: Okay. I just want to make sure
I haven't — I want to get them all over in the court
reporter's corner to make sure I haven't kept any. And
that's all I was doing.
MR. HADLEY:
Q Do you mind if I look at your Exhibit 1
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EXAMINATION
BY MR. HADLEY:
Q. Good morning, Jack.
A. Good morning. It's still morning
Q- IVe been sitting alongside you here for a
couple of hours. Am I sitting too close for you?
A. No.
Q. Am I m your space?
All right. You can reach over and pop me
one if you think I get out of line.
Why do you think you're here? You've been
here two hours testifying. What's going on? Why are
you sitting in this chair and Bryce Dixon has been
asking questions of you?
M R DIXON: Objection to the form of the
question- Irrelevant. Not likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Broad.
MR. HADLEY:
Q- When he's done go ahead
A. T would say because two people have a
problem.
Q. You understand that?
A Yes.
Q. You heard the saying the truth shall make
you free? Have you heard of that before?
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1 which is your little —
2
A. This?
l 3
Q. Yes.
4
A. There's not much on there.
! 5
Q. That's right. When was that first entry? I
6 think you said it was July 29?
| 7
A. I had the corners down.
8
Q. Okay If you don't mind I'm going to rattle
9 off some dates. You and I are going to look at this
! 10 and Fm going to rattle off some dates. I'm going to
i n have to put them in the form of the question, otherwise
12 I'm going to blow some hot air and Bryce is going to
13 take me to task on it.
14
It has an entry for Dan Smith on the 29th of
15 July; is that correct?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. We'll copy that page; is that okay?
18
A Yes.
19
Q. Okay. We have another one on Friday the
20 13th, August, of'93, correct?
21
A. Yeah.
22
Q. Okay. And we'll copy that one. Is that
23 agreed?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. Okay. Again on Monday the 16th of August,
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A. Yes, 1 would say that.
Q. Okay.
A. Reputation, too.
Q. Let's talk about item 6. And I think Tm
going to refer here to — I believe it's Exhibit 8. Do
you still have a copy of your letter there?
A. No, he took them all back there.
Q. You didn't get a copy?
MR- DIXON: You want the inspection final?
MR. HADLEY: No. If! wrote this right,
Exhibit 8.
MR. DIXON: I thought you said 6.
Exhibit 8.
THE WITNESS: No, that's different than what
he's got. It's the other one.
MR. HADLEY: Maybe it isn't 8.
MIL DIXON: This is Exhibit 5.
MR. HADLEY: Sorry. All right, Exhibit 5.
Exhibit 5.
Q. Exhibit 5 refers to — is your letter,
correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And No. 6 of Exhibit 4 talks about no soffit
venting, lack of attic ventilation has caused roof
shingles to deteriorate, okay? Hang on just one
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second
Do you know offhand just what the standard
is for a ventilation?
A. Yes.
Q. Kind of the ratio?
A. It's one to one fifty. You got to know what
the inches of the vents are, and that is put out by the
manufacturer. You have to reduce it by the fins. You
have to reduce it by the grill.
Q. Okay. And I'm referring now to your
Exhibit 5, your letter, you're saying — I'm looking at
the last two sentences of your paragraph there of the
first paragraph. I also visited the job site — the
job site another occasion and Dan and I discussed the
venting of the attic.
A. Yeah.
Q. Dan felt that it was adequate, period.
Did you feel it was adequate?
A. I questioned it at the time, I did. But I
didn't know what the space was for those vents.
Q. Why didn't you know the space?
A. Because they weren't written on the —
there's no specifications on the manufacturer what
they — they didn't put on it how many square inching
of venting it would produce.

Q. Okay. Why did you then - what was it that
caused you to discuss the venting of the attic? Why
did you bring it up to Dan?
A. I think I — that's a long time ago. But,
as I recall, I asked him if he thought that was - if
he calculated or what it needed for the attic, and he
thought that what he had was adequate.
Q. And you accepted that?
A. And I accepted that at the time.
Q. All right. Now, you raise a little point.
When you say "at the time," was there a time that you
thought maybe I shouldn't ~
A. It started to curl.
Q. Which, of course, was after Mary had bought
it?
A Yeah.
Q. Do you believe that the fact that there
was — I should ask you this: Today now as you sit
here was there inadequate ventilation back when —
during October of 1993? Was there inadequate
ventilation at that time?
A The evidence points, yes, there was.
Q. Do you believe Jack — excuse me, do you
believe that Mr. Smith knew that the ventilation was
inadequate?
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A. I don't — that's — I don't know. I would
say —
Q. Excuse me, did you ask him what the
measurements were of the -- of the attic, of the floor
space, as it pertains to the ventilation? Did you ask
him that?
A. No. But I ~ but we still went back to the
grills as to how big they were.
Q. Did you measure them? Did you go measure
those grills?
A. You can measure them, yeah. That doesn't
tell you. It's less than that measurement
Q. I know that. But I'm just asking if you
measured it?
A. Yeah, we measured at the time what they
were. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Well, then, if you measured them, did
you run a calculation so you would know exactly how
much ventilation —
A I did not.
Q. You didn't?
A I didn't.
Q. Do you think Mr. Smith had a duty to measure
and run the calculation so that he could ensure that
the ventilation was to code? Do you think he had a
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Q Okay So the nailing fin A The nailing fin goes over the top of that
Q Okay And instead of using this one foot
strip that you see used nowadays, Dan Smith used felt9
A Yeah
Q And at the time you felt that was
appropriate, at the time he was building the house,
correct 7
A Yes
Q All right Now, you say that the problem
has nothing to do with counter flashing, the windows
are cheap aluminum and they are sweating because the
frames are very cold, correct 7
A That's right
Q Now, when did you make that observation
first, the first time 7
A Well, when you have a window there's no
thermal break between the outside part of the frame and
the inside part of the frame It condenses — it
brings the cold right m on the frame and then it
condenses water on the frame, the window frames itself,
and would come off
Q Did you actually see that A Any humidity in the house would collect on
the windows Yes, I did see that
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MR DIXON
I
2
Q All nght \ n d you say the reason vvhy it
3 was constantly plugging up because they were low flush
4 toilets, designed to save some water, is that nght 7
A That's nght
^
Q If I understand you correctly, you
6
7 actually 8
A I pulled it out for her twice and unplugged
9 lt
10
Q Now, when you did that, how did she happen
l i to call you 7 Did she know that you were a construction
12 contractor7 Or did she call you because you were the
13 building inspector7 Do you know what I mean7
14
A We've been friends for a long time, and I've
15 built one other home before this one
j 16
Q I see
17
A We've been acquainted for a long time
18
Q Okay Before she purchased this house of
19 the Smiths, did she ever go to you to talk to you about
20 the house and whether she should buy it7
21
A No
22
Q Did you know she was going to buy this house
23 before she did 7
24
A No
25
Q How did you meet Mary Moore m the
first
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7

Q You saw that on Mary Moore's house
A Yes
Q When did you first see that in her house 7
A When I was helping her fix the bathroom
Q When was that, approximately7
A I don't know dates Mary's got dates on
that someplace
Q I think she said, I think, that was within
the first two or three years after she moved into the
house Would that seem right to you 7
A I really don't recall
Q Okay
MR DIXON I don't want to misrepresent
her Didn't she say the bathrooms were the first
couple or three years 7 Is that what you remember
yesterday7
MR HADLEY Within the first two or three
years 7
MR DIXON Yeah, the toilets
MS MOORE I don't remember what I said
yesterday
MR HADLEY She did have problems with the
toilets within the first two or three years
THE WITNESS The toilet is the next one on
your list, and it was constantly plugging up
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7

place
A Well, her husband and they were farmers,
raised potatoes down here in the lower sink area
Fiowell, yeah I was acquainted with all her family,
both Bill and his brother
Q Okay And you were acquainted with them
You said friends, but did you go out socially, that
close a friend7
A No I mean, they were there and we were up
here
Q So because you were that kind of friend
acquaintance, she would call you to help her on this
around the house, is that correct7
A She called and I volunteered to go help her
Q And you didn't charge her for those
services7
A No
Q And you didn't go because you were the
building inspector7
A No
Q You did that because you were her friend,
nght 7
A We were trying to see if we could solve the
problems
Q Okay Now, what kind of construction

1
J
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9

box, correct
A I can't confirm that because I don't really
recall But I have a tester that tests, and I push the
button to make sure when I'm checking GFI's I know
the garage, and that's coming up later here, I thmk,
anyway, Dan said he was going to put woodworking tools
in there so he didn't want them Then at the time I
thought, well, you know, he can put the plugs in if
it's necessary
When the GFI's first came out, people used
to pull the plug out and pulled because they tripped so
many times Nowadays it's not a problem with the GFI's
the way they are
Q There's been a lot of improvements in the
GFI's 9
A Yes And the new GFI plugs are inexpensive,
like I say, $6 But the breaker is still about $30,1
thmk, for each one
Q And then you say the two 20 amp circuits
GFCI protected is a later code change What do you
mean by that 9
A In the kitchen That's the kitchen, we
require two separate circuits That came in
Q Okay Are you talking about the 20 amp
circuits, they could have been 15 amp circuits 9
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not a big issue, as far as getting it done It should
be labeled so that they're not trying to figure out
which switch went where
Q Sure No 26 he says the house has over
house has over spanned headers and joists throughout
the house What's your response to that9
A Weil, that goes back to this He'b saying
that the long span m this report I got here, and I
haven't - I haven't got the blueprints anymore, and I
have no way of measuring the things He said the
longest span was 13 feet And when I we did it, we
did it on this span chart, which allows 13 foot plus
just a little They were fine, as far as I was
concerned
Q Okay
A -- on the spans
Q All right
A He mentions a header m one of these It's
been cut down, or something I don't recall anything
like that
Q Let me ask you about that There is a
header for a basement window that faces to the north
Do you remember that basement window9
A Not particularly There is a basement
window heads the north on that side
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A No, they were still 20 amps before They
required two separate circuits A minimum of two
separate circuits in the kitchen
Q Okay Well, didn't this house have two
separate circuits in the kitchen 9
A I thought it did I don't know I would
have to go - it's been they made this after I made
that final, and I'm not sure If it was my mistake, if
I overlooked that, I don't know
Q Well, I don't think you did, because I think
we saw two separate circuits But that's something we
can hash out But I don't want to leave you with the
impression that you made a mistake, because our
expert —
A Well -Q — saw two separate circuits
A — I don't pretend to be perfect I try to
oversee anything
Q Let's go to 24, and that's the bathrooms
A That's basically the same thing
Q Okay And No 25 A And
Q The electrical panel had not been labeled
A And I don't thmk it is yet That is one
thing on the final, I don't thmk it's labeled It's
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Q All right Do you remember ever finding out
that either Mr Moore or Mary Moore or somebody after
they took over the house, cut that header back9
A I wouldn't — I don't know anything about
any of that
Q Okay
A I couldn't say one way or another
Q All right I only ask you that because you
did help her out for some things
A I had nothing to do with anything like that,
if that was done
Q Okay And when you said you made a
reference to this — that chart that you were working
on that said that there was an allowable span of 13
foot 1 inches, you were talking about —
A The floor joists
Q You were talking about -A Yeah, Exhibit 4 9
Q The handout sheet to the contractors, which
was Exhibit 3, correct 9
A Uh huh
Q Is that yes 9
A Yes
Q All right So now we're at the footings
appear to be at grade level in some places
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Now, when you passed final inspection, the
final grading to this house had not been done, correct7
A That's right
Q And that was because it was — it was
November and it was muddy and it wasn't a good time to
be doing final grading, correct*?
A That's right
Q And you expected that the final grading
would be done the next spring when the weather cleared
up, correct 7
A Yes
Q And that's what you and Mr Smith agreed
upon, correct 7
A. Yes
Q Okay At that point in time, to your
knowledge, neither Mr Smith -- Mr Smith had no
intention of selling the house to Mrs Moore, because
Mrs Moore hadn't even come into the picture, right7
A Yes
Q And you state in here that the Moores were
not aware of the 30 inch depth requirement I'm not
following that How do you know that the Moores were
not aware of the 30 inch depth requirement7
A Well, I didn't discuss it with them I
don't know if they knew or not I don't think that she
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was never around the house when it was done
Q Okay Do you know whether the Moores, after
they moved in, moved any dirt 7
A I couldn't — I didn't witness that
Q Okay Did you ever see them doing any any of the finish grading that was expected to be done 7
A No
MR HADLEY Object Weil, strike that Go
ahead
MR DIXON
Q Did Mrs Moore ever, or Mr Moore, the late
Mr Moore, ever tell you that they had taken some dirt
away from part of the house in order to make a
driveway, or something like that7
A He had a dnveway around the east part of
the house, but he didn't talk to me about that
dnveway He had an access to go back to his corral
So that was his way of getting back there was on the
east side of the house
Q Okay Did you ever notice any changes in
the grade of the house from the time you did the final
inspection until during the time that you would go back
and visit that house periodically to see Mrs Moore 7
A When we did the final inspection, it was a
mess It was muddy, muddy, garbagey (sic) There was
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did because she didn't realize they were that shallow
until later on, and she showed me one day when we had
to put a fence in, was trying to put a post in
Q That was the first time that Mrs Moore ever
mentioned to you any problem that she had with the
footings of the house, correct 7
A That's when it came up, yeah
Q Now, when you were out there at the house at
the time that — or at the time that the inspection final inspection was done, was there dirt that could
have been used to accomplish the final grading7
A He had some dirt around the house I don't
know how much
Q Do you remember ever seeing any piles of
dirt around the house, in the back 7
A He had dirt piled up when they poured the
footings He had to dig out and for the basement I
don't remember how much
Q Do you remember him ever bringing m a load
of dirt 7
A Not to my knowledge 1 wasn't around for
that
Q He could have, but you just don't remember7
A He could have done and I wouldn't have known
about it, that's nght The grading and that stuff I
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a lot of change in it after that
Q Okay So it was such a mess that there was
obviously some changes made 7
A Obviously pictures would be better than
words on that
Q Okay
A But we don't have them
Q Have you ever told — let's see, have you
ever told anybody that the Moores had done some
movement or some alteration of dirt levels, or anything
like that 7
A No
Q Okay All right Well, tell me how you
expected the Smiths that following spring to have
complied with the 30 inch depth requirement7
MR HADLEY Objection Objection, in that
you're clearly leading the witness and you're assuming
a fact that has not been at issue, that the Smiths were
expected to do the landscaping
MR DIXON No, that's a
mischaractenzation He did say that he expected the
Smiths to do the finish grade the following spring when
the weather cleared up
MR HADLEY Let me voir dire
/ / /

20 (Pages 77 to 80)
Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc
Post Office Box 3079 S t George, Utah 84771 (435)688-7844

Villiam Moore and Mary Moore vs. Dan Smith, et al.
deposition of L. Jack Peterson, taken on February 20, 2003

Page 145

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Okay. So having stated that — shall we go
to the code, UBC 2517? Because your position was that
is not out of code. I mean, what is your position
regarding this wall and window that are cantilevered
out?
A. I would need to go measure those to make
sure what they are right now. But if they're 4 feet,
whether that's been rated or whether that's correct.
Q. Keep talking to me. What does that mean you
start saying about 4 foot, what are you addressing?
A. Well, there was a formula that the old
contractors used that had a distance of so much back
and so much over you go.
Q. Right
A. And I don't know what that — I don't
remember what it was. I know I've been told and heard,
use that, because we went back to the 3 foot.
Q. Okay. Are you prepared—
A. It was more than that. I mean, it was more
than three. It was allowed more than three.
Q. Are you prepared to say definitely one way
or another that it is within code or outside the code?
A. At this point, no, I'm not. I haven't
really checked out on that.
Q. Okay. Let's bypass it, okay?

Page 147

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. Most of them do it in about 10 minutes.
Q. What if we were in a hurry to get the home
sold, may not label it 7
A. I don't know. I would be speculating.
MR. DIXON: I sustain the objection.
(Laughter.)
MR. HADLEY:
Q. Did you ever consider law school, Jack?
A. No. I don't want to go to law school.
Q. Okay. I'm trying to just move on here.
Man, here it is No. 27, footings do not meet minimum 30
inch frost line depth. You and Bryce kind of talked
about that one, didn't you?
A. Yeah. I really can't give you the --1 know
at the time the footings were poured, I mentioned to
Dan that they were not deep enough, the whole —
Q. Right when they were pouring you mentioned
it?
A. Right when it was poured. And he told me it
was going to be backfilled. And, of course, that
wasn't done in November when we did that. So that's
basically it. I mean -Q. Why didn't he do it right back when he had
got them poured and —
A. Well, if they planned on filling them out, I
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A. Yeah.
MR. HADLEY: Robert, you're going to get a
longer lunch than maybe needed.
Q. Whoa, do you think I'm just getting picky to
go to No. 25 of Exhibit 4 and say that that electrical
panel has not been labeled?
A. It hasn't been labeled. I know what you
could do.
Q. Do you think I'm being real picky?
A. Brought up on my inspection sheet it says
panel not labeled and that there.
Q. And it's required?
A. It's required for the switches.
Q. What if I built that home for me to live in,
would you still say it's required that I label that
thing?
A. I think at the time of the final -- I don't
know — I can't remember if it was positive, but I
thought I talked about that and it was gonna be done.
But I don't know if it was forgotten. It isn't a big
job, but it needs to be done.
Q. Would it — it isn't a big job, you say?
A. Not really big.
Q. How big a job would it be for a licensed
master electrician to label an electrical panel?
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have that quite a bit, they'll backfill to get their
slope away from the house.
Q. Okay. Is the milk pale spilled over as
pertained to these footings, Jack?
MR. DDCON: Objection to the form of the
question.

MR. HADLEY:
Q. Do you follow my drift?
MR. DIXON: No, I don't. Objection to the
form of the question.
THE WITNESS: The grading was impossible at
the time I went through there. It was November. It
•was muddy. But I don't know whose responsibility ic
was. I don't know what the — I don't know what the
deals were between the two parties. I have — I really
can't answer.
MR. HADLEY:
Q. Are you aware of when Mary Moore first
contacted the Smiths about potentially buying the home?
A. No.
Q. Okay. What if I told you it was in February
of 1994, some three months after your November 8th
final inspection?
A. February of that year was —
Q. February of '94, yeah.
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A. Yes, I would say that.
Q Okay.
A. Reputation, too.
Q Let's talk about item 6. And I think I'm
going to refer here to — I believe it's Exhibit 8. Do
you still have a copy of your letter there?
A. No, he took them all back there.
Q. You didn't get a copy?
MR. DIXON: You want the inspection final?
MR. HADLEY: No. If I wrote this right,
Exhibit 8.
MR. DIXON: I thought you said 6.
Exhibit 8.
THE WITNESS: No, that's different than what
he's got. It's the other one.
MR. HADLEY: Maybe it isn't 8.
MR. DIXON: This is Exhibit 5.
MR. HADLEY: Sorry. All right, Exhibit 5.
Exhibit 5.
Q. Exhibit 5 refers to — is your letter,
correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And No. 6 of Exhibit 4 talks about no soffit
venting, lack of attic ventilation has caused roof
shingles to deteriorate, okay? Hang on just one
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Q. Okay. Why did you then ~ what was it that
caused you to discuss the venting of the attic? Why
did you bring it up to Dan?
A. I think I - that's a long time ago. But,
as I recall, I asked him if he thought that was — if
he calculated or what it needed for the attic, and he
thought that what he had was adequate.
Q. And you accepted that?
A. And I accepted that at the time.
Q. All right. Now, you raise a little point.
When you say "at the time," was there a time that you
thought maybe I shouldn't A. It started to curl.
Q. Which, of course, was after Mary had bought
it?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you believe that the fact that there
was --1 should ask you this: Today now as you sit
here was there inadequate ventilation back when —
during October of 1993? Was there inadequate
ventilation at that time?
A. The evidence points, yes, there was.
Q. Do you believe Jack — excuse me, do you
believe that Mr. Smith knew that the ventilation was
inadequate?
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1 second.
2
Do you know offhand just what the standard
3 is for a ventilation?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. Kind of the ratio?
6
A. It's one to one fifty. You got to know what
7 the inches of the vents are, and that is put out by the
8 manufacturer. You have to reduce it by the fins. You
9 have to reduce it by the grill.
10
Q. Okay. And I'm referring now to your
11 Exhibit 5, your letter, you're saying — I'm looking at
12 the last two sentences of your paragraph there of the
13 first paragraph. I also visited the job site -- the
14 job site another occasion and Dan and I discussed the
15 venting of the attic.
16
A. Yeah.
17
Q. Dan felt that it was adequate, period.
18
Did you feel it was adequate?
19
A. I questioned it at the time, I did. But I
20 didn't know what the space was for those vents.
21
Q. Why didn't you know the space?
22
A. Because they weren't written on the —
23 there's no specifications on the manufacturer what
24 they -- they didn't put on it how many square inching
25 of venting it would produce.

Page 112
A. I don't — that's — I don't know. I would
I ,say Q. Excuse me, did you ask him what the
measurements were of the — of the attic, of the floor
space, as it pertains to the ventilation? Did you ask
him that?
A. No. But I — but we still went back to the
gnlls as to how big they were.
9
Q. Did you measure them? Did you go measure
10 those grills?
11
A. You can measure them, yeah. That doesn't
12 tell you. It's less than that measurement.
13
Q. I know that. But I'm just asking if you
14 measured it?
15
A. Yeah, we measured at the time what they
16 were. Yeah.
17
Q. Okay. Well, then, if you measured them, did
18 you run a calculation so you would know exactly how
19 much ventilation —
20
A. I did not.
21
Q. You didn't?
22
A. I didn't.
23
Q. Do you think Mr. Smith had a duty to measure
24 and run the calculation so that he could ensure that
25 the ventilation was to code? Do you think he had a
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To whom it may concern
[ was contacted by Dan Smith and went over the property and the layout of the home on
the 1 I of August 1993, and inspected the footings on Fnday 13 th It was called to his attention
at that time that the footings were not at proper depth, but he stated this would be taken care of
when the back till was put around the house The basement walls were inspected on the 16th and
the rough plumbing on the 18th. The rough electrical and plumbing, along with the framing
inspection, was done on the 8^ and 9th of September 1993 I checked the building progress on
both the 28th and the 29th of October [ also visited the job site another occasion and Dan and I
discussed the venting of the attic Dan felt that it was adequate
Dan and Carol were living in the home when we a^ked to do the final inspection on the
home on the 8^ of November At that time they hadn't built the deck on the back of the house
and the final grading hadn't been done as well At the time the final inspection was done, [
discussed with Dan the fact that the access into the attic did not meet the minimum code
requirements and that the smoke detectors had not been installed None of these items had been
corrected at the time that the house was sold to the Moore's The Moore's did the landscaping
around the house not realizing that the back fill around the house did not meet the 30 inch depth
requirement
th

Respectfully submittedl/y

^ iCjacfc Peterson, Fillmore City Building Inspector

FILLMORE CITY
City Building Inspectors response to 30 items from Sunrise Engineering's inspector.
The home in question was built under the 1991 Building Code
The fascia that wasn't completed was done by Tom's Roofing when a cold roof was put
on that section in August of 1998. It had noting to do with the original construction.
The rear deck was constructed after my last inspection and was not anchored properly.
Same as r£L
The south east comer of the foundation is not cracking. The stucco finish on the
foundation is cracking where it meets the sheeting on the upper floor Ic is not a structural
problem
Not applicable.
The gab^e end vents and turtle vents were installed later -

There is a junction box und^r die kitchen cabinets up next to the counter top Not easy
access. Needs a cover. This item was missed on the final inspection.
The attic access was brought to Mr. Smith's attention when the final inspection was
made.
This problem has nothing to do with counter flashing. The wmdows are cheap aluminum
frames v/ith no thermal break and they are sweating because the frames are very cold.
Bathroom fixtures have been removed many times because of the water saver toilers that
are plugging and not flushing. I can not confirm if they were not caulked in the
beginning.
Can not confirm in attic
At the time of the final inspection it was noted that smoke detectors were lacking Mr.
Smith was going to take care of the problem. After tile Moore's moved in the battery
detector was installed.
On October 29, 1993, Mr. Smith called me and w anted mc to lock at the stairs. The
treads measured about 3'8 niche over, but there wasn't enough ceding height, and one
more tread would make the clearance far below the €6n head room clearance. It would
take major reconstruction to
change it, and I felt that the 378 inch over height was the lessor of the two problems.

14.

Not required in an unfinished basement.

15.

Not required Water pressure is not that high.

16.

To my knowledge, the copper lines were grounded.

17.

The spans for 2 x 6 headers in the 1991 code was up to six feet. None exceed that.

18.

Can not confirm.

19.

Cantilever has a 2 to \. There is 13 feet back and 4 feet over. 1991 code did not require
to be double.

20.

Combusiion air for water heater not required from outside. Plenty of room m basement
to meet needs of 50 cubic feet, 1000 BTU. Female is 90 piuse bringing its own
combustion air from outside.

21.

Dishwasher is plumbed right and works fine.

22.

In the 1991 Building Code only water heaters in seismic zone 3-4 were required to be
anchored. Fillmore is in a 2 B Zone. (1 code 1310 (e)

23.

Kitchen circuits under the 91 code 210-8 (5) Electric Code, with receptacles installed
within 6 feet of kitchen sink to service counter tops shall be GF1 protected. This was
done with a GFCI breaker in panel box. The two 20 amp circuits GFCI protected is later
code change.

24

Bathrooms under 210-8-6 also 15 or 20 amps and are GFCI protected. There were also
on a GFCI breaker in panel box.

25.

Mr. Smith told me at the time of the final inspection that he would take care of this item.

26".

In 91 code, 2 x 8 -]6 inch on center were allowed 13 feet 1 inch - max. The longest spans
in the house do not exceed this. The headers have already been addressed in #17.

27.

When the footings were inspected, Mr. Smith assured me the grading would be adequate.
When he moved in, in November, it was muddy and the grading had not been done.
When ihe home was sold to the Moore's, the grading and landscaping were not done,
the Moore's were not aware of the 30 inchricpt,

28.

'This also was done by Moore's and was part of the land scraping.

29.

Outlets in the garage ware checked on final inspection with Mr. Smith, He said he was
going to use his power tools in the garage and didn't want GFI.

30.

I miased this item on final inspecnon.

- /

RESIDENTIAL

£* /

Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance
CITY OF FILLMORE

Name of Owner-

Dan Smith

Building Permit No.:

1143

Address of Owner:

155 W 300 S

Telephone No.:

743-5170

Zone:

Property described as:.
Legal description

Otherwise known as:
Street address
Occupancy G r o u p : .

Architect/Engineer:.
Contractor: ^ /

j/fiMr

j>M/¥

No. of buildings on lot

Altered

New

.Building No.

W
_No. of Units

TYPE
_ _ OF OCCUPANCY
FAMILY OCCUPANCY
Number of families approved t o reside per building
Number of boarders or roomers w i t h automobiles approved t o reside on premises w i t h a family
Numher of legal-sized off-street parking spaces
BACHING SINGLES OCCUPANCY
Number of baching singles approved to reside per unit
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces. The number of occupants owning or operating
vehicles cannot exceed this number.
1 declare under penalty of perjury that 1 am the owner or authorized agent of the property subject of this request, that the foregoing statements and answers are true and correct, and that the stated conditions w i l l be maintained on the premise^

Signature

Date

A n y change \n intensity of use on the building or premises, or an increase of more than five percent (5%) in the number of occupants in an apartment or multiple residential building will require the issuance of a new certificate.

Chief Buildi(iglnspector
Remarks:

Section 4-4 Zoning Ordinance No, 77-3 Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance. tt shaLl be unlawful
to use or occupy or to permit the use or occupancy of any building or premises until a certificate of
occupancy and zoning compliance shall have been issued for the premises and/or building by Fillmore City.
Failure to comply with any section of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not
more then $1000 or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both aa is set forth in Chapter L
Sec. H-LG0.

O R M 123 GEM Prxntmg Co S L C
Legend

Yes(X)

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

Utah

No(0)

DATE

/A

/

he undersigned Buyer .

_ hereby deposits Wth-QiuKcmg^

EARNEST MONE»Y, the amount of

.J

flU/h

^J^^rj^./^,

_, rj_ , 7 M„

—

^

' ^

//CO

Dollars {S^/gQO.

£>Q

)

he form of
?Jf\Lr_k_.
ich shall be deposited in accordance with applicaole State Law
Received by .
Phone Number

>kerage

-//?'-

J

C^t^^r/m_

OFFER TO PURCHASE
I PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase
situated at
ase of the property siti
in the City of

County of

Utah

bject to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utiii«(hL-Qrr other easements or nnhts of way government patents
patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
cordance with Section G Said property is owned by

__ as sellers and is more particularly described

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES
O UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

O Vacant Lot

Q Vacant Acreage

]yT IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

9

E l Residential

Commercial

0 Other

0Condo

_D Other

(a) Included i t e m s Unless excluded below this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title

Xl 'J^STkG A^y^T^

j) Excluded i t e m s The following items are specifically excluded from this sale.

(c} CONNECTIONS, JJTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS
__! public sewer
g_J) septic tank
0

0

"_? connected

private water

hJ other

0
*

„

Q / V antenna

£3 master antenna

natural gas

0 connected

electnaty

t_Tdedicated road

Q prewired

J_J connected

E_f paved

Q curb and gutter
other rights

(d) Survey A certified survey Q shall be furnished at the expense of _
(e) Buyer Inspection

_ connected

O ingress & egress by private easement

# of shares M » i J_ ^ o m ^ a r V f ^ V~< * \

other sanitary system

\jf public water

O connected

STirngation water / secondary system

connected

MjTgL

Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price

Q well

Ufconnected

4~^ *Jjjt<j^\s

/L^i{

_pnor to closing

Wsshall not be furnished

Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section t (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical

condition except

.

.

le price for the property ts_
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The total purchase
~ '\df,
COO-OO

^j

Dollars ($

l_M

O'^O ' &Q

which shall be paid as follows

which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT

i-r-fj

^r?.c_-Lfl

i.

Q

representing the approximate balance ol CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer
which obligation bears interest at
which include

O

(Z3 principal

O
a interest

% per annum with monthly payments of $
_ taxes,

O insurance.

__J

.
D other

d condo fees

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer which obligation bears interest at
which include

d principal,

CIS interest

Q taxes

% per annum with monthly payments of $
Q insurance,

C3 condo fees

.

D other

representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing to be paid as follows

-O-

Other .

$ }j3, {)QO

00

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing Buyer agrees to use best efforts
to assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
to make application withm
an interest rate not to exceed

tv r

fit

A V //{

days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at
% If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within

A/ f A

of this Agreement this Agreement s/iall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written ziotice Seller agrees to pay up \o
points not to exceed $ _

_ In addition, seller agrees to pay $

/ '

TiJr:.

/* / r*

- - / c ;

/[/

days after Seller s acceptance
'h{

to be used for Buyer s other lodn costs

mortgage\ 1loan discount

EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Legend

Yes (X)

No (O)

This Is a legally binding contract Read the entire document carefully before signing

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
i INCLUDED I T E M S . Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing heating,
-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, winw and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, walt-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit
's). fencing, trees and shrubs
B INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to rts condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrorr
its production Buyer accepts the property in 'as i s " condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires any additional inspt
j d inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer
, SELLER WARRANTIES Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
will not be remedied prior to closing, (b) all obligations agamst the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
» brought current o n or before dosing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system and appliances shall be sound or in
itisfactory working condition at dosing
D CONDITION OF WELL Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller s knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
tnttnued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water nght
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC T A N K . Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller s knowledge, in good working order and Seller
is no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards
F ACCELERATION CLAUSE- Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Soller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
"*K!S of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
jprove the sale. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent pnor to closing In such case,
I earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" dause are^
"Ih
Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void
G TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days pnor to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
a preliminary title report on the subject property Prior to closing. Buyer shall grve wntten notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title
hereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreeent at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties
H TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
/ such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided lor in said standard form, and
ie encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
l a l l , unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any
ancellation charge
1 EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property Unless reasonable wntten objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent pnor
> closing. Buyer shall take title subject to such leases If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing thts Agreement shall be null and void
J CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Dunng the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases
ntered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer

estate c o n t r a c t . T r a n s f e r of S e l l e r ' s o w n e r s h i p interest .^naTTbe m a d e a s set f o r t h in Section S . Seller a g r e e s to f u n u ^ n good a n d m a r k e t a b l e title t o the property, s u b j e c t
o e n c u m b r a n c e s a n d e x c e p t i o n s n o t e d h e r e i n , e v i d e n c e d by __. a current p o l i c y of title i n s u r a n c e in the a m o u n t of p u r c h a s e p r i c e C^ an abstract of title brought current,
v i t h a n attorney's o p i n i o n (See Section H ) .
4. INSPECTION O F T I T L E . In accordance with Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to d o s i n g . Buyer shall take title
lubj&ct to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer C I h a s F f h a s not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement
5. V E S T I N G O F T I T L E . T i t l e shall v e s t in Buyer as f o l l o w s :

cZ-<i- d,0\.e- <^7/

J

(Z^f

CZ^-tL^n *

6. S E L L E R S W A R R A N T I E S . In a d d i t i o n to warranties c o n t a i n e d in S e c t i o n C, the f o l l o w i n g items are also warranted:
"

^

l

^

^

:

;

J

E x c e p t i o n s t o t h e a b o v e a n d S e c t i o n C s h a l l be limited t o t h e f o l l o w i n g :

7 . S P E C I A L C O N S I D E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T I N G E N C I E S . T h i s offer is m a d e subject t o t h e following special conditions a n d / o r c o n t i n g e n c i e s w h i c h m u s t be s a t i s f i e d
prior t o c l o s i n g :

:

:

;

:

:

___k^__2_

8 . C L O S I N G O F S A L E . T h i s A g r e e m e n t shall be d o s e d o n or before

..19

\

Vk-

at a r e a s o n a b l e l o c a t i o n t o be d e s i g n a t e d b y

S e l l e r , s u b j e c t t o S e c t i o n Q. U p o n d e m a n d . Buyer shall d e p o s i t w i t h the e s c r o w c l o s i n g o f f i c e all d o c u m e n t s necessary to c o m p l e t e the p u r c h a s e in accordance w i t h
t h i s A g r e e m e n t . P r o r a t i o n s set forth in S e c t i o n R shall J>e w a d e as of

0 date of possession C_f d a t e of closing @ other

9 . P O S S E S S I O N . S e l l e r shall d e l i v e r possession to B u y e r o n _ _
1 0 . A G E N C Y D I S C L O S U R E . At t h e ssig\
i g n i n g of this A g r e e m e n t t h e listing
n g -_4gent
agent
a n d the selling a g e n t

/_^_k

.

iless e x t e n d e d by written a g r e e m e n t o f p a r t i e s .
fv

represents ( ) Seller (

> d i s c l o s u r e of t h e a g e n c y relati6nship(s) was p r o v i d e d to h i m / h e r . {

)(

represents (

/

) Seller {

} Buyer.

)>8uyer.
Buyer a n d Seller c o n f i r m that prior to s i g n i n g this A g r e e m e n t
JBiT

} B u y e r ' s initials (

) (

) Seller's i n i t i a l s .

,-.; G E N E R A L P R O V I S I O N S . U N L E S S O T H E R W I S E I N D I C A T E D A B O V E . T H E G E N E R A L P R O V I S I O N S E C T I O N S O N T H E R E V E R S E S I D E H E R E O F HAVE B E E N
A C C E P T E D B Y T H E B U Y E R A N D S E L L E R A N D A R E I N C O R P O R A T E D I N T O THIS A G R E E M E N T BY R E F E R E N C E .
1 2 . A G R E E M E N T T O P U R C H A S E A N D T I M E L I M I T F O R A C C E P T A N C E . Buyer o f f e r s t o p u r c h a s e the property on t h e a b o v e terms a n d c o n d i t i o n s . Seller s h a l l . ;
*" <
' r ^ " ) ^t J
x *^
h a v e until _____2________-(AM/PM)
_T^p, t /
, 19
t ^ O N E Y to ttfe B u y * r ^
' ^
/ ..
\ .-

A / /:^/

,if

U- sf.K^

(Buyer's Signature)

i

Off
£ " * " f- "" '*+-''•'•' '*-*-!'' •"" '•""
7 ^ t o accept this offer. U n l e s s a c c e p t e d , this offer shall lapse a n r j t h e Aaent s h a H ^ e t u r n the E A R N E S T
j .
_^ - > ^ - v ^
•
&S O ~ "

7<

(Date)

^?~.U?fi

IS fj V V
(Address)
s

(buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Address)

(Phone)

( S S N / T A X ID>

/
(Phonej

(SS'N/TAX I D )

;<

CHECK ONE
[ ^ A C C E P T A N C E O F O F F E R T O P U R C H A S E : Seller h e r e b y A C C E P T S the foregoing offer o n the terms a n d conditions s p e c i f i e d a b o v e
E ? R E J E C T I O N . S e l l e r h e r e b y R E J E C T S the f o r e g o i n g offer.

(Seller's initials)

(?£ C O U N T E R O F F E R . S e l l e r h e r e b y A C C E P T S the f o r e g o i n g offer S U B J E C T T O the e x c e p t i o n s or modifications as specified b e l o w or in t h e a t t a c h e d A d d e n d u m , a n d
p r e s e n t s s a i d C O U N T E R O F F E R for B u y e r ' s a c c e p t a n c e . B u y e r shall h a v e until
specified below.

Y ^
( S e l l e r ' s Sii g n a t u r e ) .

d'J/Q
(Q_de)

SSiiggnnaattuurree))

f-(^

19

JMsMLlMS.

(Time)

s

Y~>
(Seller's

(AM/PM)

(Address)

8'fpPm
(Datef

'

(Time)

£tU$L

(Address)

to accept the t e r m s

•7Vl-'.ri7o

Jtif • ' ? V - '/OS
(SSN/TAX ID)

(Phone)

J__L
(Phone)

J-20-

__________2><
(SSN/TAX I D )

-^rj^/71fyt<
CHECK ONE:
D

A C C E P T A N C E O F C O U N T E R OFFER.

•

R E J E C T I O N . B u y e r h e r e b y R E J E C T S the C O U N T E R O F F E R .

D

C O U N T E R O F F E R . B u y e r h e r e b y A C C E P T S t h e C O U N T E R O F F E R w i t h m o d i f i c a t i o n s o n attached A d d e n d u m .

(Buyer's Signature)

B u y e r h e r e b y A C C E P T S the C O U N T E R O F F E R

(Date)

( B u y e r ' s Initials)

(Time)

( B u y e r ' s Signature)

DOCUMENT

(Date)

(Time)

RECEIPT

S t a t e ^ a w r e q u i r e s B r o k e r to furnish B u y e r a n d Seller w i t h copies of this Agreement b e a r i n g all signatures. (One of the following alternatives m u s t therefore b e c o m p l e t e d ) .
A.E.
I a c k n o w l e d g e receipt_of a f i n a l c o p y of the f o r e g o i n g A g r e e m e n t bearing all s i g n a t u r e s :
SinM_TiiQC
I G N A T U R En S
SELLER
c cc»
« CD
-/
c i r : w / i - n i o cOF
r 8U?YER
SIGNATURE
: i -' <

- - • x> =<?. C ?

J, :

J3e
,bzxe

'

J_i

Dale

^~

Dale

B . C3 1 p e r s o n a l t y c a u s e d a final c o p y of t h e f o r e g o i n g A g r e e m e n t b e a r i n g all s i g n a t u r e s to b e mailed on _
C e r t i f i e d M a i l a n d r e t u r n receipt a t t a c h e d h e r e t o to t h e D Seller Q B u y e r . S e n t by

- -

-.19-

-by

K AUTHORITY OF SIGN ATORS If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants
s or her authority to do so and to bind 8uyer or Seller
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS- This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any
i d all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree
ent This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be m writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement
)t expressly modified or excluded therein
N OEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
to institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
jyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
eluding a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by apicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an inrpleader action in court to resolve a depute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the prmaoal broker to draw from the
irnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
j interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
es incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
0

ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement

P RISK OF LOSS. Al! risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
e date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of h^e, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
0%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property
tor to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees m writing to repair
replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed
^ TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport. ^
G. flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations delays caused by lender, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
ite shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter,
ne is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
jlivered by all parties to the transaction
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (V2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing
le insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current vear, insurance, tf acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
1 assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
closing
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING 11 this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed tree of defects other than those exjpted herein If this Agreement is f or sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
jntaimng Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
>tate contract therein
T NOTICE Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
the event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
automatically terminated and this Agreement is m full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the
uyer or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice
U BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term

Brokerage * shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office

DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days ' shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays
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A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ. (#889)
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (7522)
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, a P.C.
192 East 200 North Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,

)
]>
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

;
DEFENDANTS' SECOND SET
OF REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS TO PLAINTIFFS

]
]
;
)
)

Case No. 000700142 MI
Judge Eyre

DEFENDANTS7 FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS TO PLAINTIFFS
Defendants, Dan and Carol Smith, by and through their attorney, A. Bryce Dixon, Esq.,
of DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, a P.C, hereby request that Plaintiffs and their attorney
answer, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 36, in writing and under oath, within 30 days
of receipt hereof, the following Requests for Admission:
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that Jason Bullock and Mark O'Barr are home inspectors.
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Plaintiffs had the right to have a home inspection

performed before the sale of the home.
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that Plaintiffs had the time and opportunity to have a home
inspection performed before the sale of the home.
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Defendants did nothing to prevent Plaintiffs from
exercising their right to ask for and obtain a home inspection before the closing of the sale of
the home.

As to all Items 1 thru 42:
DEFECT ITEM #1
R E Q U E S T NO, 5: Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru
42 in your expert witness report were discovered without destructive testing.
R E Q U E S T NO. 6: Admit that said defects were discovered through inspection by
person(s) knowledgeable in the trade of home building or home inspection.
REQUEST NO.7: Admit that said defects could have been discovered before the sale of
the home by a home inspector.
R E Q U E S T NO. 8: Admit that a home inspection would have revealed said defects.
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru
42 in your expert witness report at the time of the sale of the home were not a latent defects as
the phrase "latent defect" is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths' motion for summary
judgment.
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that said defects were not a material defect as the phrase
"material defect(s)" is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths' motion for summary
judgment.
2

Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
Counsel for Plaintiff
2696 North University Avenue, #260
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS'
SECOND SET OF REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS

v.
DAN SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 00700142 MI
Judge Donald J. Eyre

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs and do hereby amend their Answers to Defendants'
Second Set of Request of Admissions to include the following:
ANSWER TO NO. 1
Admit
ANSWER TO NO. 2
Admit
ANSWER TO NO. 3
Admit

ANSWER TO NO. 4
Admit
ANSWER TO NO. 5
Admit
ANSWER TO NO. 6
Admit
ANSWER TO NO. 7
Admit
ANSWER TO NO. 8
Deny
ANSWER TO NO. 9
Admit as to defects 2 - 8 , 10, 13 - 25, 28, 29, 30 - 37, 40, and 41.
TT
DATED this / Y~ day of February 2003
\

Gregory f^HMley

2
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MR. HADLEY: Counsel, not to break your
stride, we went through — she's still working through
the papers, but there's some documents in there from
Tamko.
M R DEXON: Are there?
M R HADLEY: Yes.
M R DIXON: Let's take a look at i t
Q. Can you find it for me?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Well, I guess you don't have them. They
were all together there. But I have —
MRDDCON: Is this your stuff?
M R HADLEY: Oh, there is more. There you
go.
THE WITNESS: I started out by putting rain
gutters — finishing the rain gutter on my home, and
Jim Sampson discovered it, and we got ahold of them and
Tamko. That started it.
M R DIXON:
Q. All right. There's a complaint form that
says that you are filling out to Tamko, correct? How
did you find out that Tamko was the manufacturer of the
shingles?
A. I asked Allen Roper at the lumberyard here.
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So your allegation at this time is that the
shingles were faulty, correct?
A. We thought like the shingles were faulty.
Q. Why did you think that the shingles were
faulty?
A. Because they were cracking, raising and
curling.
Q. Where did you see raising and curling?
A. This gentleman that we hired, Jim Sampson,
to install the rain gutter on the north side above the
garage, came down and stopped on top of the garage. We
realized it didn't come down, but it didn't connect
into the rain gutter. We wanted it to go in and hook
into the rain gutter so there would be no problems. He
came and installed that, saw the roof, said something
about it.
I said, What's the problem?
He says, They're very brittle.
I said, Who would I talk to?
He sent me to Allen Roper.
Q. Okay
A. Allen Roper got me started on this end, and
then that gentleman came down and did an inspection and
wrote — came back. And he — or he and Jack Peterson
came back then.
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Q. And how did he —
A. And he —
Q. How did Allen Roper know that they were
Tamko shingles?
A. There's a paper with — in there that has a
receipt from them.
Q. Okay.
A. And Allen came over and looked at my roof
and told me to contact these people. In fact, he
helped me do it.
Q. All right. So in your complaint you state
that the shingles were purchased from Roper Lumber and
the date the home was purchased, February 15th, 1994,
and this is Mr. Roper helping you fill out this
complaint form; is that what you're saying?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. DIXON: Let's mark the complaint form as
Exhibit 1 up here.
(Whereupon, Exhibit I was marked
for identification.)
M R DIXON:
Q. And you state that the labor was correct,
the shingles faulty, you should replace all shingles
and labor to replace.
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Q. So Mr. Sampson actually replaced three
singles, correct?
A. Tamko asked him to take them off and replace
them so that they could be mailed in for testing.
Q. Okay.
A. And we did that.
Q. Now, is that the first that you had ever
heard of any problems with the shingles on the roof,
was when Mr. Sampson brought tiiat to your attention?
A. Yes. I don't go on the roof.
Q. You didn't have any leaking through the
roof, right?
A. No, I had not.
Q. Okay.
A. None that I was aware of, anyway.
Q. And this was on the north side of the house
just above the garage, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Did Mr. Sampson say there were any other
shingles that looked bad?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What other shingles did he say looked bad?
A. He said my roof looked bad. The shingles
were getting brittle. And it was not lack of their
materials: it was lack of ventilation.
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A. Put the stuff around the Q. Around the turtle vents?
A. No, around the roof. That comes over the
garage. Like this is the garage roof, it's the piece
that goes on the edge around the garage.
Q. All right
A. I don't know what it's called
Q. Did you hire Jack Peterson to do that?
A. No, T did not.
Q. Why did you call Jack Peterson about that?
A. Tamko asked for me to contact the city
inspector to see what was required, what we needed for
the home.
Q. Okay.
A. He gave us an idea and so did Jack.
Q. All right. But I don't quite understand why
Jack Peterson would be willing to work on the house.
Did you hire him to do work on the house?
A. No, he told Tom the roofer that he would put
that on.
Q. Okay.
A. Because Tom the roofer does not do that;
Jack can.
Q. Did he expect to be paid for that?
A. He would have been paid if he would have
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sent me a bill. He would have.
Q. All right. Let's go to the toilet flooding
over several times. What damage did that do?
A. Well, it floods over. It gets under the
moulding. At one time it was so bad it leaked down
into the basement It got on the carpet in the
bedroom.
Q. Okay. Do you know why the toilets flooded?
A. I didn't know for years why the toilet
flooded. I just felt like I didn't know how to flush
the toilet properly. I don't know why it didn't flush.
Q. And did you find out the reason eventually
why the toilets were flooding?
A. I believe somebody told me venting. But I
wouldn't — Tm not —
Q. Okay. All right What other damage have
you suffered?
A. We had a very bad leak in the front windows.
Very, very cold.
Q. Excuse me, before we go on to the toilets,
did you hire anyone to repair the toilets?
A. I made attempts. I think we got them here.
Q. It appears that the check for this repair of
the toilet problem is dated July 29th of 2002? Is that
right?

A. Yeah. I tried like the stuff you put down
drains to clean things. Dan had told me about the
clean-out valve. I had plunged i t I had tried
everything I knew how to try. It's not a consistent
thing, it just happens every once in a while. You
think you have it cleared up and then it happens again.
Q. Well, this is in 2002. This is, you know,
how many years after you bought the house? Eight years
after you bought the house.
A. It might plug up once or twice and not for
several months. It might plug up 20 times in a month.
Q. This is the first time your toilet plugged
up is 2002?
A. Oh, no.
Q. Eight years after you bought the house and
you want to charge —
A- I told you I tried -MR.HADLEY: Let him finish his question.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
MR. DIXON:
Q. When did it first plug up, then?
A. That I do not remember.
Q. Well, just approximately how soon after you
bought the house did you have a toilet problem?
A. Six months. Approximately.
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Q. And periodically ever since then you've had
these toilet problems?
A Just here and there. You would think it was
fixed. It wasn't
Q. All right You say you got bad leaks in the
front window, right?
A. We had a lot of air coming, and there was a
gap in front of our window.
Q. Okay. I don't understand gap. Could you
describe it for me.
A. Evidently the caulking that had been there
had gone in the wall. I don't know where it went. But
we kept filling it with caulking trying to seal it off.
It was very cold.
Q. Okay. So you're talking about the front
room window, the biggest window or the smaller windows?
A. The big one.
Q. The big window in the front room looking
north, correct?
A. (Nods head).
Q. Yes?
A. Yes. Okay. I'm thinking when I do that.
Q. That's fine.
And you say that on the inside of the window
where there was some caulking, the caulking wasn't
•L-_, ^^-^JUJJ^lUAkeU-iJa-Ji
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I still don't go touch my living room window every day.
Q. Well, ma'am, let me tell you when we get any
leaks in our house, my wife is all over the place
feeling for leaks. She wants to see if there's water
here, water there. She wants to know where that water
is coming from. And I can't imagine you as a
conscientious homeowner, who keeps a very nice home,
SCQS water damage, or evidence of some kind of water
damage, and you not feeling all around to see how wet
it might be.
You just didn't feel all around?
A. But it was already dry when I discovered it.
So there was no way of knowing.
Q. Okay. So you have never seen -- what Tm
trying to find out, have you ever seen any damage on
the vertical section of sheet rock on either side of
any window in your house? I know that you're saying
that there's some water damage at the bottom. But have
you ever seen any on the vertical sections, the part —
the sides of the windows, interior?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. When was the first time you saw any
flaking of paint caused by water damage, first winter,
second winter, third winter? First summer? First
rain?
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Q. So the towels kept the water away?
A. Kept the cold air.
Q. So after that first winter when you noticed
some water damage, did you ever notice any water damage
after that?
A. I can't remember
Q Okay. So if you can't remember, it hasn't
been a very big problem, has it, ma'am?
A. I haven't spent a lot of time going around
my windows.
Q. It's not been something that you've been
very concerned about, has it?
A. I had other things I've been concerned more
about.
Q. Has it been something that you've been
concerned about or not?
A. Slightly.
Q. All right. What other damage have you
noticed to your house? Let's talk about the stuff that
you are concerned about, then. Serious damage, then.
Is there any*7
A. Well, the biggest damage would be the
foundation.
Q. Okay. How do you think your home has been
damaged with respect to the foundation?
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A. Probably the — end of the first winter.
Q. Okay. Where did you see the water damage,
on each of the windows or just in one window? Or
windows on one side of the house? Where?
A. The guest bedroom was the first one I
noticed.
Q. Okay.
A. On the ~
Q. North side of the house?
A. North side of the house, yes.
Q. What about the living room, did you notice
any water damage, paint peeling, in that first winter
there?
A. It's got a hard thing on it.
Q- What's that?
A. It has a hard base on it.
Q- So that wouldn't have been damaged; is that
right?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. It formed mold up in the window.
Q- All right. Now, as each winter passed, did
you see more and more evidence of water damage at the
base of the windows in your home?
A. Not as much. The towels on there.
u _ » ~^4L.~i.*£r*± ^rt^oJi.-*-*±iU^jtiki>*„
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A. When it was explained the depth of the frost
line, they said that it could damage the base of my
home. It wasn't below the frost line.
Q. Ma'am, has your home been damaged?
A. I'm saying I don't know if it's damaged
underneath
Q. Okay. Is your house sagging at all?
A. Something does I don't know what's causing
it.
Q. Is it out of - have you had one of these
experts in any of these 42 items say that the house is
going out of kilter, going out of whack, starting to
tip, and are there cracks in the interior of the house
caused by the foundation settling, or something like
that? Is that happening?
A. I wouldn't know that if I saw it. Unless I
felt the house shake.
Q. Well, ma'am, I'm asking for what you have
observed by way of damage. You're telling me that some
of these experts have told you there's some damage on
the foundation, or there's — there may be some damage,
but you haven't observed any damage, have you?
A. I have observed cracks in my home.
Q. Where?
A. I have one mat goes through from outside to
3JESE
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the inside of the back of my house. I have one that
goes from the outside inside from the garage side of my
house.
Q. A n d A. We have tried to caulk them.
Q. Do you attribute these to the fact that the
footings of the house are not deep enough?
A. No idea.
Q. When you said the foundation, I think you
said the footings not being buned low enough below the
frost line, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I want to know what you have seen, that
you can observe, that tells me about that damage, about
how you personally feel about this, because you've been
damaged
A. I can tell you how I feel about it. I can't
tell you about any damages —
Q- Okay. So you have —
A. — because I don't know one damage from the
other.
Q. So you haven't observed any damage to the
foundation, the footings, personally, correct?
A. I don't know what you attribute to —
Q. Well, do you even know what the footings
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Q. All
right.
A. I saw.
Q. When you fust moved in?
A. I saw, yes.
Q. Now, did you see that before you moved in,
after you moved in?
A. No.
Q. When?
A. Probably that spring.
Q. When you fust started to landscape,
right?
A. Raking the weeds and stuff out.
Q. Okay. And did you ever put a shovel down to
it and come to kind of a hard part and felt the cement
of the footings?
A. We didn't work up around the house. We were
trying to get sand burs, and that's all done by hand.
And we just sit and pull sand burs and to load the
pickup with sand burs.
Q. How much of the footings was exposed, could
you say? I mean, was it like a circle of—
A. The cement?
Q. Yeah, the cement —
A. Along the edge of the house?
Q. Yes.
A. The back side of the house, the door —
from
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are?
A. Not particularly.
Q. Do you know what the foundation is?
A. The house is supposed to be setting on it.
Q. Okay. Do you know what the difference
between footings and foundation isl
A. No, I do not.
Q. Okay. Well, let me see if I can — mind
you, I think Mr. Steenblik yesterday testified that you
told him that you could see the footings in the house
when you first moved in. Did he tell the truth in his
testimony?
A. Yes, he did. But you have to understand, I
didn't know mat there were footings until it was
pointed out to me that they were footings.
Q. All right. So you saw what you—
A. I saw the cement there. And that to me was
cement. I call it cement
Q. Okay.
A. They call it footing, or whatever, and
that's what I was — that's why it was called footing
tome.
Q. The rough cement at the very bottom of the
house you could see?
A. (Nods head).
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the back door to the west, you could see chunks of it
all along there.
Q. Okay. Now, did your husband see that, too?
A. No.
Q. Just you?
A. Well, I was doing pulling weeds in the yard.
He was out helping move stuff out from the farm to the
house. Moving weeds out. Eventually I'm sure he saw
it. But there was poured cement in several places in
our yard.
Q. Okay. Well, you knew that up there where
the footings were that that's cement that you couldn't
dig down to,
right?
A We never tried to dig up around the house.
Q. You knew you needed to put some dirt over
that in order to plant in that area,
right?
A. No. Up around our home was not a priority.
We had set the flower bed out in the front. That was
going to be our flower bed We put our trumpet vines
in. We just wanted grass.
Q. But you had to put some dirt in to grow
grass? You couldn't grow it on top of concrete,
right?
A. We don't like things up against the house,
it draws bugs in.
Q. Okay. Did you ever try to cover up those
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footings that were exposed when you saw them? That
cement that was exposed, did you try to cover it up
with the dirt on top of it?
A. No, because I thought it was just cement.
When I did the other I did.
Q. Well, there's something on top of it right
now, right? Isn't there kind of a dirt —
A. Last — last summer I put — when it rained,
or anything, the water ponded under that deck.
Q. Under the deck?
A. And I carried sand over there in five gallon
buckets and put it so that I could put some wood on it
and set on it and be outside and enjoy the outside
world.
Q. And so, if I'm understanding correctly, this
part where the footings —
16
17
A. Now that you say they were footings, there
18 was cement showing, yes.
[ 19
Q. In that area right under the deck, right?
A. Yes.
20
2l
Q. And you covered it last year?
1 22
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that yes?
23
24
A Yes.
Q. Okay. Until that time those footings had
25
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Q. Is that yes?
A Yes.
Q. And did you try to get up close to the house
or not?
A. No.
Q. How far away from the house did you keep the
grass? Three feet? Three and a half feet?
A. About this far out, because —
Q. Well, I'll represent that we're talking —
A. Lawn mower type width.
Q. We're talking about a width of about three
and a half kcl
Okay. How much did all that landscaping
cost you?
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, you planted some flowers and you
planted some grass by seed. Didit cost you $10,000 to
do that landscaping?
A. My son brought a trailer load of lime after
we got the grass growing, put it on there. We
hauled —
Q. You put lime on this alkaline soil we have
here?
A. It's a Q. I bet you it wasn't lime.
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been exposed to the elements for the eight years or so,
right?
A. The cement was.
Q. Now, in your affidavits I think you have
said that you did landscaping of the house, correct?
A. We planted grass. And I planted flowers in
that — by the railroad ties.
8 Q. In the front?
A. Uh-huh.
9
Q. Is that yes?
1 l0
11
A. Yes.
12
Q. And in the back the landscaping you did was
13 to plant grass, correct?
14
A Yes.
15
Q. Did you ever try to plant grass right up
16 next to the house?
A No.
17
Q. How did you plant the grass? Did you put
18
19 sod down, or did you just throw seed out?
20
A. We would take areas and pull weeds and put
down grass, and pull weeds and put down grass.
21
22
Q. With seeds?
A. With seeds.
23
24
Q. Put a little manure on top of it?
25
A. Uh-huh.
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A. It was white and it was --1 don't know what
it was. It's just to make things green. And we
fertilized it. Bill brought up manure and stuff to put
in the yard and gardened.
Q. Well, ma'am, you see that Project Analysts
want to spend $ 10,000 to re-landscape your yard. You
didn't spend that much in the first place, did you?
A. I never spent that much.
MR. HADLEY: I object to the question as
argumentative.
MR. DIXON:
Q. Do you think it's fair for you to charge the
Smith's $ 10,000 for brand new landscaping when you
didn't put in maybe 2 or $300 into your landscaping in
the first place?
MR. HADLEY: Object, argumentative.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I pulled an awful lot of
weeds out of that place and I hauled an awful lot of
weeds out of that place, and I got the garden dug up
and dug a lot of old cement and junk out of that and
hauled it out.
MR. DDCON:
Q. $10,000 worth?
A. I don't know, I'm pretty valuable, too.
Q. Okay. Now, did you ever have any
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Q. Do you remember having thought we better get
a certificate of occupancy before we buy this house to
make sure that the house is okay?
A. No, because we had been told there was one
given.
Q. Who told you that?
A. I don't remember which it was, Dan or Carol,
that Jack had given them the safety inspection for the
home.
Q. And did they tell you that before you signed
this earnest money agreement?
A. Well, T would say during the time that we
were doing it.
Q. Okay. Did you know that you were buying the
house as is? Have you ever heard that phrase before,
to buy a house as isl
A. When it's an older home, yes, I do, but not
a brand new home.
Q. Did you know that there was an as is
provision in this contract? Do you remember reading it
before you signed it?
A. I don't remember discussing it, no.
Q. Okay.
A. But again, it was a brand new home.
Q. Did you and your husband ever discuss
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whether you should get some kind of warranties from Dan
and Carol Smith on anything?
A. We thought everything was warrantied.
Q. Did you ever discuss with your husband the
need to include a specific warranty provision in the
agreement?
A. She read it, explained it, and we thought we
understood what she explained to us.
Q. Okay. Now, you did not have a Realtor help
you with the purchase of this house, did you?
A. No. He had not listed it yet.
Q. Okay. Did you consult with anybody to
advise you on the purchase of this house?
A. They said they knew how to do the paperwork.
Q. Okay. So that means no, you did not get any
advice from anybody, did you?
A. No.
Q. You could have gotten advice from somebody
if you thought it necessary, right?
A. Had we thought it was necessary, yes.
Q. You could have consulted some kind of real
estate expert, a real estate agent, correct?
A. We could have.
Q. Did you have any friends that were expert in
real estate matters?

A. We know people. I don't know, friends.
Q But you had acquaintances that you could
have asked, right?
A. Yes, we do.
Q. And you could have shown them this earnest
money sales agreement before you signed it, correct?
A. We trusted Dan and Carol.
Q. You could have shown this to anybody who was
expert in real estate matters to have them review it,
correct?
A. I could have.
Q. You could have shown it to a lawyer,
correct?
A. I could have.
Q- And you chose not to do any of those things,
right?
A. I didn't feel like it was necessary.
Q- And why exactly did you feel it was not
necessary?
A. I trusted that he was a contractor, knowing
what he was doing; that Jack Peterson had inspected the
work going on. It was a brand new house.
Q. Did Carol Smith or Dan Smith ever tell you I
guarantee you that this house is free from defects?
Did they ever use those words?
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A. Repeat it.
Q. Did they ever say I guarantee you this house
is free from every defect? Did they say those words?
A. No, they did not.
Q. Did they say anything of the kind?
A. They never discussed anything to that sort.
MR HADLE Y. I'm sorry, I couldn't hear that
answer.
MRDDCON: Did you get that?
THE WITNESS: I don't remember discussing
anything of that sort of defects. Again, all we really
looked at was a brand new home.
MR DIXON:
Q. Did you perform any kind of inspection of
the home before purchasing it?
A. Dan walked us through the house and showed
us the different — and Carol, the closets, the
pantries. What impressed me was the room big enough to
put our bed in, because that's where we had run into
problems before. He had told us he had built homes,
and it was a beautiful home. That was it
Q. Okay. Did you ever consider having someone
look the house over before buying it to make sure that
it was up to code?
A. It was a brand new house.
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Q. You shook your head, you said no, you never
considered that?
A. It was a brand new house.
Q So you did not consider that?
A. It was a brand new house.
Q. I need you to say whether you considered it
or not.
A. No.
Q. Okay. I want you to tell me about any other
conversations that you remember with either Dan or
Carol Smith before closing this deal. Tm trying to
exhaust your memory, anything you can possibly
remember.
A. Not particularly with Dan, but with Carol.
We went up and planted some flowers in the — inside
the rail, the tire rails. There was never anything
particularly important. It was never to do with papers
or anything.
Q. Have you ever asked Carol Smith for a copy
of the certificate of occupancy?
A. I don't recall ever asking her. I asked her
about the roof stuff. But that's all I recall asking
her that.
Q. Okay. So did you and your husband both read
the earnest money agreement before signing it,
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Exhibit 2?
A. Kind of like this. And we were over there.
And she would go through and explain it as it was.
Q. Okay. So you all read it together; is that
right?
A. Kind of that way.
Q. When you and your husband bought the house,
did he have any trouble getting up and down stairs?
A. No.
Q. Did he eventually start to have trouble
getting up and down stairs?
A. Probably down into around late 2000.
Q. What happened to him that caused him to have
trouble getting up and down stairs?
A. He still went up and down the stairs. We
just were more cautious with him. He was walking up to
2001 up and down those stairs.
Q. Okay. Did he spend time in the basement
right up until the time that he —just before he died?
A. We live upstairs.
Q. You didn't get down in the basement very
much?
A. We had no need for the basement.
Q. All right I see that there's a bedroom
down in the basement, correct?

A. Right. I put a bed up there, and that's
just in case somebody comes.
Q. Okay
A. I have extra beds, so I make extra- I made
an extra bedroom down there. My brother comes and
visits once m a while.
Q. Have you done any work downstairs, hired any
contractors to do anything?
A. No.
Q. Have you hired anybody to do any work on the
windows downstairs?
A. No.
Q. Did anybody ever cut anything away from the
windows downstairs?
A. No. The only thing's that done to our
windows, I put the plastic over the one and put the
curtains. And she put the curtains in.
Q. You didn't have to hire anybody to landscape
the yard for you? What landscaping there is you did
yourself, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Or you and your husband together, correct?
A. That's true
Q. Did you ever have any neighbors come and
help you 7
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A. My friends used to come and sit in the weeds
with me and help pull weeds, if that's called
landscaping. We got a lot of visiting in.
Q And that's the kind of maintenance you would
do, you would pull weeds, right?
A. It's my form of entertainment.
Q. Did you mow the lawn, too, or did your
husband mow the lawn?
A. I loved to mow the lawn.
Q. Okay.
A. He liked the garden. I liked the yard
Q. How did you first come to find out that
there was a problem with the foundation - or the
footings?
A. When they were digging the fence posts to
put the gates in. They called me out and asked me if I
was aware of this, and I said what And they explained
it.
Q. What did they explain?
A. That it should be deeper. And they told me
to go and call Annette at the city building and see
what the depth was, which I did And I came back and I
told them.
And they says, Well, they're not deep
enough. Your footing is in danger — I mean, your
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done some damage to your home? That you're aware of
I mean, as a homeowner living in that house day in, day
out, for eight years now —
A. I was not aware of any problem in my home,
even with small things and the roof, until Jason's
inspection. Little things happen you do and you deal.
All new homes have problems.
Q. So if Jason had never come out you would be
living in that house very happily right now?
A. Oh, no. If they had not dug my fence and
found the situation as it was, I would have had
different problems in my home, not understanding why I
had the problems. So I would have dealt with them the
best 1 could
Q. What problems do you think you would have
had?
A. My toilet is still a problem to this day.
Q. Other than your toilet, what else?
A. I can't think of all the things that I have.
Q. Well, what about the smoke detectors? Did
you ever really want a smoke detector in your house?
Didn't you tell Dan Smith one time that you wanted him
to take out the smoke detectors?
A. No, I did not.
Q. That you didn't like how they went off? You
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was working.
Q. Okay. So a year after you moved into the
home you found out that the smoke detector in your home
wasn't working or was not wired properly, right?
A. Yeah, I guess.
Q. How did you find that out?
A. Jack Peterson, I believe, checked it.
Q. How did Jack Peterson come to check that?
A. He and Mike came to take my son to work with
the volunteer firemen.
Q. And Jack Peterson happened to come into the
home at that point in time?
A. They came to talk with my son.
Q. Jack Peterson did?
A. Well, he was part of the fire department,
yes.
Q. And so he came into your home —
A. Him, Mike. And they both work for the fire
department.
Q. Did they do some kind of fire inspection on
the home?
A. They just asked me about my fire alarm, and
I said I didn't know what kind it was. They checked it
and said it wasn't wired. They brought me a another
fire alarm, another thing. I stuck it on the wall, put
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didn't like the sound they make?
A. I wouldn't place my life on a smoke
detector. But, no, I would never — I do know that you
have to have one in your home.
Q. All right. So one is enough.
A. And he had one in.
Q. Did it ever go off?
A. It never worked
Q. It never worked? You never heard the smoke
detector go off?
A. Not that I know of. I have heard the one on
the wall go off.
Q. When was that placed?'
A. When was that one put on the wall?
Q. Yes.
A. The fire department gave it to me, and I
went and put it on the wall.
Q. When did you do that?
A. Back when I found out that the other one
wasn't wired.
Q. When did you find that out?
A. About a year. I'm not sure of the date.
Q. A year after what?
A. Tm not sure of the date. About a year
after I moved into the home. I thought the other one
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a battery in it.
Q. And that one's worked?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Have you ever disconnected it for any
reason?
A. The top one?
Q. No, the one on the side.
A. You mean other than put a battery in it?
No.
Q. Okay. When Jack Peterson came and checked
that smoke detector, did he tell you that you ought to
have a smoke detector in every bedroom in your house?
A. No, he did n o t
Q. Did that worry you about the smoke detector
not being in the house, the one that had come with the
house, that it wasn't functioning properly?
A. I thought it was a little cheesy.
Q. You thought that?
A. (Nods head).
Q. Yes?
A. I thought it was a little cheesy.
Q. Did you talk to Dan Smith about that?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So are there any — we got the
toilets, we got the water damage, we got the roof
UJM^JX^LLUiJaB
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Fillmore to you and to us; is that what you think?
M R HADLEY: No. Why don't you tell them
where you would have faxed this to.
THE WITNESS: I would assume I would have
faxed this to you.
M R HADLEY: From where?
THE WITNESS: From here.
MR. HADLEY: Well, from here, where? This
building?
THE WITNESS: No, over there.
M R HADLEY: You got to be more specific.
Where is over there? Tell us exactly.
THE WITNESS: Where we're going to meet
The city building.
M R DIXON:
Q. Okay. So you would believe that you would
used the city fax machine to fax this to your
l8 have
attorney; is that right?
A. They may have faxed this out Their place
19
20 would have been from Josh.
21 Q. Do you recognize this handwriting down at
22 the bottom, it says, "Check 3904 Hadiey Associates, pay
23 $270, review inspection on house, August 10th, 2000"?
A. Yes.
24
Q. Do you understand what that means?
25
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Q. Each and every letter, each and every word,
each and every sentence?

A. Yes.

|
|

I

Q. The lower left-hand corner?

A. Yes.

1*

I

Q. Check number, Hadiey & Associates, all of
that's your handwriting?

A. Yes.

1
y

I

Q. And you faxed this to my office?
A. Yes.
MR HADLEY: Okay.
THE WITNESS: And my misspellings.
MR DEXON: Okay. I guess we established
that. But you're right. Thank you for doing that
EXAMINATION (Resumed)
BY MR DIXON:
Q. Okay. And this is a time line. Is
everything in this correct, to the best of your
knowledge?
A. May I finish reading it?
Q. Oh, please. I'm sorry. Go ahead.
A. Yeah. So what was the question?
MR HADLEY: He's asked you if that's a
chronology.
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A. I believe that was for them to review the
inspection on my house.
Q. So you're asking Fillmore City ~
A. I'm asking —
Q. Oh, you're asking Greg Hadiey to review the
inspection?
A. Weil, it was Jim Haslam.
M R DIXON: All right. For some reason I
assumed that you would be giving me a document between
your client, and I always thought ~
M R HADLEY: Right And that's what I
looked at. In fact, Jim would have sent it to you, my
former associate.
M R DIXON: Well, we've got it now. It's
not anything that's — it's just a chronology — this
is a chronology of the events, right? A chronology, a
time line of the events?
M R HADLEY: Would you let me voir dire in a
second? I think I'll help you.
M R DIXON: All right

I 14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
22
23 BY MR HADLEY:
Q. Is that your handwriting?
24
25
A. Yes.

h
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MR DIXON:
|
2
Q. All right. Is this accurate?
p
3
A, Yes.
P
4
Q. And so November 7th, 1997, the roof lifting,
B
5 those are the shingles on the roof over the garage that
|
6 you spoke of before, correct?
|
7
A. That is correct.
|
8
Q. And Jim was here to check rain drain, that's
|
9 the Jim Sampson that you referred to earlier, correct?
p
10
A. Yes.
[I
11
Q. Now, December 14th, 1997 says, Furnace quit.
p
12 Judy said check circuit breaker was on, said try it
B
13 And then what's the next word?
|
14
A. Heat.
|
15
Q. Heat. Tell me about that.
|
16
A. The furnace wasn't working. She told me to
|
17 go down and throw the — do something in the switch|
18 And I did. And the heater started coming on. I had
|
19 heat.
1
20
Q. Okay. Who's Judy?
|
21
A. My friend.
p
22
Q. Okay. A neighbor?
|
23
A. She lives a couple blocks down the street.
|
24
Q. Okay.
1
25
(Discussion off the record.)
|
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MR. DEXON: All right.
Q. Tt says, "Shane calked windows because it
was down in wall, cold air."
A. I explained that to you earlier.
Q. Okay.
A. That was the window I was telling you about,
the caulking kept falling in the wall.
Q. And that's in his bedroom?
A. No, that's in the living room.
Q. In the living room, okay.
All right. Then you've got a conversation
with Jack Peterson here in September of 1998, and it
says, Dan Smith — and that Jack said that Dan Smith
contractor should be responsible.
Responsible for what? Did he tell you he
should be responsible for something in specific?
A. I would say we were discussing the roof.
Q. Responsible to replace the roof for you?
A. Tom's Roofing came and said — discussed the
roof on August and asked Jack if there was a — I'm
trying to find where you were reading from.
Q. Jack-MR. HADLEY: Right there. That entry.
THE WITNESS: Oh. When it says he said, I
was referring to Jack.
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Q Right. Any other thing you remember?
A. The home, the roof, the inspection, the
toilet Jack and I talked pretty much until the —
until the city told him he couldn't talk to me anymore.
Q. I'm going to show you Exhibit 8 to the
Steenblik deposition, which is a photograph; a
photograph of a window. Where is that window?
A. That window would be either in the spare
bedroom or in my son's bedroom.
Q. Okay.
A. It doesn't say on the back.
Q. It says water — that's evidence of water
damage. Is that your handwriting on the back of that
exhibit?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
A. And the reason I'm saying is this is the
wide seal in front of the window.
Q. Okay. That's where the water damage is,
correct?
A. And I don't know which bedroom it is without
being at home.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean, I don't remember.
Q. Now, when did you first notice the water
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MEL DIXON:
Q. Yeah. That Dan Smith should be
responsible —
A. Jack Smith contractor should be responsible.
Q. For the roof; is that right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And so Jack came back and uien
measured the house for ventilation, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did he tell you about that?
A. We put the turtle vents in.
Q, Okay. And did he say that that would
satisfy the vendlauon requirement of the code? Did
he say anything like that?
A. I really don't remember.
Q. What about November 13 th, 1998, it says,
"Jack about appraisal." Look at November 1998 it says,
"Jack about appraisal." What does that mean?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Any other conversations you remember
with Jack Peterson than what we've talked about here
today?
A. Regarding the home, Jack Peterson and I?
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damage in that area that's shown on Exhibit 8? Did it
happen just that year the first time?
A. It was kind of like a blister of just a
little and then a little and then a little. And it
just wasn't something that was noticeable when I was unless I was there cleaning. And then it just seemed
like it was getting kind of big and bad. But I didn't
know what to do with it.
Q. Okay. So you noticed it ~
A. Before, but I didn't know how to fix it.
Q. When you first noticed, it would have
been —
A. It was smaller.
Q. It was smaller? Would that have been the
first year or two after you moved in the house?
A. I would say the first year it started.
Q. What about Exhibit 7 to the Steenblik
deposition, it's called the cracking around the
foundation, I think. When did you first notice that?
A. This part was probably the first spring we
were there, but it was tiny. And each year it just got
bigger and started exposing the wood. I didn't — I
didn't know it was exposing the wood until they came
and I --1 could just see like a little plaster off.
And I asked them if it was important, and they checked
^itS^n3SJi^u~*LL-l*i'i<
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1 safety inspection on it
2
Q Did you ask him to inspect anything else
3 specifically other than the footings and foundation7
4
A Probably things that t had had problems
5 with
6
Q So did you ask him to check on the roof7
7
A No, I knew the condition of the roof
8
Q Okay You knew already about the roof
9
Did you ask him to check on the windows7
10
A I don't believe so
11
Q Did you ask him to check on the electrical
12 system 9
13
A I really don't know
14
Q Okay The only thing you really remember
15 asking him to check specifically was the footings and
16 foundation problem 7
17
A He just walked through the home and was
18 making a list of things, then turned and said we needed
19 to get an inspector in before we do anything
20
Q Ma'am, that wasn't the answer to my
| 21 question My question was, was there anything other
22 than the footing and the foundation problem that you
23 specifically asked Mr Zeigler to look at 7
24
M R HADLEY I'm going to just object I
25 believe it's been asked and answered about five minutes
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That's what he felt like would repair the things that
needed to be done
Q Well, didn't you understand what he gave you
a bid for $31,000, ma'am, that he was proposing to
repair these particular problems for the figure of
$31,0007
A I do
Q You did 7
A I wanted to fix the problem
Q Okay But never did, not any of them7
A No
Q Okay All right
MR DIXON Let's have this one marked
This one marked This one marked This one marked
This one marked We have that one
MR HADLEY Can we go off the record just a
second7
MR DIXON Yes
(Discussion off the record)
(Whereupon, a recess was taken
at 10 08 a m to 10 12 a m )
(Whereupon, Exhibits 8 through 19
were marked for identification)
MR DIXON
Q Exhibit 8, ma'am, is this the bill that

ago But answer the question
M R DIXON
Q I thought you answered no, that that was the
only thing Is that what you think, too 7
M R HADLEY No, I thought she said and
anything else that needed —
MR. DIXON
Q That's what I'm asking about specifics now
I'm not talking about the anything else category, I'm
just saymg specifics
A Specifics, anything that t had had problems
with prior to And then the plumbing would have been
questions on — Tonya had a question on the board
across the top — I don't know what it's called —
downstairs We just — he walked through and made a
list of things and told me he couldn't help me until I
had an inspection done
Q Okay Well, he actually gave you a bid,
though, $31,000 I don't understand, if he gives you a
bid for $31,000, isn't he saying I'll be glad to do
this work for $31,000 and you could have said yes, sir,
go to work 7 It's what I don't understand, why would he
give- you a bid for $-31,000 if he said he can't help
you 7
A He told me to get a safety inspection done
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7

Tom's Roofing gave you for re roofing the garage
A Yes
Q And that's the check that you wrote to Tom's
Roofing for that7
A Yes
Q It says cold roofing the garage Do you
understand that they took the old shingles off and put
new shingles on, or did they roof right over the old
shingles7
A Took the old ones off
Q Why did you have that roof redone7 This
appears to be the one repair that you had ever done in
the house, doesn't it, of any substantial nature7
Right7
A Because Jack Peterson told us what needed to
be done with Tamko Roofing
Q Okay Exhibit 9 whafs that7
A The water softener I put in
Q What does that have to do with the Smiths7
A It's just trying to take care of the home -MR HADLEY If I THE WITNESS --was the reason it was
installed
MR HADLEY Let me interject Part of what
you folks had requested was that any improvements she
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may have done to the home.
MR. DIXON: That's what I'm asking.
MR. HADLEY: So this was an improvement, not
really to repair anything.
MR. DDCON:
Q. All right. So you're not implicating the
Smiths in any way with the need for a water softener,
are you? You're not blaming them in any way in
connection with Exhibit 9, are you?
A. Blaming?
Q. Let me ask it this way: Do you think that
it was some error or mistake or negligence or defect in
the building that caused you to need a water softener?
A. No.
Q. You wanted a water softener for your own
purposes, correct?
A. To maintain pipes and hot water tank, and
stuff like that, yes.
Q. Now, do you know if when the people came out
to install the water softener did they complain about
any defects or anything?
A. No.
Q. Did they say that there is some problem with
the grounding of the water pipes, or anything like
that?
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A. No
Q. When I ask for a defect, I'm talking about
did they observe some kind of construction defect.
Such as the guys who did the fence, when they told you
about the frost line and foundation problem, did the
people who installed the central air conditioner, did
they call to your attention any such problems?
A. No.
Q. Well, I guess just to make sure, do you
believe that the Smiths should reimburse you for this
central an conditioning system that you installed?
A. If they get the home, you bet.
Q. Well, let me ask it this way, then. Do you
believe that there is some defect in the construction
of the house that made it necessary for you to install
central air conditioning? I assume the answer is no.
I'm just trying to tie these things up. I just want to
make sure that you're not claiming that this air
conditioner is somehow related to any defects in the
house.
You're not claiming that, are you? Are you
claiming that7 No Is the answer no?
A. I don't know what you're looking for.
MR. HADLEY: Let me make a comment. Don't
worry what he's looking for. Just answer the question.
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A. They did not.
Q. Okay. And it was Roper Lumber Company from
whom you purchased the water softener and had it
installed, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Exhibit 10. What is Exhibit 10?
A. Refrigeration unit.
Q. So that's an in-window air conditioner?
A. No, it isn't.
Q. What is a refrigeration unit, like a
refrigerator?
A. No. It's like a ~ it's an outside
refrigeration unit. I don't know what you call it.
Q. Okay. So you're upgrading the air
conditioning system in the house?
A. I put air conditioning in. There was none.
That is our air conditioning for the home. Central
air.
Q. So this Exhibit 10 reflects that you're
having central air conditioning installed into the
home, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When the people came in to install the air
conditioning, did they report to you any defect of any
kind?
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THE WITNESS: Is he saying has the house
caused the problem?
MR. HADLEY: No, he's saying did you install
the air conditioning because the house was causing you
problems?
THE WITNESS: No.
MR HADLEY: Okay.
MR DIXON:
Q. All right. Now, Exhibit 11, could you tell
me what Exhibit 11 is, please?
A. Security door on the front. And dead bolt
on the back. And TV antenna.
Q. All right. If I understand you correctly,
you're saying that you had a new door put on the front
of your house?
A. (Shakes head).
Q. What happened?
A. I put a security door on the outside of the
regular door.
Q. Okay. And then the second one was a dead
bolt on the back door?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had you been broken into that you were
afraid of this?
A. No, sir.
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Q. Just precautions?
A. Yes From country to town.
Q And the antenna was put up on November 29th,
1994, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And that's when you found out that the attic
access was too small?
A. Yzs, sir.
Q. Okay. Exhibit 12, tell me what that is,
please.
A. The installation of the water line from the
irrigation to the house put into faucets so we could
water, outside watering with irrigation water.
Q. Pardon me for not understanding entirely,
b u t - - a n d let me ask some specific questions about
that.
Did you have a water line taken from the
water meter or the main water line entering into your
house to someplace around the yard and have faucets put
in there?
A. You're asking if that's what that is?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Does this have to do with the installation
of a water line of some sort?
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A. Yes.
Q. Where did you hook into the irrigation
water?
A. The main line on the irrigation.
Q. Where is that in relationship to your house?
A. In the back pasture behind our home.
Q. So you brought where those fruit trees are
there back there?
A. They're back.
Q. At the very back?
A. Yes.
Q. So there's an irrigation ditch or line back
there?
A. Line.
Q. It's a covered line?
A. Yes
Q. All right. Does it run continuously, or do
get your turn from time to time?
A. You get a turn.
Q. Ail right So when you get that turn, the
water will run up and you can turn it on — do you have
a pump? Do you have to pump it up?
A. No.
Q. And that's to water the backyard?
A. The garden, the back and front yard. The
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A. Yes, it does.
Q. Tell me where the water line ended up.
A. In the back. Southeast comer of the
backyard and the west. Southwest side of the back of
the house. For outside watering.
Q. Was that for an underground sprinkler
system?
A. No.
Q. Was it for a faucet, a water faucet, two
water faucets? Is that yes?
A. Yes. Two.
Q. So this would be a PVC pipe that came out of
the ground and had a water faucet on the end of it,
something like that?
A. It's a metal piping that comes up out of the
ground.
Q. Okay. It's metal piping that comes up out
of the ground? Is that yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had those water lines brought to the
back of your house for purposes of attaching hoses
thereto in order to water the lawn back there?
A. With the irrigation water.
Q. Okay. I take it so that you have water
shares in addition to city water; is that right?
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pasture.
Q. Okay. How close to the house do these water
lines get?
A. (Indicating).
Q. About three feet, two and a half feet?
A. Two and a half feet from the southwest
corner of the house.
Q. Okay. And what about the southeast comer,
did it go up that close to the house, too?
A. No, it's in the back of the backyard.
Q. Okay. Now, if I recall correctly, the
southwest comer was where you first saw the footings
exposed,
right?
A. No. It was on the east side.
Q. The southeast side is where you saw the
footings exposed?
A. What's the footing?
Q. The footings are the concrete in the ground.
Do you remember we talked about that last time, you
told me you had seen that when you were A. That was on the south.
Q. The south?
A. Not the southwest side.
Q. Just directly south in the middle of the
house, so to speak?
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the home?
A. [ don't understand the question. I'm sorry.
Q. Well, you had some conversations with the
Smiths before you purchased the home, correct, before
the closing?
A. We called the Smiths. We were told the home
was for sale. We called the Smiths and they said yes,
it was.
Q. Okay. And then after that you had some
discussions about the home, correct?
A. What kind of discussion?
Q. That's what I'm asking you.
A. We went and saw the home.
Q. Ail right. Now, when you saw the home in
the Smiths presence, did they tell you anything that
you relied upon in purchasing the home? Do you know
what it is to rely upon something? To believe and act
on?
A. That they had built the home?
Q. Is that one of the things that induced you
to buy the home from them?
A. No. We -- the home was a new home. They
had told us when they started it, when they moved into
it
Q. Okay. What did they tell you when they
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started it and when they moved into it?
A. I believe it was in September that they
started it, and they moved in in November. And it was
February.
Q. Okay. So the home had been lived in for
only about three months, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And that's true, you have never -isn't it? It is true that the Smiths lived in the home
for about three months; is that right?
A. As far as I know it is, yes.
Q. You don't think that's false, do you?
A. No reason to believe it was false.
Q. Okay. Now, in any other conversations with
you, did they tell you anything about the house to make
you buy the house, to lead you to buy the house?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Let me just clarify. Did you ever
ask Carol Smith for a copy of the final inspection of
her home?
A. I think I did when we discussed the roof.
Q. At the time of the roof?
A. If they had a copy of the final inspection
on the home.
Q. Were you able to get one from her?
- < - » - <<K, - 1 «>*?i-**-v»s»'«/** -•

A. No, T was not.
Q Were you able to get anything from her at
that time?
A. No.
Q. Now, the first time you noticed that the
roof was lifting was on November 7th of 1997, correct?
Was that about the time you talked to Carol?
A. When Jim Sampson came is when I noticed it.
Q. Okay. It says August 25th, 1999, Scott from
Salt Lake came —
A. From Tamko.
Q. Said it was ventilation, get a safety
inspection. No copy from city. Jack said it wasn't
required to keep them. Jack said not enough
ventilation. He's our safety inspector.
Is this the time you're talking about?
A. Yes. And I would say about that time is
when I called Carol.
Q. Okay. Could it have been a few days before
or after?
A. After the man from Salt Lake came, probably.
Q. Okay. And you say his name was Jim Sampson?
A. No.
Q. Scottl
A. Scott. He was the Tamko man-
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Q. Okay.
A. Inspector.
Q. Is it possible that you called her at the
time when you were concerned about the shingles, and
you wanted to find out who the manufacturer of the
shingles was?
A. No.
Q Okay. Do you believe that the house is
unfit for occupancy now 9
A. Unfit for occupancy. It's got an awful lot
of problems with it.
Q. That wasn't my question. It's a yes-or-no
question.
A. Is it unfit for occupancy? Yes.
Q. Okay. Has anyone ever told you to move out?
A. No.
Q. Has Jack Peterson ever suggested that you.
move out?
A. No.
Q. Has Mr. Radford told you you should move oat
immediately?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Steenblik?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Bullock?
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Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
James K. Haslam (6887)
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801)377-4411
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
•plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY MOORE

Vs
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos
Trust,

Civil No. 000700142 Ml
Judge

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF MILLARD

)
:ss.
)

Mary Moore, having first been duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one, and I have personal knowledge of the

matters stated herein except as to any matter stated on information and belief only
2.

I am a named plaintiff in the above-encaptioned case.

3.

In February of 1994, my husband, William Moore, and I entered into an

agreement to purchase a home from Dan and Carol Smith.
4.

We closed that transaction on May 2, 1994.

5.

The Smiths were paid a total of $83,000.00 for the sale of the home.

6.

The home was intended to be the final home for me and my husband,

who is retired.
7.

Neither my husband nor I have ever been a contractor or engineer, nor do

we have any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety
inspections, or anything like that.
8.

Despite the fact that Dan Smith had buiit the home just a few months

before selling it to us, he did not ever disclose the fact that the home contained certain
defects, not in compliance with the applicable building code, rendering the home unsafe
for human occupancy.
9.

In deciding to purchase the relatively new home, my husband and I relied

upon the certificate of occupancy, which had been issued by the City of Fiiimore in
January of 1994, along with Dan Smith's representations that he was selling us
improved, residential real property, safe for occupancy.
10.

Although my husband and I visually inspected the property, the defects

and problems that have subsequently been discovered were not of the kind that such
an inspection would have revealed to us.
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11.

We subsequently took possession of the home, landscaped the yard, and

have generally maintained the home since that time.
12.

A little more than six years after the purchase, my husband and I had

retained a company to install a fence on our property.
13.

On May 16, 2000, when the fence workers were digging holes and putting

in poles for the fence next to the home, the workers called my attention to the fact that
the home's foundation was not the proper depth into the ground.
14.

That same day, I contacted the City of Fillmore to find out what the

requirements were for foundation depth and learned that our home's foundation was
not deep enough into the ground.
15.

I became deeply concerned over this information and retained a

contractor to determine what would be required to fix the problem.
16.

On August 5, 2000, Ken Zeigler of Ken Zeigler Co. came to our home to

determine what would need to be done to fix the foundation.
17.

At that time, Mr. Zeigler informed me that he would require that we first

obtain a safety inspection and recommended that we use Jason Bullock of Sunrise
Engineering, Inc. for that purpose.
18.

On August 8, 2000, Mr. Bullock came to our home and performed a safety

inspection.
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19.

Mr. Bullock indicated to me that there were several problems with the

home's construction that were not in compliance with the building code. The next day,
Mr. Bullock provided us with a list of these items that were not constructed in
compliance with the building code. A true and correct copy of this list is attached hereto
as Exhibit TV'.
20.

It was at this time, that my husband and I first learned of the severity of

the problems in our home's construction.
21.

We visited with Mr. Haslam of Hadley & Associates and filed the complaint

in this esse on August 24, 2000.
22.

Thereafter, my husband and I retained a plumber and electrician to

inspect the home. Again, severe defects in both the plumbing and electrical systems
were discovered and reported to us.
23.

Mark O'Barr, the electrician who inspected our home, subsequently

provided me with a letter, addressed to our attorney, addressing some of the defects he
uncovered. A true and correct copy of Mr. O'Barr's tetter is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B".
24.

I attempted to discuss these problems with Jack Peterson, the Fillmore

City Building Inspector. Mr. Peterson was not particularly helpful, although he provided
me a letter in October of 2000, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit U C \
4

25.

1 do not believe that we have yet discovered all of the significant defects in

the construction of our home, and my husband and I are attempting to obtain the funds
to hire an engineer to conduct a complete inspection and to provide a detailed report.
26.

I do not believe that my husband and I could have discovered these

structural defects prior to August of 2000.
27.

Unless my husband and I can obtain some relief through this court action,

we will likely not be able to pay to have the defects corrected, or to sell the home for
anything close to what we paid for the home, and we currently have no other place to
live.
DATED this

IJ

day of March, 2001.

^Mnxi
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Mary M6ore
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Mary Moore, this

/^

March, 2001.
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Notary Public
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day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed by U.S. mail, first class, postage
prepaid, the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARY MOORE this
to the following:

A. Bryce Dixon
Nathan K. Fisher
Dixon & Truman
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
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day of March, 2001,

EXHIBIT "A"

MARY M O O R E
155W. 300So.

Inspection Request 8/7/2000
Sunrise Engineering, Inc.
Inspector: J a s o n ML Bullock
ICBO Lie. #89388
Items found not to be in code compliance at a final inspection.
1. Fascia has not been completed below roof, exposed decking
2. Ledger to rear deck has not been fastened properly with bolts.
3. Joists that bear over header for deck have not been anchored.
4. Foundation on SE corner is cracked and braking apart.
5. All handrails must return to wall at top and bottom.
6. No soffit venting, lack of attic ventilation has caused roof shingles to deteriorate.
7. Open outlet box under kitchen cabinets with exposed electrical wiring,
8. Attic access opening does not meet required code minimum opening of 22"x30".
9.~No counter-flashing around windows or doors, looks to have a lot of water leakage damage.
10. Bathroom fixtures not caulked.
1L No truss bracing or angle braces.
12. No smoke detectors in bedrooms and the only smoke detector in house is a battery detector,
code requires all smoke detectors to be hard wired with battery back up.
13. Stair risers exceed 8" max with 3/8 variance for entire run of stairs.
14. No 5/8 type x Sheetrock under stair lids.
15. No Pressure reducing valve has been installed.
16. Copper lines in house are not grounded.
17. 2x6 headers in basement exceed limits and are over spanned.
18. Missing nuts and washers on anchor bolts for sill plate in basement.
19. 4' cantiiever at front of house requires doubled up end joists with a 2-1 span back into house.
20. No combustion air, vent clearance problems.
21. Dishwasher appears to not be plumbed.
22. Water heater is not seismically strapped to foundation,
23. Kitchen circuits are required to be on 2- 20 amp gfci circuits with 12/2 awg.
24. Bathrooms required to be on a separate 20-amp circuit for gfci's.
25. Electrical panel has not been labeled.
26. House has over spanned headers and joists throughout the house.
27. Footings appear to be at grade level in some places and do not meet min 30" frost line depth.
28. Grading from house does not meet 2% slope for the first 10ft. away from house.
29. Outlets in garage are not on gfci
30. No gfci in basement.
Jason M. Bullock
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EXHIBIT " B "

October 12, 2000
To:
Hadley & Associates
Attn: Jim Haslam
Dear Mr. Haslam
On Oct. 9, 2000 I visited the home of a client of yours Mrs. Mary Moore. My visit
was in response to a phone call that I had received from Mrs. Mcore the week
before. During our phone conversation she had informed me of an inspection of
her home that had taken place back in the first pan of August by a work associate
of mine Mr. Jason Bullock (Mr. Bullock is an ICBO certified 4AVay Building
Inspector). Mrs. Moore said that Mr. Bullock had made a recommendation to her
to give me a call to se^ if I would come ever and be able to answer some
questions that she may have on the electrical portion of his inspection, and also
look over the electrical installation in her home that I might add some insight to
Mr. Bullocks inspection.
My findings were as follows:
Kitchen area;
1. There is an outlet inside a lower cabinet on the east wall that has no cover plate
on it. Wiring is exposed and susceptible to damage or someone to personal injuryViolation of National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 370-23 (C)
2. The Peninsular cabinet that extends past the 24 inches allowed by the NEC
does not have an outiet located in it.
Violation ofNEC Article 210-52 (C) (3)
3. The Garbage disposal has no disconnecung means inside the cabinet with in
sight of the disposal where service personnel can unplug the appliance while
working there on, 1 recommend an outlet and an approved appliance cord in
accordance with Article 422-16 (B) (1) (a-d) be installed in olace of the metal flex
mat has been installed. The metal flex is in violation of the NEC and is not
suitable for wet locationsViolation of NEC Article 350-5
4.1 n the master bedroom and dining room, ihe outlet spacing and locations do not
comply with the NEC
Violation of NEC Article 210-52 (A) (1), (2) (a-c).
5 The namral gas pipe is not bonded to the grounding system.
Violation of NEC Article 250-104 (B)

6 There is no ground buss in the mam lighting panel in the basement The ground
wires from the electrode as well as all the lighting circuit ground wires are ned
together under the same split-bolt connector The NEC states that the arrangement
of grounding connections snali be such that the disconnection or removal of a
ground wire will not break the integnty of the ground system ALso the NEC
states that wires of dissimilar metals because of their different characteristics
(such as copper and aluminum, also none of the aluminum wire connections have
Notox, Penitrox or any other kind of anti-oxidant compound applied to their
connections) shall not be placed under the same connector. Therefore my
recommendation would be to install a grounding kit in this panel and terminate
each wire in the proper manner underneath its own screw on the ground-buss
provided in this kit.
Violation of NEC Article 110-14.

7. There is only one smoke detector in this house, which the Uniform Building
Code book clearly shows that this is an inadequate amount. The 1991, 1994 and
1997 editions of the Uniform Building Code book (UBQ Volume 1; Section
1210-4 of the 91 and Volume 1; Section 310.9.1.4 of the 94 and 97 state that there
shall be asmoke detector located in each of the bedrooms, in the corridors ieadmg
to the sleeping areas and any room opening to the hallways that lead to the
sleeping areas whose ceiling exceeds that of the hallway by 24". One shall also be
mounted at the top of a stairway when the house has a basement, and if the
basement has a sleeping area the same rule will apply as the upstairs. The smoke
detectors shall also be interconnected with each other so if one detector goes off
all of the others will as well.
8. The garage outlets are considered a wet location area uherefore they should be
put on a GFCI circuit
Violation of NEC Article 210-3 (A) (2)
9. The wire connections outside at the main breaker have had some of the strands
cut off so that the wire can tit into the lugs provided with the main breaker, hy
doing so the installing electrician has taken away from the integnty of ;he
electrical conductor installed. Cutting the end off and re-stripping the wires end
and putting the necessary anti-oxidant compound on die bare aluminum wire and
re-terminating [he wire.can fix this.
I was also asked to give an estimated cost as to how much it would cost the
homeowner to have these items done. I feel that the homeowner could have these
services done foi an estimated cost of $ 1250.00 - S 1,565 00.
[f you have any questions please feel free to call meat (435) 743-6151.
Sincerely Yours

EXHIBIT " C "

L Jack Peterson
95 East 500 South
P O Box 84
Fillmore, Utah S463 I

To whom it may concern*
I was contacted by Dan Smith and went over the property and the layout of the home on
the L I of August 1993, and inspected the footings on Fnday 13th. ft was called to his attention
at that time that the footings were not at proper depth, but he stated this would be taken care of
when the back fill was put around the house The basement walls were inspected on the 16th and
the rough plumbing on the 18th The rough electrical and plumbing, along with the framing
inspection, was done on the 8th and 9th of September 1993 I checked the building progress on
both the 28th and the 29th of October I also visited the job site another occasion and Dan and I
discussed the venting of the attic Dan felt that it was adequate
Dan and Carol were living in the home when we asked to do the final inspection on the
home on the 8th of November At that time they hadn't built the deck on the back of the house
and the final grading hadn't been done as well At the time the final inspection was done, I
discussed with Dan the fact that the access into the attic did not meet the minimum code
requirements and that the smoke detectors had not been installed . None of these items had been
corrected at the time that the house was sold to the Moore's The Moore's did the landscaping
around the house not realizing that the back fill around the house did not meet the 30 inch depth
requirement
th

Respectfully submitt^cTby

l O a c k Peterson, Fillmore City Budding Inspector
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A. Man
Q Can you estimate on a weekly basis how many
you would do?
A. I don't do as much as I used to. I'm
strictly more — I get out maybe twice a week now on
full eight-hour days. I mean, take, for example,
yesterday, I did probably 15 different homes up in
Herriman. But realistically you could probably say
close to — probably a thousand.
Q. Okay. So in an interior inspection process
for a UBC code inspection for an average size
residence, single family residence, about how much time
would the inspector spend on the premises inspecting
that home?
A. It depends on the inspection.
Q. No, I'm talking about all the inspections
combined.
A. It depends on the inspector. Oh, to be safe
on an entire home with all the small inspections
involved, your big inspections are going to be your
four-way inspection and your final inspection. Usually
a couple hours. You're probably looking between 10 to
12 hours.
Q. Okay. Have you ever been involved in
inspections of homes for people who are considering
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would catch on a final.
And then there was some other things that
just caught my eye that I brought up in my list.
Q Now, how would that type of inspection
differ from the inspection you have done for people who
are considering buying a home?
A. If somebody is gonna buy a home and we go
out and we do a full fledged inspection, there's, I
feel, probably more involvement when they're going out
to buy a home. You know, I was just contacted, came
over, and walked through the house for her.
There's quite a lot more detail if
somebody's gonna pay the fee for us to walk through a
house that's gonna be bought.
Q. Okay. Do you remember the — or have the
documents with you to show how much you charged Mary
Moore for your initial inspection?
A. Boy. The initial inspection I -- I can't
even remember, to be honest. I believe it was around
$60.
Q. Okay. And that's a pretty good estimate
because you know what you did on the onginal
inspection?
A. Give or take probably $10,1 bet.
Q. Okay.
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buying a home and they want — and they want to find
out if the home -A. Yes.
Q. -- is a — is a sound home?
A. I am
Q. All right. In your employment with Sunrise
Engineering have you done that?
A. Yes.
Q. That is one of the services that Sunrise
Engineering offers the public?
A. Yeah.
Q. How many of those have you done,
approximately?
A. Residentially, we don't do a whole lot. We
do more on the commercial end. Residentially, oh, 20.
Q. Okay. Now, when you came to Mary Moore's
home, what kind of inspection did you originally do for
her?
A. Originally when Mary contacted me, she had
talked to Ken Zeigler that was a contractor, and I came
out more or less — just came back - more or less I
will walk through the home as a final. I'm not going
to spend five, six hours, you know, nitpicking. I
basically went through and walked through and basically
what I would check on a final; go through things that I
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A. I mean, it was more or less, I guess, a
courtesy.
Q. Does that figure include the drafting up of
the report that you did, the 30 items?
A. In that $60 there?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Now, what would you do in a
pre-purchase home inspection that you did not do in
that inspection?
A. I would involve more guys. I would probably
have two additional guys. I usually try to bring in
guys that are considered, I guess, expert, expertise,
in that field. I have guys on my staff that have
either been plumbers, mechanical contractors, that I
have hired that have got licensed through ICBO. So
I — I respect their knowledge of, yeah, I hold all
these licenses but I respect their knowledge to come
in. And we would come through and just do a
thorough ~ we go through everything. We go through
furnaces. We take everything apart. Which on Mary's
house I did not do. You know, obviously you can't come
in and start checking walls and cutting sheet rock.
Q. You have done no destructive testing?
A. No. No.
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Q. Let me finish my question, since I know you
knew what I was going to say, but [ need to make sure
that it's all the way finished
A. Sure.
Q. Have you done any destructive testing on the
Mary Moore home?
A. No.
Q. Have you done the type of inspection on Mary
Moore's home that you would have done -- and I say
"you," meaning Sunrise Engineering and you supervising,
would have done had you been hired pre purchase to
inspect the home?
A. That I would have done?
Q. Yes. Have you accomplished as of yet that
thorough an inspection of the Moore residence?
A. I would say no. I've obviously — IVe gone
back at later dates and inspected some additional
things that were not part of that list, the original
30. But if I was, you know, to bring down -- the only
other guy I got involved on this was Mark O'Barr.
Q. Was the original list of 30 alleged defects,
was that list drawn up after your first inspection?
A. Right after my first inspection? It was
actually drawn up at the time I was walking through the
home.
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you know, we have a list that we would go through. A
checklist, call it, that we go through and check
specific items on everything. Whether it's the Mary
Moore house or Joe Blow's house, we have a list that we
would go through.
Q. And you have never gone through that entire
list on the Mary Moore home, have you?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Is there any reason why you haven't
done that?
A. At the time of the inspection that Mary —
at the time Mary called me, when I came over I just
told her that I would be go through — she asked me to
come through and basically do this as if this was a
final inspection on a house that had just been built
and go through a final inspection of what I would do on
any new residential home where I would walk through on
a final inspection. And we usually take an hour and a
half to two hours there.
Q. Okay. Did she tell you about anything in
particular that she was concerned about?
A. She pointed out some things, open electrical
box. But to be honest with you, I cannot remember. If
I recall, I walked through the house and do what I'm
supposed to do. I'm here. And there may -- I know
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Q. Okay. How long did you spend in that
inspection?
A. Probably a little over an hour on that
inspection.
Q. Okay. And how many hours would be spent on
a pre-purchase inspection?
A. It depends on the home, really.
Q. In a home such as Mary Moore's.
A. Really to go through it thoroughly, you're
probably looking six hours. Six to eight hours.
Q. I guess there are degrees of thoroughness
that a person could ask in a pre-purchase inspection,
correct?
A. Sure.
Q. She could have hired you for the $60 and
felt that that might be okay, correct, depending on
what the person wanted?
A. Depending on what the person wanted, what
was necessary.
Q. And they may have concern about certain
areas and ask you to concentrate on certain things,
right? That might affect how much work you do, right?
Not any one inspection will ever be exactly the same in
a pre-purchase situation, I suppose?
A. No. I mean, we go through — I have a —
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maybe the electrical box was pointed out. But it's
something that I would have eventually looked at.
Q. Did she tell you why she was asking for a
home inspection?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Did she tell you anything about any footings
issues?
A. As far as coming out, she pointed — when we
got outside, you could see where the footings were.
And she just brought up that as a concern of hers,
safety issue.
Q. Okay. Did she elaborate on that? Did she
explain what she was concerned about? What did she say
to you about the footings?
A. I don't think she would know as a homeowner
of what the concerns to be there. I mean, this is — I
feel she's just a homeowner that is looking — you
know, you've got an exposed footing there, and by code,
you know, it's required to be 30 inches in depth for
frost line. I really don't think she would know that
that's an issue.
Q. That wasn't my question, sir. My question
was simply what did she say about that?
A. More or less that she pointed out the fact
is this something that maybe I should be concerned
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Q. That would be great I appreciate it
Thank you
Okay. Based upon the second inspection
where Rex Radford was present, did you make any changes
to the original report based upon the things that were
observed there?
A. Yes. And those are the changes that I have
given to you today. As a result of our inspection
w e - - w e observed closely the construction of the
windows- I had made a statement in the original report
that the window was installed on the outside of the
siding. On closer inspection we determined that that
was not the case. The windows still leak. It's
apparent that the window installation does not keep out
the weather. So I did not change my opinion as to the
cost of repairing the window defect, but merely changed
what I had observed on closer inspection.
TheQ. Go ahead, please.
May I ask this about the window? And it
just may be slipping my memory right now. If I recall
correctly, it was Jason Bullock who originally
determined that the windows were defective in their
installation. Isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
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defect is.
MR. DIXON: I'll be asking that. We'll be
talking about that. That's a good point. We do need
to get to a definition.
Q. But right now Fm just trying to get to the
scope of your reports, and I'm going to go into these
in a little more detail later on. I don't want to get
too far into it.
I think you've answered the question, you
didn't just assume that everything that Jason Bullock
said was correct, you tried to make an independent
analysis of what Jason Bullock said of what alleged
defects that Jason Bullock had found, and you went and
checked each one of them out and tried to make an
independent review to see if they were indeed defects,
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And, if I understand you correctly, the way
you have defined defects in your report is a deviation
from the building code, correct?
A. Well, I think we defined it in the report.
But I'm not sure if that's where we defined it or not.
Q. I'm not sure if you used the word
"deviation." Let's look for that. I think that was
the essence; is that
right?
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Q. Were you sort of relying on Jason Bullock's
original inspection of the windows and sort of adopting
his inspection, and is that the reason for the error?
A. No. The reason that I went down to the home
to inspect the home was — was to independently observe
the conditions of the home as it was built, the
construction, and then to do an independent check
against the building code that I would agree that those
were, in fact, construction defects.
So I could have -- I didn't want to just
agree with the list of construction defects without
being able to independently verify that they were, in
fact, construction defects, after having observed the
actual conditions and construction of the home.
Q. Okay.
MR. HADLEY: Can I make a comment?
MR. DIXON: No.
M R HADLEY: Okay. I was actually going to
ask you a question.
MR. DIXON: Thank you for asking. I'll let
you ask the questions at the end
MR. HADLEY: All right (Laughter.)
MR. DIXON: You would probably help me more
than anything. I just want to make sure -M R HADLEY: I just wanted to clarify what a
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A. It says — in our report, page 3,1 believe
first paragraph, site visit, "During our inspection we
observed the existing conditions at the home relative
to each item listed by Sunrise as, 'found not to be in
code compliance', throughout the remainder of this
report the listed items found not to be in code
compliance will be referred as 'defects'."
Q. So the deviation from the code I said, and
the reasons you found were not in code compliance, but
that means the same thing, doesn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now, is that definition of a
construction defect a generally accepted definition in
the
field?
A. Something could be a defect without without being necessarily a code compliance problem.
Q. Because there might be just standards
observed by the construction industry that are not
embodied in the code, and if a person didn't meet that
standard, that could be considered a defect; is that a
fair statement?
A. That is correct
Q. Okay. But likewise, though, that's because
there might be substantial, I guess, safety issues or
structural integrity issues that might be considered to
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Page 79 I

destructive testing, removing any sheet rock, or
whatnot, to observe it was a question in my mind and it
still is.
Q. Because you have never done any destructive
testing to answer that question, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Ceiling access 19 inches by 16 inches.
A. That's a recording of — of the measurement
that I took of the ceiling access while I was there.
Q. Okay. And bathroom, no vent, is that what
that says?
A. Yes.
Q. No vent at all?
A. That's -- that may be a - a recording of
what was reported as — as a condition.
Q. Is that what you had found?
A. Is that what I found?
Q. Yes.
A. I believe that there is a vent in — in that
bathroom. I don't know whether — I don't believe that
that vent is necessarily the only — or the proper
vent.
Q. Okay. Support for pipe, what does that
mean?
A. As I was reviewing the construction in the

1
?

Q. Engineered trusses at 2 foot off center?
A. 2 foot on center. I measured the spacing of
the trusses to assure that they were, in fact, 2 foot
on center. And 1 observed such to be the case.
Q. And you found that there was 8 inches of
cellulose insulation in the attic?
A. Yes,uh-huh. I did.
Q. And that was adequate?
A. Pardon me?
Q. Was that adequate?
A. I didn't make a determination about whether
that was adequate.
Q. Okay. The next page, which would be 3-B, it
appears that you start going through the list of 30
items at this point, right?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. Maybe I can just — now we've gone from 30
to 42. Are the 12 additional items 12 additional
defects or just a different breakdown of the original
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A. Some of the additional items are related to
22 stuff that was pointed out by Mark O'Barr in his
23 supplementary electrical inspection.
24
Q. Let me just ask it this way, did you find
25 any defects that either Mark O'Barr or Jason Bullock
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home, I had a concern about whether the pipe had enough
pipe supports.
Q. Those are the little ties to keep the pipe
from rattling around?
A. And from sagging.
Q. Sagging?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you include that in your report?
A. No, I didn't I didn't - I didn't address
that as a code violation. It was merely a comment to
me about it appeared not to have enough support.
Q. So you didn't make any definite conclusions
one way or the other on that one?
A. No.
Q. The next one is -- I don't know if I can
read that. Slop five?
A. Slope.
Q. I was going to say slope, and I didn't see
the E in there. I didn't want to What does that mean?
A. Just a question about slope of the sanitary
sewer lines.
Q. Okay. Did you make any ~ you didn't render
any opinions on that?
A. No.
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originally identified?
A Yes, I did
Q, Tell me which ones those were.
A. 40--38, 39 and 40.
Q. Okay. All right. Tell me how you found
that there was insulation in the eave space.
A. By observation. I could see that the
insulation was covering the — all the way to the
underside of the sheeting — sheathing. And [ also was
able to observe that the venting in the attic was
inadequate, did not meet code. In order to meet code
my repair analysis recommended putting additional
venting in the eaves. And without removing that
insulation from the underside of the joist, it would be
ineffectual to put eave ventilation in if the air can't
get there.
Q. Right. And that's why you recommend these
baffles to keep the eave space from A. Right. So that the roof temperature stays
cold in the winter so you don't get ice dams forming.
Q. But how do you keep the eave space clear of
the insulation? Is that —
A. You put the insulation baffles in.
Q. The insulation baffles, is that what that's

for?
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FILED BY

A BRYCE DIXON, ESQ (#889)
MATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. (#7522)
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.
192 East 200 North Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 652-8000
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNIV, STATE OF UTA fi
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the
Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and CAROL
SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the Carol L
Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

MEMOl LANDUM IN SUPPORT
OR ORJ JL MOTION UNDER
RULE 5 \ FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT

Civil No: 000700142 MI
Judge: LYRE

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OT ORAL MOTION UNI ER RULE 50 FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT
Plaintiffs allege two theory? of recovery:fraudulentnondiscl >surc and breach of
contract. The two remaining allegtd defects are both subject to the fi audulent nondisclosure
claim. Only the final grading issue is subject to the breach of contxac, claim. Both theories of
recovery should be dismissed and & directed verdict granted because he Statute cf Limitations
dictates this result and because Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidei cc necessary to sustain
those claims.

L STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Finish Grading Claim
The coun has already ruled that UCA 78-12-21,5 is the statute of limitations applicable to
this case. See order dated October 1,2003 annexed hereto. Subsect on 21.5 (3) pVovides that all
claims in contract have a six year limitations period running from the earliest of either the date of
the Certificate of Occupancy or the date of possession of the improve nen~ In this case it is
admitted that the Certificate of Occupancy was granted on January 2t k 1994 and that possession
took place in November of 1993 < The Moores occupancy was May < f 1994. The complaint
was filed in August of 2000, over six years from either date. Thcrefo e the statute of limitations
bars the contract claim.
The plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not be* in to nin until discovery of
the alleged building code violation. That argument fails as a matter c F law end as a matter of
fact. Legally it fails because subsection 3 clearly Implies that the dLs< ovcry ru> does not apply to
contract or warranty claims. 2L5 (3) (a) provides for a six year perio I of limitations for actions
in contract, then 21.5(3) (b) provides; "All other actions.., shall be < ommenced from the earlier
of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a :ause of action should have
been discovered by reasonable diligence/1 The juxtaposition of these two paragraphs clearly
implies that only the non-contract claims are subject to the discovery *ule, Contract claims exist
for six years and no more. This is to allow builders some certainty ar d peace of mind that they
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will not be afflicted with stale contract claims. If Plaintiffs* argumen prevailed that would BIIOW
the Moores to sue six years after they discovered the contract claim, rhat is clearly excessive. In
fact, the legislative preamble language immediately preceding these t vo provisions explains the
legislative purpose of drawing definite limitations periods: "The iegis lature finds that (a)
exposing a [builder] to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, c: breach of duty after the
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexp< ctedly creates costs and
hardship to the [builder] and the citizens of the state,,, ,(d) the possi Dility of injury and
damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven years followin j completion [of the
building] . .;and (e) ,, it is in the best interest of the citizens of the « late to impose the periods
of limitation and repose provided in this chapter ..." Clearly the in ent of this six year statute
of limitations is that it be construed in f&vor of the builder. Thus, the discovery rule should not
apply to the six year limitations period for contract claim*.
Moreover, the contract makes it clear that the breach occurs il at all at the time of the
closing, It was a: that time that any alleged building code violations i smalned unremedied.
Therefore the statute must runfromthe date of closing. The closing ^ /as in May of 1994,
Therefore, the breach of contract claim is barred.
If there was a breach it was that there was a building code vie lation at closing, Even if
the discover)'rule applied, reasonable diligence would have required 'laintifft to inquire of the
building official whether there were any building violations, Had the' done this they would have
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discovered cither that there were none or they would have discovered some violation from which
time the statute of limitations would have begun to run. Clearly, for *lrs, Moon: to wait over sU
years to make such an inquiry is not reasonable diligence,
Therefore the statute of limitations bars her contract claim.
Alleged Defective Windows Claim
UCA 78-12-21.5 (3)(b) bars the fraudulent nondisclosure clai lib as well This two year
statute of limitations begins to run upon discovery of the alleged deft ;t or on the "date upon
which a caufle of action should have been discovered through reason; ble diligence,"
Mrs. Moore admitted that she saw the water intrusion and damage to ihe paint at the window sill
in thefirstwinter after she moved in. That is when she had notice of the claim, She admits and
Jack Peterson confinns that she called him to check out die water into aston Although he said the
windows were not defective sbe still had notice as early as 1954 and 10 later rhan 1995 or 1996
of water intrusion,
n. FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS
To prevail plaintiffs must prove that Dan and Carol Smith km w of the existence of these
two building code violations. The sole evidence of this is that Dan S nith must have known there
were building code violations since he was required, as a builder of a home, to know the
contents of the building code. Carol Smith did not build the home ' Tierc is no evidence that
she has any such requirement so she should be dismissed at the thresl hold.
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Fraud requires clear and convincing evidence. No such evide ice exists that showg that
Dan Smith knew there were material defects and that he refused to di close them. Regarding the
final grading issue, his un-rebutted evidence is that he explained to V r Moore that the final
grading had not yet been accomplished. Jack Peterson, the Budding c Eficial, haa testified that he
granted Dan Smith permission to do the final grading when the wead w cleared in the spring.
The condition of the grading when the Moot es bought the property is not a hidden thing. The
status of the din was obvious.

There is no evidence therefore that Tv r. Smith held back that

information.
Regarding the windows, there is no evidence that Dan Smith \ new there was a building
cods violation, There it no evidence that Dan Smith was cited or red tagged for any building
code violation, ho witness for the Plaintiffs has been able to say wit] any certainty what the
defect is. Theiefoie, Dan Smith cannot be found to have withheld in smutiun concerning a
defect of which Plaintiffs have no knowledge.
ITT. BRFACH OF CONTRACT
The contractual provision that applies is found in paragraph C:. This paragraph clearly
applies to either one of two types of cases. Either the building officii I has cited the home builder
for a violation or the home builder has concealed the violation from t te building official. Thett
U no such evidence, The evidence Is that the home builder could not accomplish the final
grading because it was too muddy, He intended to do the final gradir g in the spring. The
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contractual provision requires there to be BL violation. There was no v olation beoaiase Dan Smith
obtained permission from the building official to do the grading in th< spring,
IV. CONCLUSION
Plainuff* have not produced evidence sufficient for this case t > go to the jury, Therefore
und«r URCP 50 a diiected verdict should be granted
DATED this

of March, 2005

DIXON, TRUMAN & IISHER, P.C.

By;.
A. BRYC^DDgON
Attorneywr Defends ats
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St George, UT 847'0
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Case No. 000700142 MI
Judge Donald J. Eyre

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION UNDER RULE 50 FOR A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR REMITTITUR

Plaintiffs prevailed on its two theories of recovery, fraudulent nondisclosure and breach
of contract, with respect to one of 42 alleged defects. Defendants moved for a directed verdict at
the conclusion of plaintiffs' case. The court allowed the case to go to the jury without ruling on
the motion. Now the Defendants request a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under URCP

50.
Both theories of recovery are defective because the Statute of Limitations bars them. The
contract claim as a matter of law fails. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence to support the
claim on final grading.
I.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Finish Grading Claim
The court has already ruled that UCA 78-12-21.5 is the statute of limitations applicable to
this case. See order dated October 1, 2003. Subsection 21.5 (3) provides that all claims in
contract have a six year limitations period running from the earliest of either the date of the
Certificate of Occupancy or the date of possession of the improvement. In this case it is admitted
that the Certificate of Occupancy was granted on January 28, 1994 and that possession took place
in November of 1993. The Moores occupancy was May 2, 1994. The complaint was filed in
August of 2000, over six years from either date. Therefore the statute of limitations bars the

The plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery of
the alleged building code violation. That argument fails as a matter of law and as a matter of
fact. Legally it fails because subsection 3 clearly implies that the discovery rule does not apply to
contract or warranty claims. 21.5 (3) (a) provides for a six year period of limitations for actions
m contract, then 21.5(3) (b) provides: "All other actions . . . shall be commenced from the earlier
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of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have
been discovered by reasonable diligence." The juxtaposition of these two paragraphs clearly
implies that only the non-contract claims are subject to the discovery rule. Contract claims exist
for six years and no more. This is to allow builders some certainty and peace of mind that they
will not be afflicted with stale contract claims. If Plaintiffs' argument prevailed that would allow
the Moores to sue six years after they discovered the contract claim. That is clearly excessive. In
fact, the legislative preamble language immediately preceding these two provisions explains the
legislative purpose of drawing definite limitations periods: "The legislature finds that (a)
exposing a [builder] to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and
hardship to the [builder] and the citizens of the state .. . .(d) the possibility of injury and
damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven years following completion [of the
building]. . .;and (e) . . . it is in the best interest of the citizens of the state to impose the periods
of limitation and repose provided in this chapter...." Clearly the intent of this six year statute
of limitations is that it be construed in favor of the builder. Thus, the discovery rule should not
apply to the six year limitations period for contract claims.
Section 4 of 78-12-21.5 supports this statutory construction. It provides for a period of
repose after which no claim can be brought regardless of discovery. In doing so, it refers to
section 3(b) but not to section 3(a). It provides that "Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an
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action may not be commenced against a provider more than nine years after completion of the
improvement.. . ." It is significant that this statute of repose is given "notwithstanding"
subsection (3)(b) but not subsection (3)(a). If (3)(a) could be construed to enlarge the period of
limitations beyond 9 years then it would have been referred to. The language of Subsection 4
would have read: " Notwithstanding Section 3 . . ." It would not have limited its reference to
subsection (3)(b). Since the legislature did not intend Subsection (3)(a) to be subject to the
discovery rule there was no need to refer to it in the statute of repose.
Moreover, the contract makes it clear that the breach occurs if at all at the time of the
closing. It was at that time that any alleged building code violations remained unremedied.
Therefore the statute must run from the date of closing. The closing was in May of 1994.
Therefore, the breach of contract claim is barred.
If there was a breach it was that there was a building code violation at closing. Even if
the discovery rule applied, reasonable diligence would have required Plaintiffs to inquire of the

building official whether there were any building violations. Had they done this they would have
discovered either that there were none or they would have discovered some violation from which
time the statute of limitations would have begun to run. Clearly, for Mrs. Moore to wait over six
years to make such an inquiry is not reasonable diligence.
The Plaintiffs argue that this court has considered and rejected this claim previously. It
has not considered this issue in isolation. The statute of limitation issues were always considered
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in conjunction with the fraudulent nondisclosure issues. This is the first time the court has been
able to focus solely on whether the discovery rule applies to contracts without the distraction of
41 other defects and fraudulent non-disclosure claims. The Plaintiffs in effect have confused the
one simple issue that should have been the subject of this lawsuit. By throwing so much
irrelevance at the court, Plaintiffs have succeeded in obscuring the true nature of their claim for
breach of contract. Finally, with all the irrelevance blasted away, the court can see clearly to
grant judgment based on the clear meaning of the statute of limitations.
II.
FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIMS
To prevail plaintiffs must prove that Dan and Carol Smith knew of the existence of the
alleged violation of the building code. The sole evidence of this is that Dan Smith must have
known there were building code violations since he was required, as a builder of a home, to
know the contents of the building code.
Fraud requires clear and convincing evidence. No such evidence exists that shows that
Dan Smith knew there were material defects and that he refused to disclose them. Regarding the
final grading issue, his un-rebutted evidence was that he explained to Mr. Moore that the final
grading had not yet been accomplished. Jack Peterson, the Building official, has testified that he
granted Dan Smith permission to do the final grading when the weather cleared in the spring.
Thus, there is no fraud.
The condition of the grading when the Moores bought the property is not a hidden thing.
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Even if Dan Smith had not informed Mr. Moore and even if the Moores did not remove dirt, the
Moores knew when they bought the house that there was no landscaping. The height of the dirt
against the foundation was clearly visible for all to see. They could see, for example, that the
electric meter sat so high that someone needed,to stand on a box to read it. There is nothing
hidden or latent about this issue. There is no evidence therefore that Mr. Smith held back that
information.
III.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The contractual provision that applies is found in paragraph C:. This paragraph clearly
applies to either one of two types of cases. Either the building official has cited the home builder
for a violation or the home builder has concealed the violation from the building official. There
is no such evidence. The evidence is that the home builder could not accomplish the final
grading because it was too muddy. He intended to do the final grading in the spring. The
contractual provision requires there to be a violation. There was no violation because Dan Smith
obtained permission from the building official to do the grading in the spring.
Under URCP 50 a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted.
REDUCTION OF DAMAGES
Utah law on reduction of excessive damage awards by juries is as follows: "Juries are
permitted wide discretion in awarding damages, and courts must accord considerable deference
to the jury's determination. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083
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(Utah 1985), Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993). Thus, a jury1s award of damages should not be disturbed "unless (1) the jury
disregarded competent evidence, (2) the award is so excessive beyond rational justification as to
indicate the effect of improper factors in the determination, and (3) the award was rendered under
a misunderstanding." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corporation dba Firemaster, 883 P.2d 295,
300, quoting Brown, 840 P.2d at 153.
Disregard of competent evidence- The evidence was undisputed that there is no damage
to the structure of the house from the alleged violation of the building code. The only testimony
on damage was that of Steenblik who claimed that it would cost $30,680 to repair the defect.
First, this is excessive because it would give the Moores numerous landscaping and home
features that they did not pay for. For example, Steenblik's plan included large retaining walls
both in front and back, $13,000 worth of sod in front and back, and rain gutters . The Moores
bought the house "as is" without any such features.

The jury must have disregarded the

evidence that the home had no landscaping to begin with and that the house was bought "as is."
The award is excessive beyond rational justification. The total cost of the house was
$83,000. $30,860 is 37 % of the total cost of the house. That is clearly excessive. Mary Moore
received one bid to put dirt up to the 30 inch frost line that covered everything for $7,000. See
the second page of the exhibit where the price of $7,000 is quoted to take care of item "#27 & 28
Footing and Grading," Item 27 isthe same item and item number that the final grading issue has
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been identified by throughout this litigation. Defendants are willing to pay twice $7,000 or
$14,000, to satisfy this judgment. That is twice as much as can be sustained by any reasonable
interpretation of the evidence. The court should reduce the damages and allow this case to be
disposed of properly.
The award was rendered under a misunderstanding. The jury must have
misunderstood the nature of damages because damages cannot be used to place the Plaintiffs in a
position better than what they would have been had there been no breach. As shown above, this
damage award does that very thing.
CONCLUSION
The statute of limitations in a contract claim cannot be tolled by the discovery rule. There
is no clear and convincing evidence to support fraud. The Defendants are willing to accept a
reduction of damages to $14,000. That is twice the true worth of the claim.
DATED this 12J

day of March, 2005.

DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.

By:
BRYC^DKON
Attorney for Defendants
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St. George, UT 84770
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FAX
I hereby certify that I am an employee of DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER and that on
March 22, 2005,1 placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing in the United States mails at St.
George, Utah, with 1st class postage prepaid and addressed as follows and also faxed this
document to:
Gregory B. Hadley
James K. Haslam
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo,UT 84604

An Employee of Dixon, Truman & Fisher, a P.C.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
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vs.
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the
Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and CAROL
SMITH, individually and as Trustee of the Carol L.
Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
U.R.Civ.P. RULE 60(b)
Hearing Requested
Case No.: 000700142 MI
Judge Donald J. Eyre

COMES NOW Patrick J. Ascione, of the law firm Ascione, Heideman & McKay, L.L.C,
substitute counsel for Defendants and does hereby file its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment in Accordance with U.R.C.P 60(b).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of clarity and convenience Defendants set forth the following procedural history
regarding this Court's rulings on the various summary judgment motions that have been filed in this

IS31

1.

Defendants filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment on February 26, 2001 in

which they argued that: (1) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations;
(2) Plaintiffs' claim of rescission was barred by the statute of limitations; (3) Plaintiffs' claim for
violation of the consumer sales practices act was barred by the statute of limitations; (4) Plaintiffs failed
to plead fraud and misrepresentation with sufficient particularity; (5) punitive damages should be
dismissed because all underlying claims are subject to summary judgment
2.

August 16, 2001, this Court entered a ruling on Defendants' first Motion for Summary

Judgment and held that:
a. Plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresentation in this case was precluded as a matter of
law by the merger doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 21
P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000).
b. That the claims of fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation had been
pled with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
c. That there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to claims of fraudulent
nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation that precluded summary judgment.
d. Defendants may have had a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material
defects in the home or building code violations, of which they were aware.
e. The discovery rule should be applied to toll the statute of limitations in situations where
its application was not otherwise expressly prohibited by law.
f.

The discovery rule does apply to those defects that would be considered latent and that
there were issues of fact with respect to when the defects should have reasonably been
discovered.

g. Plaintiffs elected rescission rather than monetary damages for breach of contract.
3. Defendants filed their next motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2003 arguing that: (1)
Plaintiffs' claims were barred inasmuch as the Plaintiffs failed to have the home inspected and
inasmuch as the applicable statute of limitation ran before suit was filed; (2) Plaintiffs admitted
that the majority of their claims were patent defects and should therefore be dismissed.
4. On August 21, 2003, this Court held that: (1) the Defendants were only legally obligated to
disclose defects that were not discoverable by reasonable care; (2) that summary judgment was
appropriate for all admittedly patent items and that summary judgment was not appropriate for
defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39; (3) that there were disputed material facts regarding
Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation; (4) that there were disputed material facts
regarding Defendants' statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, this Court granted summary
judgment only as to the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim of fraudulent nondisclosure as to all defects
except 9, 11, 12,26, 27, 38 and 39.
5. Finally in November 2003, Defendants filed four (4) additional motions for summary judgment
as/to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract; consumer sales practice act; mutual mistake of
fact; and fraudulent misrepresentations.
6. On April 26, 2004, this Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiffs' claims under the Consumer Sales Practice Act and Fraudulent Misrepresentation, but
denied the motion as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. Furthermore, during the hearing on
the motions, Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to the dismissal of the claim for mutual mistake.
7. In addition, on April 26, 2004, this Court also denied Plaintiffs' Motion to reconsider its prior
ruling on Plaintiffs' Fraudulent Nondisclosure and Negligent Misrepresentation causes of action.

ARGUMENT
This Court should grant Defendants' Motion for relief from judgment based upon mistake of law
and in the furtherance of justice. Mistake of law by the trial court may support a motion for relief from
judgment. Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1995). Furthermore, this Court may grant relief under
the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6) governing relief from judgment for any reason other than those
specifically enumerated by rule if relief is justified and motion is made with reasonable time. Kunzler v.
O'Dell 855 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1993).
The mistake upon which Defendants seek relief from judgment is determinative and precedential
case law on the merger doctrine as applied to the prior decisions of this Court that effectively invalidates
both Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract and claim for fraudulent nondisclosure. Defendants
specifically affirmative that they do not seek to re-litigate issues that have already been raised and
argued, but instead seek to draw the Court's attention to conclusive precedent on the issue of the coeffect of the merger doctrine on Plaintiffs' claims and this Court's decision regarding the dismissal of
Plaintiffs' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation.
L

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER THE PARTIES' EARNEST MONEY
SALES AGREEMENT IS SUBSUMED AND EXTINGUISHED.
As Judge Howard noted in his summary judgment decision in this case on August 16, 2001, the

common law merger doctrine applies to this case. In particular, this Court stated that:
Pursuant to the common-law merger doctrine, execution and delivery of a deed by a
seller usually renders any prior contractual terms extinguished and unenforceable.
Although certain specific exceptions allow a party to avoid application of the merger
doctrine, a claim for negligent misrepresentation relating to alleged construction defects
in a building does not fall within any such exception. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for
negligent misrepresentation in this case is precluded as a matter of law by the merger
doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv. Inc., 2000 UT App 200, 21
P.3d219.

[Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 16, 2001]. Robinson v. Tripco, as well as
numerous other cases establishes that the merger doctrine applies in Utah. Although the merger doctrine
has been described as "'an admittedly harsh rule of law' it applies in Utah because it 'preserves the
integrity of the final document of conveyance and encourages the diligence of the parties."5 Robinson v.
Tnpco, 21 P.3d at 223 (citing Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah App. 1996).
The doctrine of merger . ..is applicable when the acts to be performed by the seller in a
contract relate only to the delivery of title to the buyer. Execution and delivery of a deed
by the seller then usually constitute full performance on his part, and acceptance of the
deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of that performance even though the estate
conveyed may differ from that promised in the antecedent agreement. Therefore, in such
a case, the deed is the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are
extinguished and unenforceable.
Furthermore, "the merger doctrine extinguishes the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and makes
preeminent the warranty deed." Shafir v. Harrigan. 879 P2d 1384, 1392 (Utah App. 1994).
The facts of Shafir are very similar to the facts of this case in that both cases involved the
interpretation of Section "C" of a standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement. In particular, the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement in Shafir contained a general provision entitled "Seller Warranties" wherein the
Seller warranted that "Seller had received no claim or notice of any building or zoning violation
concerning the property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing." IcL Likewise, in this
case section (C) of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement provides that "Seller had received no
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not or will not be
remedied prior to closing."
In Shafir, the Court specifically found that the warranty deed did not include a warranty of notice
of building code violations, and therefore, the merger doctrine precluded the argument that the sellers

had breached a warranty contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement Id. Thus, under the merger
doctrine, Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants breached section C of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement would be precluded as a matter of law.
II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO MEET THE FRAUD
EXCEPTION TO THE MERGER DOCTRINE.
As recognized by this Court in its summary judgment decision, there are several discrete

exceptions to the merger doctrine including "fraud in the transaction". See Maynard, 912 P.2d at 450.
However, the fraud exception only "applies when the party seeking to avoid merger can prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the other party committed fraud in the real estate transaction" Id In order
to prevail under the fraud exception, "all the elements of fraud must be established." Secor v. Knight
716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986). The elements of fraud in Utah are:
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that
he or she had insufficient knowledge on which to base such representation; (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby
induced to act; (9) to his [or her] injury and damage.
Maynard, 912 P.2d at 450 (emphasis added)(quoting Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah
1980)). Thus, in order for Plaintiffs to prove that the fraud exception to the merger doctrine should
apply, they must necessarily provide clear and convincing evidence that any omissions by Defendants
were (1) material; (2) withheld knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing the Plaintiffs to act
(3) that Defendants had a duty to disclose the material fact; and (4) that Plaintiffs acted reasonably and
did in fact rely upon the concealment of the fact.
On April 26, 2004, this Court determined as a matter of law that Plaintiffs had failed to establish
a core element of fraud: willful or reckless intent to mislead the Plaintiffs. Upon motion by Defendants

for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, this Court identified three
alleged misrepresentations by the Defendants:
(1) the earnest money sales agreement constituted a representation "that they [the Smiths]
had no knowledge or notice of any building or zoning violations concerning the property
that would not be remedied before closing;" (2) the Smiths made an implied fraudulent
misrepresentation that there were no building code violations by providing the Plaintiffs a
copy of the Certificate of Occupancy; (3) the Smiths impliedly misrepresented that the
home was compliant with the building code by Dan smith having said (a) that he was a
contractor; (b) by the Smiths living in the home, and (c) by the Smiths remaining silent
regarding any possible building code violations.
[Memorandum Decision dated April 26, 2004, pg. 4 (emphasis added)]. Thus, this Court identified not
only the alleged misstatements or misrepresentations made by the Defendants but also the alleged
omissions of the Defendants. This Court then went on to specifically find that;
Defendants alleged misrepresentations by Plaintiffs do not meet the requirement that
these representations were made recklessly for the purpose of inducing the other party to
act upon it. There is not legally sufficient evidence before the Court [that] the
Defendants acted willfully or recklessly to mislead the Plaintiffs. IcL
Thus, this Court has already determined as a matter of law that Defendants did not have the requisite
scienter for fraud.
Because this Court has expressly determined that Plaintiffs could not establish willful or reckless
intent to defraud, the fraud exception to the merger doctrine fails and the merger doctrine necessarily
acts to merge and subsume the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Thus, Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim fails as a matter of law.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS OF FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE ALSO FAIL AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
If there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendants acted, willfully or

recklessly to mislead the Plaintiffs, it necessarily follows that there is insufficient evidence to support a

finding that Defendants acted willfully or recklessly in failing to disclose information. The
misrepresentations identified in Plaintiffs' fraudulent misrepresentation claim, which were expressly
dismissed by this Court for lack of legally sufficient evidence, are the same representations/omissions
upon which Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim was based; namely, that the Defendants are liable
for remaining silent about building code violations.
The elements of fraudulent nondisclosure claim include proof that: (1) the nondisclosed
information is material; (2) that the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose,
and (3) that there is a legal duty to communicate. Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah
2001). However, it is clear that fraudulent nondisclosure is a claim of fraud by "suppression of the
truth", Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1963), and requires all of the same elements of fraud
including willful or reckless intent to induce the Plaintiffs to act. In light of the fact that this Court
determined that there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendants acted with willful or
reckless intent, Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claims also fail as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant Defendants
Motion under Rule 60(b) for Relief from Judgment.
DATED AND SIGNED this

//

day of April, 2005
ASCIONJE; HECDEMAN

& M C K A Y , L,L.C.

A
PATRICK J. A;
"Attorney for Defendants
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Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance
CITY OF FILLMORE

Name of Owner:.

Dan Smith

Building Permit No.:

1143

Address of Owner:

155 W 300 S

Telephone No.:

743-5170

Property described as:.

Zone:
Legal description

Otherwise known as:
Street address
Architect/Engineer:
Contractor: _
J

//rtM,

Occupancy Group:.

rjfatf'K.

No. of buiidings on lot

New

Altered

W

.Building No.

JMo. of Units

T Y P E OF OCCUPANCY

V

_ F A M I L Y OCCUPANCY
Number of families approved to reside per building
Number of boarders or roomers with automobiles approved to reside on premises with a family
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces
_ BACHING SINGLES OCCUPANCY
Number of baching singles approved to reside per unit
Number of legal-sized off-street parking spaces. The number of occupants owning or operating
vehicles cannot exceed this number.

I declare under penalty of perjury that I am the owner or authorized agent of the property subject of this request, that the foregoing statements and answers are true and correct, and that the stated conditions will be maintained on the premises-

Signature

Date

Any change in intensity of use on the building or premises, or an increase of more than five percent (5%) in the number of occupants in an apartment or multiple residential building will require the issuance of a new certificate.

Date

W_^

Date

^; m

f-

rfff

Remarks:

Section 4-4 Zoning Ordinance No. 77-3 Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance. It shall be unlawful
to use or occupy or to permit the use or occupancy of any building or premises until a Certificate of
occupancy and zoning compliance shall have been Issued for the premises and/or building by Fillmore City.
Failure to comply with any section of this ordinance is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fin* of not
more then $1000 or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both as is set forth in Chapter I
Sec. il-lOO*

ADDENDUM 7

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

ORM 123 GEM Printing Co S L C . Utah
Legend

Yes(X)

No(O)

J-<r1L\u-a&*4
%

DATE

/$.

he undersigned Buyer

/ ? 9¥

_ hereby deposits W4*h-Druhc.» ag^

_ „RNEST MON^Y, the amount of
EARNEST

. ^ rtlJ/V <^^f} ^^i. » / i ^

7

^

*

1/

Received by.

rJ**

. Dollars ($ t~foOn.

Ky //Q-Q

^0

*

he form of ?
JfaLsk..
cU shall be deposited in accordance with applicaole State Law
Phone Number

>kerage

J- ^/TJ

OFFER TO PURCHASE
. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST^MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the jproperty situated at I£>5

in the City of

Jr^JLyr^^UL^

*^*

County of

1OQ5*
. Utah

>ject to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations
utilto_or otner
other easements
easements or
or rights
rights of
of way
way government
government patents
is utiiyv_or
patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
ordance with Section G Said property is owned by
as sellers and is more particularly described
K.Ja,}\
^HECK APPLICABLE BOXES
O UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

O Vacant Lot

0 Vacant Acreage

BllMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

( 3 Commercial

El Residential

0 Other

Q Condo

0 Other

(a) Included items Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property
CThe following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title

$JsJ^sn&

i) Excluded items The following items are specifically excluded from this sale.

(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS

¥

[Unconnected

G well

E J septic tank

0 connected

[yjirrigation water / secondary system

Q p u b l i c water
0

private water

O connected

# of shares

_J connected

Q other

t 1/

0 JM antenna

0 connected

JLU,

- f ^ zJit^jiA.i'tuiu^

• * / w

Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price

E_Tpublic sewer

@ other sanitary sysjem

fuy2~r^

'7____£____

0 master antenna

szr natural gas

E_f electricity
Q

O prewired

(_T dedicated road

_ T paved

Q curb and gutter

Qconnected

other rights

"i~

o

(d) Survey A certified survey £j shall be furnished at the expense of

__ connected

ingress & egress by private easement

prior to closing _ ! shall not be furnished

(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical
condition, except

_ PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The total purchase price for the property is
2£_
4

" C.Ofcc\o
/ nhto* 00
'<_>

)f 3

\JJ\hjjt^
\J/jL**t
oz>o* °a

U-^ n-<i
_) which shall be paid as follows

which represents the aforedescrtbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,
which obligation bears interest at _
which include

O

Yj^fUy

Dollars ($.

D principal,

G

_ % per annum with monthty payments of $

D interest,

D taxes,

•

insurance,

__J

Q condo fees,

D other

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
which include

Q principal,

D interest,

D taxes,

% per annum with monthly payments of $
Q insurance,

D condo fees.

O other

representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows

O

Other .

$3*.ooo'

oo\

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

II Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts
assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
make application within

/ y / /j

"i interest rate not to exceed

,

'A/ j n~

days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at
% If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within

/y f A

days after Seller's acceptance

this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon wnttennotice Seller agrees to pay up ft/ /[/ / /f
Dints, not to exceed $

nf y

y-

_np two of a four Daae form

fi

In addition, seller agrees to pay $

\<kMJL&M
Seller's Initials^

A /

Date _ _ _ _ _ _

ft

/ i_

mortgage loan discount

to be used for Buyer's other loan costs

Buyer's Initials (

)C

1

Date.

EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Legend

Yes (X)

No (O)

This Is a legally binding contract Read the entire document carefully before signing.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heattng,
onditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, wirv
and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, walMo-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit;), fencing, trees and shrubs.
. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
ny representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom
5 production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspt
I inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
rill not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
wrought current on or before dosing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound .or in
sfactory working condition at closing.
. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
tinued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller
no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
. ACCELERATION CLAUSE- Not less than frve (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
ds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
iimterest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
irove the sale. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case,
samest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are*?*" "rth
Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void.
L TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
i preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing. Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title,
ireafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreent at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
1. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided lor in said standard form, and
encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
ill, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any
icellation charge.
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing'
opy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior
losing. Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objections) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void.
I. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing (eases shall be made, nor new leases
ered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.

3 lAsNUIIIVJN A M U l / U l l ( C I f\r%\^u. v#r

111 v.t-|

>

late contract Transfer of Seller's ownership interesi^nalTbe made as set forth in Section S Seller agrees to furrwsn good and marketable title to the property, subject
encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by {ft a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price t j an abstract of title brought current,
h an attorney s opinion (See Section H)
4 INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to dosing. Buyer shall take title
bject to any existing restrictive covenants including condominium restrictions (CC & R s) Buyer f j has f j . has not reviewed any condominium CC & R s prior to signing this Agreement
5 VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows
<Z. <J£rXA_-i CJJ*- J
<T^f Z4_4-<l£^ J
6 SELLERS WARRANTIES In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted
"""^-f * ^ <

__

J

_Zi_

cceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following .

7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS ANO CONTINGENCIES This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied
lor to closing

.

.

& CLOSING OF SALE This Agreement shall be dosed on or before

* f \ftA^1

^

19

S4L* a reasonable location to be designated by

alter, subject to Section Q Upon demand Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
is Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R shall .be "made as of
9 POSSESSION- Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on _

0 date of possession G f date of closing Q other

r * *r? / &tj / *t 7 y -

swgning of this Agreement the listing :&gent
Jagent
10 AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the
tiresigning

represents ( ) Seller (

id the selling agent.

l disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her (

unless extended by written agreement of parties

*J
A /

)(

/ //V
V

represents (

) Seller ( ) Buyer

)ytJuyer
)£uy Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement

) Buyer s initials (

)(

) Seller's initials

,^ GENERAL PROVISIONS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
CCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THJS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE
12 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller shall
i
___.,
tr. >rJT.theiuHARNESTT
ave until ____2____1_-(AM/PI
19
to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse an I the Agent shal^teturn
I0NEY to ttfe Buyer/

m-

p*J_J?c£

< .' > ' f t/-/ r V ^* t :
—7

_^*

*-xr*

3uyer's Signature)

a_i. uyer's Signature)

A-

?*?-

n^

(Date)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

(Date) '

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX IDJ

"t

>IECK ONE
GJ^CCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above
E? REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's initials)

£5 COUNTER OFFER Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until
specified below

(AM/PM)

19

to accept the terms

)

Seller'ssignature)
Signature)

(t}4le)

[Seller's Signature)

(Date/

-r

'
f

fTime)
(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

JOO-

JL£Lf n$*<

CHECK ONE

(SSN/TAX ID)

D ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
D REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER

(Buyer's Initials)

D COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum

(Buyer s Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEtPT
State ^aw requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement beanng all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed)
A _f \ acknowledge receipt j)f a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures
SIGNATURE OF SELLER

SIGNATURE OF BU>YER
7
-J

1'i

/ •

'/

.
Date

r-t)ate

'"

B D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures to be mailed on_
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller D Buyer Sent by

Dale

-.19-

-by

AUTHORITY OF SIGN ATORS If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants
or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller
C<$flHIi!ffE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any
all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree
it This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties
COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement
expressly modified or excluded therein
DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
> institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
ontingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
er. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
jding a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by apible law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an inleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the pnncioal broker to draw from the
lest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
fiterpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement
RISK OF LOSS Al! risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fi-e, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts o* God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
6) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property
' to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair
iplace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport s;
flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter,
is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
rered by all parties to the transaction
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (V2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing
insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, tf acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
ssumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
osmg
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex
ed herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
aining Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
te contract therein
NOTICE Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
ie evenl with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to whicli the notice was to be given
jtomatically terminated and this Agreement is m full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the
er or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice
BROKERAGE, For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office
! DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term. ' days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

iE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM

ADDENDUM 8

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
Millard County, State of Utaf

Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
James K. Haslam (6887)
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200
Provo Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801)377-4411

\

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER

vs
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos
Trust,

Civil No. 000700142 Ml
Judge Fred Howard

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court for decision
pursuant to a Notice to Submit for Decision filed by the Defendants, and a hearing was
held before the Court on May 31, 2001, concerning this motion and Plaintiffs'
Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Appearing at the hearing were
James K. Haslam, of Hadley & Associates, on behalf of Plaintiffs, and A. Bryce Dixon,
of Dixon & Truman, on behalf of Defendants. The Court, having reviewed the motions
and all memoranda, objections, and other materials filed in support and in opposition

thereto, and having heard oral arguments from the parties on the motions, and for good
cause shown, hereby makes the following findings, conclusions, and rulings:
Pursuant to the common-law merger doctrine, execution and delivery of a deed
by a seller usually renders any prior contractual terms extinguished and unenforceable.
Although certain specific exceptions allow a party to avoid application of the merger
doctrine, a claim for negligent misrepresentation relating to alleged construction defects
in a building does not fall within any such exception. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim for
negligent misrepresentation in this case is precluded as a matter of law by the merger
doctrine as set forth in the case of Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, 21
P.3d219.
With respect to Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent
misrepresentation, the Court concludes that those causes of action, though not pleaded
with great detail, have been pleaded in the Complaint with sufficient particularity by
Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In any
event, the Court would grant Plaintiffs' motion to amend the Complaint to plead these
causes of action with greater detail if Plaintiffs desired to do so. Moreover, the Court
concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to these claims
that precludes the granting of summary judgment. Finally, the Court further concludes
that Defendants, as the sellers of the home in question, may have had a legal duty to

2

disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material defects in the home, or building code
violations, of which they were aware.
With respect to the remaining claims, the Court believes that the discovery rule
should be applied to toll the statute of limitations, even as to contract-based claims, in
situations where its application is not otherwise expressly prohibited by law.
Accordingly, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the discovery rule does apply
in this case with respect to those defects that would be considered latent, and that there
remain issues of fact with respect to when those defects should have reasonably been
discovered. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs1
claims for breach of contract, rescission, and violations of the Consumer Sales
Practices Act.
The Court will consider, at the close of all discovery, a motion for summary
judgment by Defendants, based on their limitations defense.
Finally, over Plaintiffs' objection, the Court required Plaintiffs to make an election
of remedies at the hearing between their contract-based claims asserting both a right to
contractual damages and a right to rescission of the transaction. Plaintiffs elected to
pursue the remedy of rescission.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' claim

of negligent misrepresentation, and that claim is hereby dismissed;

3

2.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied as to all other claims;

3.

Plaintiffs may not seek monetary damages for breach of contract, but may

pursue the remedy of rescission; and
4.

No further motions for summary judgment will be considered by the Court

until after the close of discovery.
DATED this / ^

day of / $ ^ ^ T

, 2001.
BY THE COURT:
r^M-IF/ty^

4

ADDENDUM 9

A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ (#889)
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ (#8992)
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.
192 East 200 North, Suite 203
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435)652-8000
Facsimile: (435)652-9000
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
;
Plaintiffs, \I ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
1 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
vs.

) Civil No.: 000700142 MI
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee of ]I Judge: EYRE
the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, and
]
CAROL SMITH, individually and as Trustee ;
of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
]
Defendants. ]
ORDER ON DEFEND ANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants' motion for summary judgment came before the court on July 21, 2003.
Plaintiffs were represented by Gregory Hadley and defendants by Bryce Dixon. The court heard
the arguments of counsel, read the briefs, took the matter under advisement and issued a
"Memorandum Decision" dated August 21, 2003. Based on that decision the following is
ordered adjudged and decreed:
1.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part in
accordance with the following.

2.

Plaintiffs admitted that all defects except defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39 were
patent and not latent defects and could have been discovered by a home inspection.
(Court's decision at page 5.) In addition, the court determines that defect items 12 and 38

o& z*\

are patent defects. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted regarding
plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claims as to all defects except 9, 11, 26, 27 and 39.
3.

This construction defect case is governed by Utah Code Section 78-12-21.5 of which
subsection (3)(a) provides that an action by or against a provider based in contract or
warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of completion of the
improvement. (Decision at page 6.) Subsection (3)(b) provides that all other causes of
action against a provider shall be commenced within two years of the discovery of a cause
of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through
reasonable diligence. In accordance with UCA 78-12-21.5 (3)(b) the discovery rule
applies in this case. Plaintiffs have created material issues of fact as to when such defects
were first discovered and therefore summary judgment as to such defects is denied.

4.

Defendants did not address the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation in their motion for
summary judgment. The defendants did however mention that Maack v. Resource
Design & Construction, Inc. 875 P. wd 570 (Uta App. 1994) disposed of a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim. However, Maack decided that issue on whether there was a
presently existing material fact. There was none in Maack but there are such issues in the
instant case. Therefore, plaintiffs fraudulent misrepresentation claims survive summary
judgment.

/

DATED this 29th day of ^ttgtrstf 2003.
BY\THE COURT

Honorable Judge Donald Ewe, J a ^ 7
District Court Judge
\

NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEYS
TO.

Gregory B.Hadley
James K. Haslam
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo,UT 84604

You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Plaintiffs, will submit the
above and foregoing ORDER ON September 11, 2003, HEARING to the Honorable Donald
Eyre, Jr., for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice.
DATED this 29th day of August, 2003.
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C.

(

•A * / / /
7

L^lBRYiCE
V^ 7/> DTON,
/ / J?
A.
ESQ.
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 2003,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first class postage prepaid
and addressed as follows:
Gregory B. Hadley
James K. Haslam
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo, UT 84604

jt>lA>-^
An Employee of Di^ph, Truman & Fisher, P.C.

ADDENDUM 10

F.vs:*,Tnc.;-=:<cTc:usf-M:U/.ao

20G5KAR1O

ftMIO-19

FIUOO"-^-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUBICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE 5F UTAH

SPECliL VERDICT

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee ot die
Dan Irvin Smidi Inter Vivos Trust, and
CAROL SMITH, Individually and as Trustee of
die Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
Defendants.

Civil #(00700142 Ml
Judge E onald J. Eyre

MEMBERS OF THE JURY;
Please answer the following questions considering all tfc s evidence:
1.

a) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidei ce that Dan and Carol
Smith breached their conn-act with William and: 4ary Moore?
Yes g>

No O

b) If yes, what, if any, compensatory damages di 1 the Plaintiff suffer as a
result thereof?

S ZDjbf&XD

c) If you answered "yes" to l a above, do you flat. chat the statute of
limitations barred or prohibited the Plaintiff s breach of contra -t claim?
Yes 0

No /3_

2. a) Do you find by dear and convincing evidence th* t the Deiendant, Dan
Smith, fraudulently failed to disclose the material deieccinvoking the footings to the

Plaintiffs at or about the time of the sale of the house?
Yes f5

No 0

b) If yes, what, if any, compensatory damage? di« 1 the Plaindf? suffer as a
lesuli thereof:

S ^P , laGO.cD

c) If you answered "yes" to 2a above, do you fine that the statute of
limitations barred or prohibited the Plaintiffs fraudulent non-c isdosure claim to the
footings?
Yes 0
3.

No

6

a) Do you find by clear and convincing evidence tl at the Defendant, Dan

Smith, fraudulently failed to disclose the material defect invofc ing the windows to the
plaintiffs at or about the time of the sale of the house?
Yes _ C L

NO

8

b) If yes, what, if any, compensatory damages dii the Plaintiff suffer as a
resulr thereof;

$

^

£/*

c) If you answered ,,yes" to 3a above, do youfln<.that the statute of
limitations barred or prohibited tht Plaintiffs fraudulent non-disclosure claim as to the
windows?
Yes
DATED this °\

No

day of March, 2005.

JURY FOREPERSON

^Jfc 1 0

\J

20O5HARIO AMIOi 2 1
SUPPLEMENTAL VERDICT FORM

4a Since you found the defendant liable for fraudulent noud 9closure, should punitive
damage* be assessed against the defendant, Dan Smith'?
v

Yes

NJ

b. If yes, in what amount?

Dated this

Q_ day of March, 2005.

Q&r^

h 6

*
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GrejjwryB.Hadley (3(552)
Counsel for Plaintiff
2696 North University Avenue, #260
Piovo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (SOI) 377-4403
Facsimile-(801) 377.4411

JL

IN THE FOl RTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF M LLARD COt'NTY
STATE OF UTAH
— — — • —

.

-

I

WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,

JUDGMENT
Civil No, OOO700H2MT

Plaintiffs,

Judge Donald J. E/re
D \ N SMITH, individually and as Trustee
of the Daji Irvine Smith Inter Vivos Trust,
MI d CAROL SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos
TJUSL,

Defendants.

'

**mm*mwm~

THIS ACTION came on for Trial before the Court and a Jury, Honorable Dona]d J. Eyre
District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and tl c Jury having duly rendered
its verdict, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
I.

That Plaintiff recover from Defendants, jointly and se /crly, S £D.y.b 10.. 5 •

\Mth interest ai the statutory rate.
DATFD this

tc^

day of March 2005.
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Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
Counsel for Plaintiff
2696 North University Avenue, #260
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS
MOTION UNDER RULE 50 FOR A
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR
REMITTITUR

DAN SMITH, etal.,

Civil No. 00700142 MI

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

Judge Donald J. Eyre

THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion Under Rule 50 foi a
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for Remittitur. The Court having reviewed
the various memorandum on file and having heard oral argument on the Motion on June 6, 2005 stated
it's ruling from the bench. There now being no just reason for delay and for good cause appearing the
Court does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as follows:
L Defendant's Motion Under Rule 50 for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the
Alternative for Remittitur is denied.

DATED this (£_ day of ftme2005.

By the Court:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand-carried, a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this 2--T
of June 2005 to the following:
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & McKAY, LLC
2696 N University Avenue, Suite 180
PO Box 600
Provo, UT 84604

£*.

CERTIFICATE
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT,
:
&fi^s£&
\
STATE OF UTAH
~ip^mmil\
COUNTY OF MILLARD
l i ^ S f r l N o r m a Brunson, Clerk of the above named
^ ; > ^ - ^ / Court, certify that the foregoing is a full, true=and
^£^o^i>{
correct copy of the original as .led and now of
>,>'^Z3Z3*'^ record in t h i s 0f}iCe. Consistmgjf __2±=
_day
pages. Dated this
of
0\oHj
C
nQOTLCierk
Signed X t d i n "
r)~tf
Deputy Clerk
hy v \XJ>

2^a

•

"C3

2374

day
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Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
Counsel for Plaintiff
2696 North University Avenue, #260
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411
"iN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILL APT> COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,
Plaintiffs,

|
I

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT S'
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET
ASIDE JUDGMENT

v.

Civil No. 000700142 Ml

DAN SMITH, individually and as
T: -jstee of the Dan lrvin Smith later
Vivos Trust and CAROL SMITH,
individually and as Trustee of the Carol
L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,

Judge Donald J Eyre

Defendants.

TI: ;S M V r T F p came Kefore the Court pursuant to Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Sr\
Aside Judgment. The Court having reviewed the various memoranda on file and ha\ mi; hea*d
oral argument on said Motion on June 6, 2005, entered it's written Ruling denying the Motion •-.•.
July 6, 2005 with the Court directing Plaintiffs Counsel to prepare an Order consistent with siud
K ding. There now being no just reason for delay and for good cause appearing the Court JUL>
hereby ORDER, ADH rDE a..d DECREE as follows:

1.

Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment is denied

DATED this / K _ day of July 2005
BYT HE COURT

IVC^^Srds.S

JUDC^DOMii£lJ EYRE^

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/^oimsel for Defendants

ie-

CERTIFICATE
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT,
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF MILLARD
Norma Brunson, Clerk of the above named
Court, certify that the foregoing is a full, true and
correct copy of the original as filed and now of
record in this office. Consisting of
2-pages. Dated this
\?^M
day

of____JIku4_.

20££?

Signed f\ m im n 6 / U J nD&n Clerk
by V-JlX 0 f\ oAcfSt^
Deputy Clerk
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Gregory B. Hadley (3652)
Counsel for Plaintiff
2696 North University Avenue, #260
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4403
Facsimile: (801) 377-4411
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY
MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR AN ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES, EXPENSES
AND COSTS
Civil No. 000700142 MI

DAN SMITH, individually and as
Trustee of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter
Vivos Trust and CAROL SMITH,
individually and as Trustee of the Carol
L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust,

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Defendants.

THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Motion for an Order
Awarding Attorney Fees, Expenses, and Costs. The Court having reviewed the various
memoranda on file and having heard oral argument on said Motion on June 6, 2005, entered it's
written Memorandum Decision on August 1, 2005. There now being no just reason for delay
and for good cause appearing the Court does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as
follows:

1.

Attorneys fees are awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $40,000.00.

2.

Costs are awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $10,000.00.

3.

The Judgment previously entered in the amount of $30,680.00 is augmented in the

amount of $50,000.00 for a total Judgment in the amount of $80,680.

DATED this2^" day of August 2005.
BY (THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

.ounsel for De

2
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U.C.A. 1953 § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I I . Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY

Copyright © 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 1981,
1982, 1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright © 1986-1994 by The Michie
Company. All rights reserved.
7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 Actions related to improvements in real property.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions,
or breach of duty that causes injury to persons or property, whether based in tort, contract, warranty,
strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other source of law;
(b) "completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to real
property as established by a Certificate of Substantial Completion, a Certificate of Occupancy issued
by a governing agency, or the date of first use or possession of the improvement, whichever is
earliest;
(c) "improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar manmade change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property;
(d) "person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, proprietorship,
or any other legal or governmental entity; and
(e) "provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans,
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, topographic surveys,
staking, construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision,
inspections, and tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected as to claims for
breach of contract or warranty six years following completion of the improvement or the
abandonment of construction and, as to all other claims, ten years following completion or
abandonment;
(e) it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to impose the periods of repose provided in
this chapter; and
(f) it is in the best interests of the citizens of this state to impose a period of limitation requiring that
an action against a provider be brought within a two-year period following discovery of the act, error,
omission, or breach of duty that forms the basis of the action.
(3) An action against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the date of discovery of
the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the date upon which the act, error, omission, or breach
of duty should have been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the act, error, omission, or
breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before completion of the improvement or abandonment
of construction, the two year period begins to run upon completion or abandonment.
(4) Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may be commenced
against a provider more than six years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction. In the event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the sixth year of
the six year period, the injured person has two additional years from the date of discovery to
commence an action.
(5) Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), no action may be commenced against a provider more than
12 years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the act,
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error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the twelfth year of the 12-year period, the injured
person shall have two additional years from the date of discovery to commence an action.
(6) Subsections (4) and (5) do not apply to an action against a provider:
(a) who has fraudulently concealed the act, error, omission, or breach of duty;
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or
(c) for breach of a written express warranty where the warranty period extends beyond six years as
provided in Subsection (4).
(7) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods
prescribed by Subsections (4) and (5) solely because that person was a minor or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the
disability is removed to commence the action.
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is
brought.
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a
valid and enforceable contract.
(10) This section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue after April 29, 1991,
notwithstanding that the act, error, omission, or breach of duty occurred, or the improvement was
completed or abandoned before April 29, 1991.
History: C. 1953, 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 , enacted by L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 7 8 - 1 2 - 25.5, as last
amended by Laws 1988, ch. 6 1 , § 1, relating to th e seven-year limitation on actions for injuries due
to defective improvements to real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts the present section.
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78-15- 3.
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Discovery doctrine.
Statute of repose.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of construction, or
to their successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing duty to make repairs,
and should discover any fault in construction within seven years; claim that the statute is
unconstitutional is without merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974).
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, §
11) because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy is arbitrary and
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah

1989).
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury was
caused by a latent defect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the
Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah

1989).
Discovery doctrine.
The discovery doctrine was inapposite in an action for injuries sustained when plaintiffs struck a pole

on a city-constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent, and there was no injury
inflicted that was unknown at the time of its infliction. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah
1987).
Statute of repose.
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it barred all
actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries
occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions based on injuries
occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that period. Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cutshaw, 784
P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am.Jur.2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction Contracts § 114.
A.L.R. -- What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper
performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914.
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 A.L.R.4th.

972.
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property
caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438.
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions 0^55(3).
U.C.A. 1953 § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5
UT ST § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5
END OF DOCUMENT
(C) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to O n g . U.S. Govt. Works.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I I . Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 2. OTHER THAN REAL PROPERTY
Copyright © 1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 Actions related to improvements in real property.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions,
or breach of duty that causes injury to persons or property, whether based in tort, contract, warranty,
strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other source of law.
(b) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to real
property as established by the earliest of:
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion;
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency;
(iii) the date of first use or possession of the improvement; or
(iv) the date the map of the survey is filed under Section 17-23-17 with respect to real property.
(c) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar manmade change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property.
(d) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, proprietorship,
or any other legal or governmental entity.
(e) "Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans,
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, surveys, staking,
construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision, inspections, and
tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected as to claims for
breach of contract or warranty six years following completion of the improvement or the
abandonment of construction and, as to all other claims, ten years following completion or
abandonment;
(e) it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to impose the periods of repose provided in
this chapter; and
(f) it is in the best interests of the citizens of this state to impose a period of limitation requiring that
an action against a provider be brought within a five-year period following discovery of the act, error,
omission, or breach of duty that forms the basis of the action.
(3) (a) An action against a provider shall be commenced within five years from the date of discovery
of the act, error, omission, or breach of duty or the date upon which the act, error, omission, or
breach of duty should have been discovered through reasonable diligence.
(b) If the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered or discoverable before completion of
the improvement or abandonment of construction, the five-year period begins to run upon completion
or abandonment.
(4) Subject to Subsection (3), no action for breach of contract or warranty may be commenced
against a provider more than six years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction. In the event the act, error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the first through
the sixth year of the six-year period, the injured person has five additional years from the date of
discovery to commence an action.

(5) Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), no action may be commenced against a provider more than
12 years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the act,
error, omission, or breach of duty is discovered in the seventh through the twelfth year of the 12-year
period, the injured person shall have five additional years from the date of discovery to commence an
action.
(6) Subsections (4) and (5) do not apply to an action against a provider:
(a) who has fraudulently concealed the act, error, omission, or breach of duty;
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or
(c) for breach of a written express warranty where the warranty period extends beyond six years as
provided in Subsection (4).
(7) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods
prescribed by Subsections (4) and (5) solely because that person was a minor or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the
disability is removed to commence the action.
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is
brought.
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a
valid and enforceable contract.
(10) This section applies to all claims and causes of action that accrue after April 29, 1991,
notwithstanding that the act, error, omission, or breach of duty occurred, or the improvement was
completed or abandoned before April 29, 1991.
History: C. 1953, 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 , enacted by L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1 ; 1997, ch. 149, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 , as last
amended by Laws 1988, ch. 6 1 , § 1, relating to the seven-year limitation on actions for injuries due
to defective improvements to real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided Subsection ( l ) ( b ) and
added Subsection ( l ) ( b ) ( i v ) ; deleted "topographic" before "surveys" in Subsection ( l ) ( e ) ; substituted
"five-year period" for "two-year period" in Subsections (2)(f) and (3)(b), "five years" for "two years"
in Subsection (3)(a), and "five additional years" for "two additional years" in Subsections (4) and (5);
substituted "first through the sixth year" for "sixth year" in Subsection (4) and "seventh through the
twelfth year" for "twelfth year" in Subsection (5); and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78- 15-3.
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Discovery doctrine.
Statute of repose.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of construction, or
to their successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing duty to make repairs,
and should discover any fault in construction within seven years; claim that the statute is
unconstitutional is without merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974).
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, §
11) because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy

for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy is arbitrary and
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah

1989).
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury was
caused by a latent defect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the
Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah

1989).
Discovery doctrine.
The discovery doctrine was inapposite in an action for injuries sustained when plaintiffs struck a pole
on a city-constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent, and there was no injury
inflicted that was unknown at the time of its infliction. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah

1987).
Statute of repose.
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it barred all
actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries
occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions based on injuries
occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that period. Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cutshaw, 784
P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AmJur.2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction Contracts § 114.
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper
performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914.
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 A.L.R.4th

972.
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property
caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438.
U.C.A. 1953 § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5
UTST§ 78-12-25.5
END OF DOCUMENT
(C) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to O n g . U.S. Govt. Works.

ADDENDUM 17

U.C.A. 1953 § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 1 . 5
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I I . Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY
Copyright © 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a
division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights
reserved.
7 8 - 1 2 - 2 1 . 5 Actions related to improvements in real property.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has been no design or construction activity on the improvement
for a continuous period of one year.
(b) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions,
or breach of duty arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an
improvement, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or
other source of law.
(c) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to real
property as established by the earliest of:
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion;
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or
(iii) the date of first use or possession of the improvement.
(d) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar manmade change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property.
(e) "Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, joint venture,
association, proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity.
(f) "Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans,
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, surveys, staking,
construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision, inspections, and
tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected ten years following
completion or abandonment;
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to
impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or
against a provider arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an
improvement.
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within
six years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. Where an
express contract or warranty establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated
within that limitations period.
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the earlier of
the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been
discovered through reasonable diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins to run
upon completion or abandonment.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a provider more
than 12 years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the
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cause of action is discovered or discoverable in the eleventh or twelfth year of the 12-year period, the
injured person shall have two additional years from that date to commence an action.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider:
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the injury, damage,
or other loss caused by his act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty.
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods
prescribed by Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that person was a minor or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the
disability is removed to commence the action.
(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an individual while
engaged in the design, installation, or construction of an improvement.
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is
brought.
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a
valid and enforceable contract.
(10) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action.
(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 1998, notwithstanding that
the improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 1999.
History: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by L 1991, ch. 290, § 1 ; 1997, ch. 149, § 1 ; renumbered by
L 1999, ch. 123, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repeals and Reenactments. —Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals former § 78-12- 25.5, as last amended
by Laws 1988, ch. 6 1 , § 1, relating to the seven-year limitation on actions for injuries due to
defective improvements to real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. —The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided Subsection ( l ) ( b ) and
added Subsection ( l ) ( b ) ( i v ) ; deleted "topographic" before "surveys" in Subsection ( l ) ( e ) ; substituted
"five-year period" for "two-year period" in Subsections (2)(f) and (3)(b), "five years" for "two years"
in Subsection (3)(a), and "five additional years" for "two additional years" in Subsections (4) and (5);
substituted "first through the sixth year" for "sixth year" in Subsection (4) and "seventh through the
twelfth year" for "twelfth year" in Subsection (5); and made stylistic changes.
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as
78-12-25.5, and rewrote the section.
Cross-References. —Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78- 15-3.
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Applicability.
Discovery doctrine.
Express warranty.
Running of statute.
Statute of repose.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Former seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of
construction, or to his successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing duty to

make repairs, and should discover any fault in construction within seven years; claim that the statute
was unconstitutional was without merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974).
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, §
11) because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy is arbitrary and
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah

1989).
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury was
caused by a latent defect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the
Utah constitution (Utah Const, art. I, § 11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah

1989).
Given the legislative intent in enacting this section, and the remote chance of injury or damage after
a period of years, the statute is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating the stated
evils, and is constitutional under the open courts clause of the state constitution. Craftsman Bldr.'s

Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999).
Applicability.
This statute applies to products liability actions when they relate to improvements in real property.
Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999).
This section merely prescribes certain situations to which the periods of repose do not apply; it does
not purport to set up a substitute remedy. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d

1194 (Utah 1999).
Discovery doctrine.
The discovery doctrine was inapposite in an action for injuries sustained when plaintiffs struck a pole
on a city-constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent, and there was no injury
inflicted that was unknown at the time of its infliction. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah

1987).
Express warranty.
Without evidence of an express warranty period, let alone one extending beyond six years, plaintiff
was unable to satisfy this section. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194
(Utah 1999).
Running of statute.
Plaintiffs slander of title and tortious interference claims against a builder did not accrue until after
the house was sold at a foreclosure sale by the bank, when plaintiff first became able to demonstrate
special damages. Valley Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (Utah 1997).
Proviso in Subsections (4) and (5) that both are "subject to" the discovery provision of Subsection (3)
means that if an injured party discovers, or should have discovered, his cause of action before the
end of the repose periods, then the applicable time period is the discovery limitations period and not
the six-or twelve-year period of the statutes of repose. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg.

Co., 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999).
Statute of repose.
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it barred all
actions against planners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries
occurring after seven years from the date of construction, as well as actions based on injuries
occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that period. Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).
Fifteen year time between construction of building and collapse of its roof barred a cause of action
because this section acts not as a statute of limitation but as a statute of repose, for which latency of
a defect does not toll the limitation period. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d

1194 (Utah 1999).
Where a faulty electrical system in an apartment building caused a fire approximately eighteen years
after it was built, this section barred the plaintiffs' action. Olsen v. McMillen Elec, 364 Utah Adv. Rep.

51 (Utah 1999).
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Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cutshaw, 784
P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am Jur.2d. —13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction Contracts § 114.
A.L.R. —What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper
performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914.
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 A.L.R.4th

972.
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property
caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438.
U.C.A. 1953 § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 1 . 5
UT ST § 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 1 . 5
END OF DOCUMENT
(C) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-12-21.5
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I I . ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
ARTICLE 1. REAL PROPERTY
§ 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 1 . 5 . Actions related to improvements in real property

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has been no design or construction activity on the
improvement for a continuous period of one year.
(b) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, or administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions,
or breach of duty arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an
improvement, whether based in tort, contract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or
other source of law.
(c) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to
real property as established by the earliest of:
(i) a Certificate of Substantial Completion;
(ii) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency; or
(Hi) the date of first use or possession of the improvement.
(d) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar manmade change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property.
(e) "Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, joint venture,
association, proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity.
(f) "Provider" means any person contributing to, providing, or performing studies, plans,
specifications, drawings, designs, value engineering, cost or quantity estimates, surveys, staking,
construction, and the review, observation, administration, management, supervision, inspections,
and tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the
possibility of injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and
hardships to the provider and the citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and
unlimited liability risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in
defending against claims many years after completion of an improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils;
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven years
following completion or abandonment; and
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to
impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or
against a provider arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an
improvement.
(3)(a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six
years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. Where an
express contract or warranty establishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated
within that limitations period.
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the earlier
of the date of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have
been discovered through reasonable diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable
before completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, the two-year period begins
to run upon completion or abandonment.
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(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a provider more
than nine years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event
the cause of action is discovered or discoverable in the eighth or ninth year of the nine-year period,
the injured person shall have two additional years from that date to commence an action.

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider:
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the injury,
damage, or other loss caused by his act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty.
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods
prescribed by Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that person was a minor or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian, that person shall have two years from the date the
disability is removed to commence the action.

(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an individual while
engaged in the design, installation, or construction of an improvement.

(8) The time limitation imposed by this section shall not apply to any action against any person in
actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any
defective or unsafe condition of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is
brought.

(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a
valid and enforceable contract.

(10) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action.

(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 2003, notwithstanding that
the improvement was completed or abandoned before May 3, 2004.

Laws 1991, c. 290, 5 1: Laws 1997, c. 149, 6 1, eff. May 5, 1997: Laws 1999, c. 123, 5 1, eff. May 3,
1999: Laws 2004, c. 327, 5 l r eff. May 3, 2004.
Codifications C. 1953, § 78-12-25.5.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2004, c. 327, in subsec. (4) substituted "nine" for "12" throughout and substituted "eighth or
ninth" for " eleventh or twelfth"; in subsec. (11) substituted "2003" for "1998" and "2004" for "1999".

CROSS REFERENCES
Product liability, see § 78-15-3.
Survival of actions, see § 78-11-12.
Wrongful death, statute of limitations, see § 78-12-28.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Consumer Protection o^37.
Contracts o^329.
Limitation of Actions 0^10, 95(16), 95(7).
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 2 4 1 k l 0 ; 241k95(16); 241k95(7); 95k329; 92Hk37.
CJ S Architects 5 39.
C J.S. Contracts 55 608 to 609,
CJ.S. Credit Reporting Agencies; Consumer Protection §§ 98 to 99, 104, 107.
CJ.S. Limitations of Actions §5 15 to 16, 204.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Treatises and Practice Aids
American Law of Products Liability 3d PS, Primary Sources.
ALR Library
2002 A.L.R.5th 2 1 , Validity, as to Claim Alleging Design or Building Defects, of Statute Imposing Time
Limitations Upon Action Against Architect, Engineer, or Builder for Injury or Death Arising Out of
Defective or Unsafe Condition of Improvement to Real Property.
1 A.L.R. 3rd 914, What Statute of Limitations Governs Action by Contractee for Defective or Improper
Performance of Work by Private Building Contractor.
Encyclopedias
Am. Jur.2d Products Liability 5 1630, Generally.
Am. Jur.2d Products Liability 5 1632, Validity.
Treatises and Practice Aids
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:77, Introduction.
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47.79, Relationship to Other Statutes
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:80, Validity of Repose Legislation.
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:83, Parties in Possession or Control of Property.
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:84, Exclusion of Fraud Cases.
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:85, Commencement of Statutory Period Leading to
Repose.
American Law of Products Liability 3d 5 47:86, Tolling and Extension of Time Limitation Period
Express Warranty.
American Law of Products Liability 3d § 47:89, Infancy, Mental Incompetency, or Imprisonment.
Bruner and O'Connor on Construction Law 5 12:22, Duration of Performance Bond Obligation.

NOTES OF DECISIONS
Commencement of period of limitations 5
Completion of improvement 7
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Construction and application 2
Governmental entities 12
Ignorance of cause of action 14
Improvement 6
Injury to person or property 11
Landlord and tenant 13.
Limitations statute applicable 4
Provider 8
Statutory amendments 3
Subsequent purchaser rights 9
Validity 1
Warranties 10
1 . Validity
Builders statute of repose limiting period in which to bring actions for injury arising from
improvements to real property, while not providing adequate alternative remedy, sought to eliminate
clear social and economic evils of costs to construction industry of liability insurance and records
storage in reasonable and nonarbitrary manner, and thus did not violate open courts clause of State
Constitution. Const. Art 1, S 1 1 ; U C.A.1953 r 78-12-25 5. Craftsman Builder's Supply. Inc v Butler
MfQ. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d 1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18. Constitutional Law <C^ 328;
Limitation Of Actions o^> 4(2)
Remand of suit by injured golfer for new trial was required on limitations issue, given intervening
state Supreme Court ruling in another case that applicable architects and builders statute of repose
was unconstitutional. U C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5; Const. Art. 1 , 5 1 1 . Klatt v Thomas. 1990. 788 P.2d
510. Appeal And Error o ^ 1177(1)
Architects and builders statute of repose violates open court's provision of Utah's Constitution in that
it does not provide injured person with effective and reasonable alternative remedy for vindication of
his or her constitutional interest, and elimination of cause of action was arbitrary and unreasonable
means of achieving statutory objective of limiting stale claims and protecting construction industry
from perpetual liability. Const Art 1, § 1 1 ; U C.A 1953, 78-12-25.5 Horton v. Goldmmer's Daughter,
1989, 785 P.2d 1087. Constitutional Law <^ 328; Limitation Of Actions < ^ 4(2)
Architects and builders statute of repose violates open courts provision of Utah's Constitution in that it
does not provide injured person with effective and reasonable alternative remedy for vindication of his
or her constitutional interest, and elimination of cause of action was arbitrary and unreasonable
means of achieving statutory objective of limiting stale claims and protecting the construction
industry from perpetual liability. Const. Art 1, § 1 1 ; U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Sun Valley Water Beds
of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc , 1989, 782 P.2d 188. Constitutional Law o* 328; Limitation
Of Actions <** 4(2)
Statute, which provides that no action to recover for damages arising out of defective or unsafe
condition of an improvement to real property may be brought more than seven years after completion
of the construction but which contains an exemption for persons who are in actual possession and
control as owners of the improvement at the time that the defective and unsafe condition constitutes
the proximate cause of an injury, is not unconstitutional. U.C.A.1953, 78- 12-25.5. Good v.
Chnstensen, 1974. 527 P.2d 223. Limitation Of Actions o* 4(2)
2. Construction and application
In action alleging taking of plaintiffs' property by low-level overflights and concomitant noise, there
was genuine issue of material fact as to applicability of Utah seven-year statute of limitations and
whether some or all of plaintiffs' remaining properties not directly beneath approach-departure
corridor had also been taken, precluding summary judgment. U.C.A 1953, 78- 12-25.5; 42 U S.C.A.
§ 1983; U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 1986, 634 F.Supp. 100.
Federal Civil Procedure o ^ 2498.3
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Statute providing two-year limitations period for actions to recover for injury to person or property
does not apply to actions to recover for purely economic injury. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Cathco v.
Valentmer Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 1997, 944 P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation
Of Actions Q* 30
3. Statutory amendments
Validity of caselaw precedent holding that economic damages did not constitute "injury to persons or
property" for purposes of two-year limitations period to recover for such injuries was not affected by
subsequent amendments to relevant statute, where phrase "injury to persons or property" was not
altered. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Cathco v. Valentmer Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 1997, 944
P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation Of Actions <^ 30
4. Limitations statute applicable
Builders statute of repose, and not products liability statute of limitations, applies to products liability
actions which relate to improvements in real property. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-22.5, 78-15-3. Craftsman
Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d 1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18.
Limitation Of Actions <^ 30
Builders statute of repose, and not products liability statute of limitations, applied to products liability
claims asserted against manufacturer of prefabricated metal building, and contractor which installed
building, by building's owner after roof of building collapsed from weight of snow. U.C.A.1953, 78-1222.5, 78-15-3. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d 1194, 364 Utah
Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18. Limitation Of Actions <** 32(1)
Breach of contract action by real estate development company against architects to recover economic
damages in connection with remodeling project was governed by six-year limitations period applicable
to actions founded upon an instrument in writing, rather than by two-year limitations period
governing actions to recover for injury to persons or property, including those based on contract
theory. U.C A 1953, 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25 5 Cathco v Valentmer Crane Bruniies Onyon Architects,
1997, 944 P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation Of Actions <^ 24(1)
Statute providing six-year limitation period for action for liability founded upon an instrument in
writing does not conflict with statute providing two-year limitation period for action to recover for
injury to person or property, even though latter statute explicitly purports to cover actions based on
contract theory, because two-year limitation period does not apply to purely economic injuries.
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25 5 Cathco v Valentmer Crane Brunjies Onyon Architects, 1997,
944 P.2d 365, 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Limitation Of Actions <c^ 24(1); Limitation Of Actions o * 30
5. Commencement of period of limitations
Even assuming that property owner's claims against contractor that it had hired to perform
remodeling work, for contractor's alleged slander of title and tortious interference in filing mechanic's
lien on property, were subject to two-year statute of limitations on claims against provider of real
estate design or construction services for "injury to persons or property," statute of limitations did not
begin to run when contractor first filed its mechanic's lien, but only when property was sold at
reduced price, when special damages sustained by property owner could be ascertained. U.C.A.1953,
78-12- 25.5(3). Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 1997, 944 P.2d 3 6 1 , 324 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26. Limitation Of Actions <^ 55(1); Limitation Of Actions o 55(5)
Seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or unsafe improvement to real property
began to run when all construction and improvements on city's tubing hill were completed, even if
statute could be applied to city as "improver" of hill. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Jackson v Layton City,
1987, 743 P.2d 1196. Limitation Of Actions <^ 55(4)
Under statute requiring claims for damage to real property caused during construction of
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improvements to be brought within seven years of completion of construction, the limitations period
for consultant engineer's alleged negligence in supervising the construction of a water well
commenced running at the completion of construction and not at the time of discovery of negligence.
U C.A 1953, 78-12-25 5 Hooper Water Improvement Dist v Reeve, 1982, 642 P 2d 745. Limitation
Of Actions <^ 55(5); Limitation Of Actions <^ 95(10.1)
6. Improvement
Developer's activities in determining the boundaries, size, location, and placement of the Plat B lands
were not an "improvement to real property" within the meaning of statute of repose barring action
against provider more than twelve years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of
construction; the activities did not constitute a building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or
other similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property. U.C.A 1953,
78-12-25 5 ( l ) ( c , e), (5) (1998). State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Sundance Development Corp., 2003,
78 P.3d 995, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2003 UT App 367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d
1041. Limitation Of Actions <^ 30
The definition of "improvement" under the statute of repose barring action against provider more than
twelve years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction focuses upon the
activity of a provider and, therefore, contemplates more than determining the boundaries, size,
location, and placement of lands. U.C.A 1953, 78-12-25 5 ( l ) ( c , e), (5) (1998). State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Sundance Development Corp., 2003, 78 P.3d 995, 485 Utah Adv. Rep 32, 2003 UT App
367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d 1041. Limitation Of Actions o ^ 30
7. Completion of improvement
Developer's filing of plat did not result in completion of improvement and improvement within the
meaning of statute of repose barring action against provider more than twelve years after completion
of the improvement or abandonment of construction. U.C.A.1953, 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 ( l ) ( b ) ( i v ) , ( l ) ( c ) , (5)
(1998). State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Sundance Development Corp , 2003, 78 P.3d 995, 485 Utah
Adv. Rep. 32, 2003 UT App 367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d 1041. Limitation Of
Actions ps- 30
8. Provider
One cannot be a provider within the meaning of statute of repose barring action against provider
more than twelve years after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction, unless
the activity listed in the definition of a provider is performed for, or in relation to, an improvement;
thus, while surveying and staking for or in relation to an improvement may implicate the statute of
repose, surveying and staking for some other purpose does not amount to an improvement, and the
surveyor or staker will not come within the definition of provider in such situations. U.C.A.1953, 7812-25.5(l)(c, e), (5) (1998). State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sundance Development Corp., 2003, 78
P.3d 995, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2003 UT App 367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 90 P.3d
1041. Limitation Of Actions <c^ 30
9. Subsequent purchaser rights
Under statute which provided that no action to recover for damages arising out of defective and
unsafe condition of improvement of real property could be brought more than seven years after the
completion of the construction and which also provided that the limitation would not apply to any
person in actual possession and control of the improvement at the time that the defective and unsafe
condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of injury, owners who purchased
house from former owners who had had carport built on to the house could not, more than seven
years after the carport was completed, bring action against the contractor for damage incurred when
the carport fell after a heavy snowfall. U.C A 1953, 78-12-25.5. Good v Chnstensen, 1974, 527 P.2d
223. Limitation Of Actions <^ 10
10. Warranties
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Contract for construction of prefabricated metal building, which contained specifications for roof which
would support 40 pounds per square foot, did not contain express warranty extending beyond six
years, as would come within exception to builders statute of repose, where even assuming that
language constituted a warranty, no indication was given as to the period of such a warranty.
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5(6)(c). Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc v. Butler Mfg. Co , 1999, 974 P.2d
1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 r 1999 UT 18. Limitation Of Actions o ^ 47(1)
11. Injury to person or property
Property owner's claims against contractor that it had hired to perform remodeling work, for economic
losses that it sustained due to contractor's alleged breach of contract, repudiation of contract, unjust
enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in abandoning project before
remodeling had been completed, did not involve claim for "injury to persons or property," within
meaning of two-year statute of limitations on claims for "injury to persons or property" against
provider of real estate design or construction services. U.C.A.1953r 78-12-25.5(3). Valley Colour, Inc.
v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 1997, 944 P.2d 3 6 1 f 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. Limitation Of Actions <^ 21
(1); Limitation Of Actions <c^ 28(2)
12. Governmental entities
Seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or unsafe improvements to real property
did not apply to personal injury action filed against city for injuries sustained on tubing hill where city
was owner in possession of property. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Jackson v. Layton City, 1987, 743 P.2d
1196. Municipal Corporations o 857
Plaintiffs could not invoke claim that seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or
unsafe improvements to real property violated "by due course of law" provision of State Constitution
where plaintiffs had effective remedy against city as owner in possession of property that could have
been filed within four years from date of injury. U.C.A.1953, 78-12- 25(2), 78-12-25 5; Const. Art. 1,
§ 11. Jackson v. Lavton City, 1987, 743 P.2d 1196. Constitutional Law < ^ 308; Limitation Of Actions
o*4(2)
13. Landlord and tenant
Builders statute of repose, prohibiting commencement of cause of action against provider more than
12 years after completion of construction, barred tenants' negligence action against participants in
construction of apartment building for damage to personal property which resulted from fire caused
by faulty electrical system, where construction of apartment building was completed approximately 18
years prior to fire and filing of complaint. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25.5. Olsen v. McMillen Elec, 1999, 976
P.2d 606, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 1 , 1999 UT 19 Limitation Of Actions <^ 170
14. Ignorance of cause of action
While provisions of builders statute of repose, which limits period in which to bring actions for injury
arising from improvements to real property, are made subject to two-year limitations provision, this
does not make repose provisions subject to discovery rule, but rather, simply means that if an injured
party discovers, or should have discovered, his cause of action prior to running of the applicable
repose period, then period for bringing suit is the two-year limitations period, and not the repose
period. U.C.A 1953, 78-12-25.5. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999, 974 P.2d
1194, 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 1999 UT 18. Limitation Of Actions &* 95(3)
Discovery doctrine did not apply to personal injury action against city arising out of accident on city's
tubing hill where defect, if any, was patent and plaintiff was aware of collision, even if discovery rule
could be read into seven-year limitation period for injuries caused by defective or unsafe
improvements to real property. U.C.A 1953, 78-12-25.5. Jackson v. Layton City, 1987, 743 P.2d
1196. Limitation Of Actions O^ 95(4.1)
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ADDENDUM 19

INSTRUCTION NO-

7/

Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred and invalid if they did not file their suit
within the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs filed their suit on August 24, 2000.
Utah law provides that an action for construction defect based in contract or warranty
shall be commenced within six years of the date of the closing of the sale of the house.
Utah law provides that an action for fraudulent nondisclosure shall be commenced within
two years of the time that Plaintiffs discovered their a cause of action for fraudulent nondisclosure or the date upon which such cause of action should have been discovered through
reasonable diligence.
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